The sociology of a profession: the Faculty of Advocates by Wilson, Nan
THE SOCIOLOG-Y OF A PROFESSION :
THE FACULTY OF ADVOCATES
by
Nan Wilson, M.A. (Edin.)
Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the







Chapter 1 General Introduction 1
Chapter 2 Comparative Sketch of Legal Professions 12
Chapter 3 The Evolution of the Faculty of Advocates:
Its Social and Professional Setting 62
Chapter 4 The Faculty of Advocates Today 90
Part II
Chapter 5 Introduction to Analysis and Interpretation 122
Chapter 6 The Status and Role of Advocate 149
Chapter 7 The Professional life Cycle of the Advocate 173
Chapter 8 The Advocate's Role Set 191
Chapter 9 Role Preservation 226
Chapter 10 Conclusion 246
Appendix A The Scottish Courts 25&
Appendix B The Scottish Bench and Bar in 1890 2'&8





The inferences of value which a social anthropologist may draw from
a study of the Faculty of Advocates will he discussed in detail after its
history, structure, function and organisation have been described. First,
however, it seems desirable to touch on a number of general considerations
in an attempt to present the whole subject in perspective.
Riesman in his paper "Towards an Anthropological study of Law and the
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Legal Profession" has already stressed the need for serious sociological
investigation of the structure of law, the type of people it attracts, their
training and the role the law has played in shaping present day society.
He writes in particular of American law and lawyers, and, though his general
comments are relevant for a study of all Wdstern systems, it is clear that
his illustrations and examples based on observations of law and lawyers in
the United States would not necessarily be useful or accurate if applied to
other western legal systems. Within the legal profession in all such sys¬
tems the division of roles varies greatly, and this in part accounts for the
two contradictory public images of the lawyer which have persisted over the
centuries. On the one hand, a lawyer may appear as an heroic figure; on
the other he is envisaged as mean, avaricious, unscrupulous, a manipulator
of technicalities. It is perhaps significant that in Riesman*s own country
the expression "Philadelphia Lawyer", which meant originally a fearless
champion of accused who, through political pressures, might otherwise have
1. (1951) LXXVII Am. J. Soc. 121.
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been denied counsel and then cane to mean a specialist who was 'too clever
by half1, has come now to imply in effect a pettifogging attorney. It may
be suggested that through separation of roles one part of the legal pro¬
fession may command and retain public respect, while other groups such as
the "shyster" lawyer, are scapegoats for all public disapprobation of the
law's failure to secure justice between man and man or citizen and state.
An English County Court Judge of great experience (His Honour Judge Henry
Cecil Leon, Q.C., who writes under the literary pseudonym of "Henry Cecil")
has stressed that 'a man who is in the right hardly ever gets everything to
which he is entitled' due to delay, inconvenience, uncertainty and expense.
He proves this, and says there is general, if not unavoidable dissatisfaction
2
experienced by those who resort to the law. This colours the image of the
legal profession.
To generalize, there are perhaps five roles which are fulfilled by law¬
yers in western legal systems - the jurist, the judge, the advocate, the
solicitor and the notary. The prestige attaching to each role varies from
system to system, and may vary as specialisation of the function crystallises.
The status of advocate may differ according as to whether the legal system is
dominated by Judges or Jurists. Riesman notes^ that in America "The judge
stands the image of the lawyer hero" • He adds that the higher the court the
greater esteem the judges evoke, yet the corporation or industrial lawyer,
the 'Jail-Street lawyer, the Washington lawyer, influencing great policy de¬
cisions are in fact more significantthan the judge and can do most of their
2° Hot Such an Ass, p.13.
3. opocit., p.1220
work outside the courts. Similarly, in England and in countries whose legal
systems have been influenced by English lawyers, the judge is of all lawyers
the one who commands the greatest respect. This is not of course true of
western systems which organise their systems in the Romanistic tradition
where the Jurist is pre-eminent. In such systems the judiciary or magis-
trature is a career embarked on at the stage of professional qualification,
not by way of promotion after proven success at the Bar. In G-ermany, the
professor or academic lawyer takes precedence over the judge.
Such a situation would not surprise an anthropologist who had traced
the course of the evolution of German lav/ and legal procedure back to Roman
sources. The headwaters of Roman lav/ flow from a juristic not a judicial
aristocracy. Sir Henry Maine, one of the few legal writers to have shown
sympathy with and understanding of the aims of social anthropologists, has
commented upon ancient law in the West as follows:-* "The important point
for the jurist is that these aristocracies were universally the depositaries
and administrators of law the epoch of customary lav/ and its custody
by a privileged order is a very remarkable one. The condition of jurispru¬
dence which it implies has left traces which may still be detected in legal
and popular phraseology. The law thus known exclusively to a privileged
minority, whether a caste, an aristocracy, a priestly tribe or a sacerdotal
college is time unwritten law." The unwritten law was not, as in England,
in gremio iudicum, but a mystery declared by jurists. Talcott Parsons in
his important paper The Professions and Social Structure noted "Comparative
4« Ancient Law (jOth Ed.) pp. 10-11.
5. Ibid. pp.10-11.
6« (1939) 17 Social Forces 457; Essaygdn Sociological Theory, p.34«
study of the social structures of the most important civilisations shows that
the professions occupy the position which is ... unique in history. Perhaps
the closest parallel is the society of the Roman Empire where notably the lav/
was very highly developed as a profession indeed." Certainly a close study
of the legal profession in Rome would provide ample confirmation of that
paper's conclusion that the elements of rationality although blended with
strong elements of traditionalism, specificity of function and of universal-
ism are of cardinal importance in an evaluation of the role of a profession.
Rome's earliest laws were never expressly repeated up to Justinian's day, yet
they had been interpreted out of all recognition by juristic adaptation to
social needs.
Originally the function of declaring or interpreting the lav/ of Rome
was entrusted to the Pontiffs, an aristocratic college v/hich was in no sense
concerned with spiritual matters. The situation was well put by Schulz^
"The earliest Roman jurist known to us is the state priest (sacerdotes pub-
lici). It is necessaiy from the outset to be clear as to the religious and
sociological character of the four priestly colleges. Priests they were,
but the great variety of meanings borne by the term 'priest' has been over¬
looked by legal historians. In the present case the spiritual and charis¬
matic elements of the priesthood are very much in the background. These
priests were not spiritual persons, but men of high social standing whose
economic position enabled them to undertake public duties without pecuniary
reward. The door to their illustrious guilds was opened partly by high
birth and partly by meritorious service to the state in peace or war."
7. P. Schulz, Roman Legal Science, pp. 6-7.
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Eventually the place of the pontiffs was taken over in Rome by lay
jurists who, by their interpretation of the law, by their teaching and writ¬
ing, and by advice to the magistrates and judges, played a vital role in the
formulation of Roman Jaw. These jurists were at first almost invariably
aristocrats. They accepted no remuneration for their services; their re¬
putation and authority were pre-eminent. The Roman jurist of the classical
period had his reward in the respect which he commanded. He did not appear
to plead as advocate. Advocates (oratores') were in the main ignorant of the
law, and, though some like Cicero enhanced the prestige of the profession in
general, the social status of most advocates was inferior. Those of humble
origin might by way of the advocate's toga gain social advancement. It was
against such men that satirists wrote bitterly, accusing them of lack of
scruple, avarice and other vices,^ again the double image of lawyers.
Only at a much later period when advocates were required to qualify in
law and join an organized profession did their position carry any high pres¬
tige. The succession of great jurists came to an end in the Third Century
and Byzantine bureaucracy eventually controlled all aspects of the legal pro¬
fession - judiciary, teachers, law-makers, notaries and pleaders.
The leading treatise on the origins and social position of the Roman
jurist is, of course, W. Kunkel's Herkunft und soziale Stellung der Romischen
Juristen, but Schulz's Roman Legal Science traces the development of the
legal profession generally in Roman society with particular awareness of the
9
social factors. The jurists of Republican times were of noble family and
their successors were in general from good families. Throughout the Classic¬
al period (1st - 3rd Centuries A.D.) the legal profession in Rome, however,
8. See Eriedlander-Wissowa Sittengeschichte i, p.182 et seq.
9. See in particular pp. 6-7, 41-43» 102-104, 268-272.
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included those who were then regarded as of the lower orders, advocati or
forensic orators, and tabslliones (notaries), and those who gave elementary
instruction in the law. In the Eastern Empire, where Roman law reached its
culmination under Justinian, there was a certain change in the prestige of
roles. The advocate's role took precedence of that of the contemporary -
though not of the classical-jurist, whose repute was reflected by the esteem
10
of the Doctors of the Reception (Twelfth Century). Schulz observed "Once
again, for the last time in the history of the ancient world, Roman law was
still showing its power of attraction. As of old under the Republic and
still under the Principate it was precisely the educated and well-to-do
classes who in the Eastern Empire turned to jurisprudence with the object of
becoming advocates or higher officials.... The social origins of the men of
law as a group were much the same as under the Principate. Plebeians still
made their way under cover of the toga, but large numbers of young men of
respectable family entered the profession. Advocates were held in high
it
respect. Exclusion from political activity attracted both Roman and Byzan¬
tine talent and social position to the professions of Law and Arms. This
pattern is reflected in Scottish life after the Union of 1707.
Justinian, who regarded his codification of Roman law in the Corpus
Iuris Civilis (528-534-) as final, still described the role of the lawyer as
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similar to that of the priest - "Cuius mento quis nos sacerdotes appeliet."
The Digest is a collection of edited fragments from the opinions of great
Roman jurists, successors to the veneration accorded to the early pontiffs
and mediators of that respect to the Civilian i.e. Romanistic jurists who





defined as the knowledge of things divine and human, the science of the
just and unjust. The opinions of the Roman jurists continued to dominate
European legal thinking directly until the era of codification was intro¬
duced by Napoleon. The main European codifications are still erected upon
foundations of Roman law. To this day, while in the Anglo-American world
the majesty of the law is symbolised by the judge, in countries which have
inherited a Romanistic tradition - as in France, Germany and Italy - to the
lawyers themselves at least the jurist is the figure most regarded, and here
may be mentioned a matter to which repeated attention will be paid in later
chapters - the public image of the lav/ and lawyers, and the image which
lawyers have of law and themselves, which do not always or necessarily co¬
incide. It would be difficult for an intelligent or even an unintelligent
laymay or laywoman to take seriously Sir Frederick Pollock's vision of the
13
English Common Law in 1912. He described. "Our Lady of the Common Lav/"
as belonging "to the kindred of Homer's Gods, more powerful than men; not
passionless or infallible, she can be jealous v/ith Hera, ruthless with Ar¬
temis, and astute with Athene. We are her men of life and limb and earthly
worship." The sceptic might observe that outside England none has been
voluntarily converted to her worship. A less hieratic assessment of the
Anglo-American common law is that of 0. Wendell Holmes, "The life of the law
has not been logic; it has been experience."''^'
The social anthropologist will note the recurrence of the religious
motif in both the great legal traditions of the western world, namely, the
Civil or Romanistic law and the Anglo-American Common law. Ceremonial
12. Inst. 1,1.
13« The Genius of the Common Law p.2
1^. Holmes: The Common Law p.1.
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invocations of the deity and religious symbolism are more apparent in the
western judicial process than in any other profession or public function,
whether it be by the hanging of a crucifix in court, as on the continent of
Europe, or by holding religious services at the beginning of the legal year,
or by prayers offered at the opening of Circuit or Assize, or until recently
in England by the solemn and somewhat obscene request for divine mercy upon
a convicted accused who has just heard sentence of death pronounced. Paren¬
thetically, one may also observe that if the public administration of justice
in the western world is fortified by rites of the Church, the theology of the
Western church itself has been deeply penetrated by legal concepts through
the Fathers of the church - Augustine, Ambrose and Tertullian in particular.
Through Aquinas and Calvin the Western churches think and speak largely in
terms of justification, guilt, judgment, punishment, atonement, and remission
of sentence. Through the Chancellor's function as Keeper of the Conscience
of the English Kings, developed the strange parallel system of Equity to
supplement the rigors or the English Common Law. Yet, despite the stress
put upon mercy and good conscience by the early Chancellors, Equity proved so
vulnerable to the legalistic attitude of the English legal profession that it
degenerated into the horrors portrayed by Dickens in Bleak House or by Gals¬
worthy in In Chancery. While the lawyers turned their 'mystery' into quasi-
15
religion, the ecclesiastics turned their mystery into quasi-law. The
interaction between law and traditional Christian morality is more fully con¬
sidered in Appendix C to this thesis»
As has been suggested already, the legal profession over the centuries
in the various countries of the West has presented a double image - one of
15* Denning "The Need for a new Equity" in (1952) Current Legal Problems p.1.
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respect and the other of revulsion. In Scotland, as will be discussed later,
the Faculty of Advocates segregating its r&Le by stages over a long period
of time, created a favourable popular image. This, it is suggested, has
been in part due to the smallness of the group concerned and in part due to
somewhat complex historical factors. Moreover, there are indications that
the high-water mark may already have been reached and that the flood-tide may
already be receding. The Faculty of Advocates, as will appear, were re¬
cruited in the main from the most privileged sections of the community.
They were almost exclusively Scotsmen and the nature of their work concen¬
trated them both at home and in the courts in the capital of Scotland it¬
self, from which since the Unions of 1603 and 1707 London had drained the
leaders of other important social groups. The Faculty has offered many
services gratuitously, in particular in its defence of poor persons accused
of crime, and the public imagination conceives erroneously that criminal law
is the main function of an advocate. The War of 1939-1945 has clearly
shaken the economic and social foundations on which the whole of the Faculty
was based. The Legal Aid (Scotland) Act, 1949» and the Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Act, 1963, now provide for State legal aid to persons of moderate
means, thus remunerating advocates for work which formerly they would have
undertaken out of a sense of public duty. It will be considered later whe¬
ther this elimination of gratuitous services reduces their status. Those
who can afford to work for nothing and out of public duty enjoy a very high
esteem, as was true of the Roman jurists. To offer services gratuitously or
to be very highly remunerated alike augment status. Working for a modest
competence does not. Legal aid for criminal work under statutory authority
only became operative on 19th October, 1964. In 1960 a Committee presided
16
over by; Lord Guthrie observed "The day in which the doctor and the lawyer
16. Co-crtfi. 1015/1960.
were the rich men of the community, and could afford to spend a fair pro¬
portion of their time on unremunerative work of a charitable nature is over."
Though Britain has not yet entered the Common Market many lawyers assume that
in time she will. Should this be so the repercussions on the organisation
of the legal profession in Britain could be considerable. One of the ob-
17
jects of the Common Market is to secure freedom of movement and of employ¬
ment for the nationals of any one member state in the territory of another
and its programme envisages that by 1970 any citizen of a Common Market
country will be able to exercise a profession on the same terms as nationals
of any other associated country. This means that the laws of each state
must be prepared to admit nationals of other states to practise in its courts.
In general, the organisation of the legal profession in the present Six
Common Market states does not recognize the division between advocates or
barristers on the one hand and solicitors on the other. Thus it is at
least possible that the segregation of role which has characterised the
Faculty of Advocates in the past may in the future be modified in various
ways. Another factor which casts a shadow over the Parliament House is
the increasing diversion of specialist work to England through nationalisa¬
tion or economic concentration directed from the South. The desirability
at this moment in time of undertaking study of the role of the Faculty of
Advocates in the mid-twentieth century is self-evident. The opportunity
for field work on, as opposed to historical study of, the Faculty and its
roles of greatest interest to the anthropologist may in future be limited.
For the sake of perspective and to stress the unique organization of
17. See E.H. Scammel, The Common Market and the Legal Profession, (1963)
Current Legal problems, 54 at p.64.
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the Faculty, however, it seems desirable to conclude these introductory comments
with a few elementary comparative observations on the organization of the legal
professions in other western countries„ As has been noted the legal systems
of these countries are divided broadly into those which are Civilian or Romanis-
tic and those which are founded on Anglo-American Common law. Scotland, like
Quebec, Louisiana and South Africa has drawn upon both legal traditions so far
18
as content of law is concerned. It must be observed, hoy/ever, that a social
anthropologist studying the organization of a legal profession and the segrega¬
tion of roles in particular cannot generalize safely to any great extent along
the lines of the division between Civil law and Anglo-American law. Divergence
in formal rules between Civilian and Common Law may not (as Riesman suggests
they do) imply fundamental differences in attitude. One safe generalization
which may be made is that in the former category of systems the role of the
jurist as teacher and writer is especially respected, while in the latter the
judge, rightly or wrongly, is the hero-image. Neither jurist nor judge is of
direct interest in this study except as orienting the development of specific
legal systems and for relative comparison with the Bar, since it is in the field
of legal practice that the Faculty of Advocates must be evaluated.
19
Since, as Riesman hg.s stressed, legal education has an important effect
upon the lawyer's outlook on society and upon his own profession some attention
must be paid to requirements imposed for qualification to practise.
18. See T.B. Smith; Studies Critical and Comparative, Introduction passim.
19« Op. oit. supra,n.l.
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Chapter 2
COMPARATIVE SKETCH OE LEGAL PROFESSIONS
Before proceeding to trace the evolution of the Faculty of Advocates over
the centuries, the material for which is based on secondary sources, and before
describing its present role, the material for which has been collected by field
work, it seems appropriate to include a comparative sketch of the organization
and functions of the legal profession in certain other countries. Scots law
combines the European civilian tradition with certain Anglo-American elements,
and for this reason it has been decided to select for consideration the legal
profession in two Continental systems, France and Germany, and then those of
England and the United States. Whereas the description of function in the
cases of France, Germany and England is based mainly on literary sources,
checked with lawyers experienced in actual practice in the system described,
the account of the American legal profession derives largely from field work.
The writer had the privilege of working as a 'Special Student' at Harvard Law
School, the leading Law School of the United States, and she also received
generous grants from the Louisiana State Law Institute and from Edinburgh Uni¬
versity to conduct research into the role of the legal profession in America.
She had the opportunity to attend at Harvard Professor Braucher's course on the
legal profession and Professor Caver's course on legal education. She was al¬
so enabled to meet and talk with many lawyers of many kinds and in several states
and also to visit courts ranging from the Supreme Court of the United States at
the invitation of Justice Brerman, to courts of minor jurisdiction.
13.
FRANCE 1
The patron saint of lawyers in France is St. Ives (1253-1303) whose Feast
is observed to this day on the 19th May as a legal holiday. As advocate and
judge he was celebrated for his rectitude, wisdom, and concern for the widow
and orphan. Of him it was said "Advocatus et non latro res miranda populo"
(Advocate yet not a thief, a wonder to all) which again pinpoints the double
image which the lawyer presents to the public.
Apart frcm the Cour de Cassation in Paris which has its own specialist
Bar and is concerned only with errors of lav;, the administration of justice in
France is substantially de-centralised. The Courts of first instance - Tri-
bunaux Civils have limited territorial jurisdiction, but almost universal juris¬
diction over litigated matters. A rough approximation would be in Scotland the
situation which would result if the Outer House of the Court of Session were to
be eliminated (and its present importance is, of course, a nineteenth century
development) and the Sheriff Courts to have general original jurisdiction over
actions.^
As will appear in the following chapter tracing the development of the pro¬
fession of Advocate in Scotland, French influence was important at the outset.
For example, the Faculty of Advocates as a constituent element of the College of
Justice with the Dean as its elected head may well have originated as the result
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of French influence. Smith has asserted in Studies Critical and Comparative
that through the influence of Bishop Elphinstone, who had studied in France, the
Parlement of Paris was taken as a model for the Court of Session when it was es¬
tablished as the College of Justice. The French system has thus special com¬
parative interest for the present study; both historical and contemporary
1. See generally Cremieu Traite de la Profession d'Avocat, David & de Vries
The French Legal System Chapter 1-3; Schlesinger Comparative Law (2nd Ed.)
73 et seq.203-207; Olivier Martin Histoire du Droit Francais p.322 et sea;
2. See A.E. Anton, Scottish Thoughtso'ft French Civil Procedure,(1956)Jur.Rev.158-9«
3. p Z~J eJcse<^>
factors are important. In pre-Revolution Prance royal justice was administered
in various Parlements and was not centralised. The judges - Messieurs de Par-
lements - domini curiae - enjoyed very high social status, and though only of
the noblesse de la robe, their dignity was transmissible as was their office.
In each Parlement as well as judges, royal officials, greffiers and huissiers
(corresponding to clerks or macers) there were avocats and procureurs. These
were organised in distinct corporations, each with its batonnier or head with
its own disciplinary machinery. They were strictly controlled by the Court
before which they practiced and before which they renewed each year their pro¬
fessional oath.
The Court conferred a considerable honour when it requested the King to
attach an advocate to that tribunal, and the office itself carried great pres¬
tige. The advocate was a member of an order, a Chevalier es Loi. The ranks
of the order were, naturally enough, recruited from the privileged classes and
had corresponding public obligations and responsibilities. These practitioners
in most cases did not hold university degrees, because not until 1679 were
courses given in French dealing with French legislation and customs. Univer¬
sities taught only Canon and Civil Law, while professional training was through
the medium of apprenticeship to members of the Ordre des Avocats. Professor
John p. Dawson of Harvard is at present writing the History of Professional
Judges which will complement his History of Lay Judges. In the work being pre¬
pared he deals fully and critically with the organisation and function of the
Parlements which were destined to be swept away at the Revolution. In the
modern system, it will be observed, the judges of France have become public
officials without the exalted status of their predecessors, but the avocat
still retains high prestige, and in general the profession of advocate is not
calculated to attract young men of modest means„
The French legal profession is very highly specialised. Preparation for
its various branches is thorough, and a University degree is followed by a
stage - apprenticeship - and competitive examination. Legal education is part
of the nationally uniform system of free secular public education, but to be ad¬
mitted a candidate must have passed the Baccalaureat which comprises a consider¬
able range of scholarly knowledge - philosophy, literature, languages, natural
science and mathematics, and the student must effect a synthesis of his know¬
ledge - not merely pass courses. Similarly, as for admission to the Faculty
of Advocates in Scotland, a liberal general education is required as well as
legal qualification. The Licence en Droit, a four year curriculum at a French
university caters for the needs of those who have no intention of entering the
legal profession and is therefore wide in its scope, yet in content more or
less uniform throughout France. Accordingly, the French lawyer is conditioned
by his studies at the Ecole de Droit to approach the law in a scholarly way, as
a social science and also as an intellectually stimulating and satisfying body
of learning. The status of the law professors in France is high and their
opinions and writings (doctrine) are treated with great respect by the courts.
Indeed, the fact that their writings are abstracted from actual controversy
gives them greater - not as in Scotland and England less - weight. The teach¬
ing methods adopted in France also tend to buttress the law teachers' authority.
Emphasis is on systematic oral presentation, and though latterly students have
been required to research into particular problems, the American 'Case-book'
method is altogether inconsistent with French tradition. As has been said^"
by a distinguished French scholar, Professor Rene David, who also was a disciple
of G-utteridge of Cambridge, 'The law schools of French universities other than
4. David & de Yries The French Legal System, p.26.
the University of Paris, which has a huge student body, do afford an opportunity
for contact between a professor and his students, but French students generally
speaking are not inclined to raise questions and they reveal the extent of the
authority exercised over them during their entire schooling by their restraint
in taking any position which might be regarded as critical or disrespectful of
the professor. He in turn finds it difficult to close the gap without yield¬
ing some of the authority which in France has been necessary to his effective¬
ness as teacher'. The overall effect of university law teaching of this kind
on the legal profession is to make it approach practical problems from a general
and philosophical standpoint. The law professors' influence on the legal de¬
velopment is very considerable.
After obtaining his or her licence, since women take a prominent part as
avocats in France especially in Paris, a candidate for any branch of the legal
profession must accomplish a stage and further examination. In France general
practice of the law is not restricted to persons who have received formal legal
training, and legal work is often done by individuals or firms describing them¬
selves as agents d'affaires, but for many legal matters a professional is required
by law or expediency. The main branches of the profession are as follows:-
(a) The Judiciary: Professional judges are, in effect, members of a judicial
civil service. It is, however, competent for law professors or avocats to be
appointed judges and eminent professors sit in the highest courts. Over three
hundred women hold judicial appointments in France - some as Presidents of Courts.
Promotion within the service is a general rule. The candidate for this service
5. The magistrature in France, is either assise.- i.e., the judges - or debout -
i.e., officers of the executive or the Ministere publique, who are appointed
and classified as judges. The judiciary also comprises certain lay judges
who sit in specialised tribunals.
after his licence takes a period of practical training followed by an examination
to qualify either as a juge de paix or judge of general jurisdiction. Those
qualified in this latter category may gain promotion from the lowest to the high¬
est judicial office in the Republic - Premier President de la Cour de Cassation.
By contrast with the Scottish and Anglo-American systems in which promotion
to the bench crowns success at the Bar - and consequently relations between bar
and bench become close - in Prance a barrier between the two exists, based on
difference of temperament, training and outlook. Bench and Bar have their own
separate traditions and regard each other, not as brethren, but as belonging in
effect to different professions. The judiciary who seldom sit alone have de¬
veloped their own esprit de corps rooted in tradition. This contrasts with
the more personal professional public image of the individual judge in Scottish
and Anglo-American systems. Judgments are delivered by the court and not by
individuals and dissenting judgments cannot be given. Unlike the old Messieurs
de Parlement modern Prench judges are not primarily and deliberately law makers.
Appointment to the judicial branch of the legal profession (whose members are
often chosen through family tradition) guarantees security and reasonable tran-
quility0 To it attaches neither the prestige of the old regime nor that of
the judge in the Anglo-American system. The relatively small salaries paid to
the lower judiciary seems at present to discourage recruitment. The judiciary
tends to compensate for its own rather undistinguished public image by regarding
the avocat as something comparable to the Roman orator.
A judicial civil service, as in Prance, is a system intended to eliminate
political pressures and to maintain impartiality. Promotion may of course be
influenced by personal relations and impressions made upon superiors in the hier¬
archy - and therefore conformity with the views of higher courts i.s encouraged.
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Nevertheless, the civil service mentality minimises the personal factor in
matters of promotion. This system, it will be noted, contrasts strikingly
with that of Scotland where promotion to the Bench .depends on a reasonably
successful career at the Bar and where political factors often are important,
especially for the filling of the highest judicial offices.
(b) Ministere publique: The office of Ministere Publique dates from the
Fourteenth century when the King of France authorised certain persons to repre¬
sent his views in matters of public or general interest - to some extent act¬
ing like the Lord Advocate or his representatives in Scotland for Her Majesty's
interest. Representatives of the Ministere Publique or 'parquet' belong to
the magistrature debout. They, like the judges, are appointed and classified
as m3-gtstrats. They may often be appointed to the judiciary having indeed taken
the same qualifications, and their arguments carry special weight with the courts.
As Davidasrvdde Vries^ have noted - 'Undoubtedly the weaker role of the court as
compared to its counterpart in Anglo-American countries is to some extent
buttressed by institution of the Ministere Publique.'
(c) Avocats. In prestige the avooat ranks with the law professor and
higher ranks of the judiciary. The French Bar has preserved its ancient or¬
ganisation in its Orders (Barreaux) membership of which is necessary for prac¬
tice. Through its elected head the Batonnier (comparable to the Dean of Facul¬
ty in Scotland) and its executive council (Conseil de l'Ordre - comparable to
the Dean's Council) the Barreau of each city or district exercises disciplinary
powers over its members. Before admission an avocat must gain a certificat
d'aptitude conferred by a faculty of law, the courses for which are given mainly
6. op.cit. p.21
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by advocates, civil servants, judges and avoues. These course are designed to
instil the essential professional knowledge and traditions. The certificat
requires an examination which by force of circumstances becomes competitive„
The Barreau de Paris, for example, can admit only 250 to 300 stagiaires each
year, yet 700 may present themselves as candidates. The examiners are headed
by the Batonnier of the Paris Bar and the Dean of the Paris Law Faculty. After
obtaining his oertificat the successful candidate makes application to the
Batonnier of the Bar where he wishes to be admitted. Three persons are per¬
mitted to join together in practice in Paris, but in general the avocat prac¬
tices on his own. The large firms encountered in Germany and the United States
are unknown in France, where most avocats practice as in Scotland in their own
residences. Except for a few celebrated defenders in criminal cases, specialisa¬
tion in a particular field of law is unusual. Though the courts exercise au¬
thority over those who speak for them, the primary responsibility for the avocat
is to the Ordre des Avooats, the particular local guild to which he belongs.
The avocat combines most of the roles of advocate and solicitor. His main
function is to some extent comparable with the orator, in the Roman system since
he specialises in oral argument. Unlike the orator, however, he has mastered
the law. Though French procedure precludes the dramatic elements of cross exami¬
nation, the avocat is given considerable oratorial licence in his address to the
court.
The French advocate identifies himself much more closely with his client
than does the Scottish advocate, due perhaps to the fact that parties in France
are the personal clients of advocates and partly because the object of oral
pleading is to convince the court that the written evidence is valid. It may
be noted that the division offunction between avooat and avoue does not corres¬
pond exactly to the division between advocate and solicitor in Scotland, either
geographically or according to functions actually performed.^ Senior members
of the Bar are not required by virtue of their office to give their services
gratuitously by way of legal aid. This duty is imposed on junior members of
the Bar. In civil causes this means acting for no remuneration whatsoever,
but in criminal causes, if the Batonnier, having allocated the services of
an avocat finds the accused has sufficient means to pay he may transform the
official appointment into a remunerated service.
Cases argued before the Cour de Cassation (or Conseil d'Etat) and cri¬
minal trials require the services of the avocat and he is of course engaged
before other tribunals. The avocat does not, however, enter into a con¬
tract with his client any more than in Scotland. The tradition moreover
was that the profession would suffer loss of prestige if members depended on
professional activity for a livelihood, though they were free to accept a
voluntary and spontaneous honorarium from a client. In 1885 the Batonnier
Q
of the Paris Bar declared "The avocat does not discuss any money questions
with his client. He requests nothing from him either before or during a
case." In modern times it has become recognised by the Courts that an avo¬
cat has a right to compensation - but in general an avocat acts unethically
and is liable to disciplinary action if he sues for his fee. Gratuitous
service enhances the prestige of the profession. Some Bars however permit
9
an avocat to sue if he first obtains leave of the Batonnier or Conseil.
This attitude to remuneration is of course reflected in Scottish legal eti¬
quette which forbids an advocate from suing for a fee. Since the Second
YYorld War lack of expectation of reward comparable with that offered in
7* Poignaret 'The Study of Law,/the Stage and the Profession of Advocate'
(1948) Rev. du Barreau de Quebec 113 passim.
8. Quoted by Lepaulle 'Law Practice in Prance (1950) 50 Colum. L.R. at
PP®949-50.
9o Cremieu Traite de la Profession d'Avocat (2nd Ed 1954) P®247 et seq.
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other occupations has tended to discourage recruitment of men as avocats -
but the profession as in Belgium, Germany and especially Italy has become in¬
creasingly attractive to women. Of rather over 2,000 avocats in Paris 700
are women. Since the war some decline in the status of avocats has been
suggested, yet the more favourable popular image is of high status and any
avocat taking other employment must resign from the Bar. The costume of
the avocats portrayed by Daumier in Les Gens de Justice has now been modi¬
fied. Toques are no longer worn, but the traditional boxes which contained
them are kept in the robing rooms and are used as receptacles for papers
left for their owners by colleagues. Specialised in role, vested with
those social attributes discussed by Talcott Parsons, the avocat is accord-
A
ed high respect. Whatever his seniority he is addressed as "Maitre" -
Gallic delicacy accords the same designation irrespective of sex. In con¬
cluding this sketch of the avocat it may be noted that avocats who appear
before the Cour de Cassation or the Conseil d'Etat fulfil a special role.
These are dffioiers ministerielle. They buy their office and discharge
both the functions of avocats and avoues as Scottish advocates seem to have
done in the Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries. They do not appear
before other courts and their number is limited to sixty. This small pro¬
fessional group has thus even higher social density and more *exclusiveness*
than the Faculty of Advocates.
(d) Avoues correspond roughly speaking to solicitors engaged in civil
practice. They are officers of the court, are limited in number, and either
inherit or buy their practices. Their services are necessary in litigation,
and unlike the avocats they enter into contracts with their clients. Con¬
trasting with the avocats the avoues undertake much of the writing necessary
in litigation and superintend the carrying out of the courts* judgments.
They may not instruct or be instructed by avocats, who on the whole tend to
minimise the importance of their function. Nevertheless their office is
both ancient and honourable. Henry IV, being in need of money, created
their offices and instituted the system of selling them. Today there are
no more than at the time of creation - 150 practising in the lower courts in
Paris and 52 in the Paris Court of Appeal. There are, perhaps, three or
four vacancies by death or resignation each year and the aspirant to office
who has to satisfy the scrutiny of the Compaqriie des Avoues must wait much
10
longer than the avocat for admission to full status. There is a current
project to abolish by legislation the profession of avoue as an anachronism,
to compensate those who follow it, and to permit them to become avocats.
In the Cour de Cassation and Conseil d'Etat, as has been noted, sixty
privileged practitioners discharge the functions both of avocats and avoues.
In practice proceedings are mainly in writing before these tribunals as in
Scotland until the early Nineteenth Century.
(e) Notaires. The office of notaire is very important in Prance as in
most countries deriving their tradition from the Civil Law. In Scotland,
though not in older times, in England and America the function of the notary
has become largely formal. The French notaire has almost a monopoly of
such matters as conveyancing, matrimonial settlements and succession. He
is empowered by law to impart the quality of acte authentique to certain for-
11
mal legal writings. Again, quoting David and de Vries "As family coun¬
sellor and thus often the informal arbiter of disputes, he is especially in
the smaller towns a solidly established eminently respectable institution."




Having selected the organisation of the French legal profession as most
relevant for comparison with that of Scotland, the profession in Germany will
be considered very briefly - mainly for purposes of comparison with the French.
As will appear there are fewer similarities to and more contrasts with the
Scottish system. Dr. Erich Dohring in his Geschichte der Deutschen Reoht-
spflege seit 1309 and Professor Dawson whose typescript the present writer
was privileged to read at Harvard have surveyed the history of the German
legal profession in detail. Indeed, Dr. Dohring's book provides a start¬
ing point for future close historical anthropological investigation. No
detail historically treated is too small for his attention. The development
of the social position of judges; admission of advocates to practice; the
eventual abandonment, as in Italy, of the division of the legal profession
into two main sections, the use of oral and written argument are all explained.
Even the paintings which ornament the courtroom, the seating arrangements for
counsel and the quality and quantity of food which the travelling lawyer might
expect his client to provide for him are described. Unfortunately this study
stops abruptly with the arrival of Hitler in 1933«
Though the function of the notary tends to be set apart from other pro¬
fessional activities, in German speaking countries, by contrast with the situ¬
ation in France, the functions of advocate and solicitor are merged in the
Rechlssfcanwalt.Legal firms in Germany, as in the United States and indeed as in
Italy which in other respects has been strongly influenced by the French sys¬
tem, may comprise numerous partners who not only specialise in a particular
branch of the law, but engage both in chamber and court practice.
In Germany (the Federal Republic alone will be considered) those who
take a course in legal education fall into several categories, namely -
legal scholars, jurists, judges, prosecutors, officials, counsel, notaries
and advisors to industrial or commercial enterprises. The basic training
is the same for all. A candidate for legal education must have taken the
state AbiturientjUn examen which required a high standard of education -
much higher indeed than the minimum required for a university or college de¬
gree in Arts at many British or American universities. Entering University
at the age of 18 or 19, the German law student undertakes three years of le¬
gal studies, studies which are often pursued at a number of different uni¬
versities. Though as in France in recent times more active participation
has been required of students, instruction is given by expository lecture.
At the end of three years a student undergoes examination - extending over
four months - and if successful becomes a Referendar. At this stage spe¬
cialisation of professional training begins. The most revered of lawyers
are the jurists, those who teach and write. After qualifying as Referendar
the aspirant to juristic eminence must gain the degree of Doctor awarded for
an original contribution to legal scholarship. Thereafter he will normally
spend three years preparing a further thesis to justify his admission to the
teaching faculty of a university, as Dozent - instructor. Thereafter the
jurist ascends the ladder of fame according to his contributions to scholar¬
ship and success as a teacher. It has been estimated that before the par¬
tition of Germany after Hitler's War there were perhaps three hundred recog¬
nised legal scholars engaged in teaching. An able man may spend years of
waiting before appointment to one of the coveted professional appointments.
The influence of this small group has been enormous and nowhere perhaps in
the world does the legal scholar enjoy such prestige as he does in Germany,
though in Italy public and professional recognition of legal scholarship is
also marked. The present writer understands that an eminent professor in
Germany may expect to be addressed by his double doctorate and that if he re¬
sists an invitation to move to another university, his students will honour
him with a torchlight procession. The veneration of the student for his
professor may perhaps be illustrated most strikingly by reference to the in¬
stitution of Actenversendung by which very difficult questions of lav/ might
be remitted by appellate judges to those who had taught them, thus making the
professoriate in effect an ultimate court of appeal. This institution no
longer operates as formerly, but the tradition lingers on in the practice of
counsel laying before the court opinions given by prominent jurists on diffi¬
cult questions. If this practice causes the administration of law in Ger¬
many to smell somewhat of the lamp, it also keeps the leading academics in
touch with the realities of life and law. In Scotland a comparable attitude
can be discerned in the early Nineteenth Century when judges gave earnest
consideration to what they had been taught by Bell or Hume, and even scruti¬
nised notes taken of lectures given by these professors.
Judges in Germany are by contrast with those of Britain thick as the
leaves that strew the brooks in Vallombrosa - approximately one judge for
every six or seven thousand inhabitants. Those who qualify for this office
normally undergo four years of practical training after passing the examina¬
tion for Referendar; the training covering practical work in courts of
different jurisdictions and in law and administrative offices. Thereafter,
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the Assessor-examen is taken, and the successful candidate then becomes
eligible for appointment as judge, is entitled to the designation (and de¬
signations are important in Germany) of Assessor. The judicial career, as
in Prance, is one for which a lawyer opts from the outset. This is also
true in the case of prosecutors, whose training is identical with that of
judges. Indeed, it is possible, though rare, for lawyers to move from one
career to the other. The prosecutor's status is that of an executive civil
servant and he is bound to take orders from his superiors in the hierarchy,.
The German legal profession is clearly more appropriate than that of Scot-
12
land for analysis in Weber's terms. Where he deals with types of autho¬
rity, the bureaucratic is in general applicable to the German legal system.
Practitioners also undergo training comparable to that required of the
judiciary. A period of up to four years apprenticeship is required, of
which six months are spent in an office and the remainder in various courts
and in a prosecutor's department. It will thus be observed that legal
training for the German lawyer is stressed in the direction of the judicial
and prosecuting function, and consequently lawyers in Germany are more dis¬
posed than in other jurisdictions described to reflect the official attitude.
The office of notary carries considerable status especially in small towns,
but the Anwalt's higher status corresponds with the advocate and solicitor
in Scotland. He drafts legal documents, advises clients, and pleads in
court. Law firms are recognised and there is no specialisation between the
two branches of the practising profession as in Scotland.
It may be mentioned that many administrative officials in Germany must
have legal training, while those who intend to enter commerce may also take
12. Max Weber The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (trans. Hender¬
son and Talcott parsons) p.A5j et seq. —————
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a legal training. Shartel and Wolf observe on this practice "Certain uni¬
versities are not too strict about their standards of scholarship and grant
doctors1 degrees rather readily. A doctor* s degree gives a definite social
prestige, and even the most lenient standards do represent some degree of
achievement." Of others who intend to become business advisers they comment,
"These men do not intend to become members of the bar. They simply seek the
titles of Doctor Referendar and Assessor for the prestige and training which
these titles respectively represent."
Remuneration and professional status seem to be inseparably linked.
Prom Roman times it has been regarded in civilian systems as a grave impro¬
priety for any person to agree to advance money to carry on a lav/ suit upon
agreement to receive a proportion if the action succeeds, and such an agree¬
ment between the advocate and client was regarded as particularly obnoxious.
The lex Cincia (B.C. 204) had prohibited advocates from accepting gifts in
payment for their services. Under the Principate honoraria were permitted,
and to the present day advocates in Scotland receive, strictly speaking, not
payment for their services but honoraria for which they cannot sue. Anglo-
American law is similarly concerned with the so-called contingent fee, a fee
recoverable by a lawyer only in the event of success. In England such agree¬
ments are unlawful. In the United States, resort to the contingent fee is
often in practice the only way by which the impecunious litigant can obtain
legal representation. At least until the Legal lid (Scotland) Act 1949 came
into force, though much li-tigation was undertaken gratuitously by counsel, it
was not considered improper to act on the understanding that a fee would only
be paid in the event of success. Since legal aid is afforded in Germany to
13o 'German Lawyers - Training & Functions' (1943 ) 42 Mich.L.R. 521 et seq,.
impecunious litigants the incentive of the contingent fee as in America is not
such a pressing problem. In Germany what was then the highest court
(Reichsgericht) pronounced as follows upon an agreement under which counsel
sued his former client on a contract providing for contingent remuneration.
"As in other cases it is thus necessary in the instant case to examine whe¬
ther the violation of professional honour of which the pursuer has been guil¬
ty is so grave that persons whose views are just and equitable would consider
it morally objectionable. This question has been answered in the affirma¬
tive by the Intermediate Appellate Court and rightly so. The applicable
standard cannot be based upon the philosophy of those persons who think only
in economic terms and who have no understanding of the special legal status
provided for counsel. If this special status is taken into consideration
the conclusion is clear. In making the arrangement with the defender the
pursuer did not live up to the moral standard which counsel should never re¬
linquish. He pursued his personal advantage so unscrupulously that his con¬
duct, far from being in accord with justice and equity, must be characterised
as morally objectionable."
Legislation followed upon this decision, but the relevant statute being
itself repealed the position regarding contingent fee has been left to the
courts. These take very much the same attitude as in the case mentioned
above. Moreover, if counsel in Germany has made an invalid contract for a
contingent fee and loses, he cannot recover even the statutory fee permitted
for the work which he has done0
14« In G.v.P. Oct.20. 1933, R.G.Z. 1^2,70, the translation is substantially
based upon Schlesinger Comparative Law, 2nd ed. p.350.
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ENGLAND
Much has been written in recent years describing the state of the legal
profession in England. Most of the available literature has been written by
lawyers who represent with moderate or considerable impartiality the view
which English lawyers take of themselves, but sociological studies are also
available such as that of P. Abrams of Cambridge on the social background of
15
English judges.
The public image of the lawyer may not at the present day be as favour¬
able as in the past, thus reflecting to some extent public dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice in England. The prosecution of the pub¬
lishers of Lady Chatterley1s Lover; uneasiness regarding the prosecution of
Dr. Ward, and the quashing of "Lucky" Gordon'.s conviction; the reporting
(although he was exonerated) of the former Attorney-General, head of the
English Bar, to the Benchers of his Inn for alleged unprofessional conduct
in handling extradition proceedings concerning Chief Enaharo - all these
affect the public image. John Mortimer writing in the Sunday Times on May
19th 1963, puts the question 'Are we still unconsciously allowing our legal
system to be operated by a small section of the Establishment to the bewil¬
derment of a large section of the community which no longer accepts its
values.' Perhaps a social anthropologist could with advantage undertake a
16
study of the English Bar.
Eor one who is not a legal specialist the most helpful short non¬
technical study of the English legal profession is Lawyer and Litigant in
England by R.E. Megarry, Q.C., though the present writer is not alone in
concluding that the author presents the case for the status quo in an unduly
15. See ref. 'Sunday Times', 18th August 1963»
160 Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Annual Report for 1964 reports the
preparation of a Ph.D. thesis in this field.
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favourable light. Indeed, the Dean of Harvard Law School seems to take the
view that the book was much too complacently written, and Professor H. Street's
17
review observes with some exasperation "Must a Hamlyn lecturer be so com¬
placent, so much on the side of the Establishment? Much of the argument for
the status quo is unconvincing." Among other books which are more critical
of the status quo than that of Megarry may be mentioned Henry Cecil's Hot
Such an Ass, and Brief to Counsel, which give a witty yet sincere account of
life at the English Bar.
Unlike the legal systems already described, where there are local Bars
enjoying more or less autonomous powers, the English Bar is highly centralised.
Three quarters of all English barristers, including all Queen's Counsel have
their chambers in London,, In all, about 1900 barristers are in practice,
and rather over 22,000 solicitors, who are distributed widely in England and
Wales. Division of function between these two separate branches of the pro-
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fession is of cardinal importance. Megarry observed "The main advantage of
the English system of a divided profession is the obvious benefits which flow
from all specialisation - each becomes expert in his own field." A barrister
is never approached directly by a client, nor does he interview him in the ab¬
sence of a solicitor. Moreover, he must not interview ?ri.tnesses or undertake
the preliminary paper work for a case. The theory is that solicitors (who
usually practise in partnership and may specialise in particular types of law)
can select from the 'cab rank' a specialist barrister to plead the client's
causeo Barristers are not allowed to enter into partnership and are bound
17. (l96^J.S.P.T.L.(htS,)p.139
18. Megarry, p.7 et seq.
19. p.11
to accept a brief from anyone who tenders an appropriate fee. Yet the barris
ter himself does not discuss his remuneration with solicitor or lay-client.
This is left to the barrister* s clerk, who fulfils a very important and res-
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ponsible function in the English legal system. Megarry observes that the
barrister* s clerk is his shield and buckler. The clerk is remunerated by
ten per cent of the fees for counsel in his Chambers. A lucky one may earn
£3,500 which will be substantially more than several of the barristers in the
chambers earn. One of the most helpful things about Megarry*s book is that
he does give figures as well as facts. From the tables published on pages
l8fj-- 186, it appears that only at the highest professional level does the
barrister earn more than his most successful counterparts in other professions
In the medium range, consultants, dentists, general practitioners and solici¬
tors all earn more money. This may have some influence on the present drift
from the Bar, but there seems little doubt that the status of barrister con¬
tinues to attract more recruits than the profession can maintain.
One of the main attractions of the career of barrister is undoubtedly
the very high prestige which it enjoys through the exalted image of the ju¬
diciary, all of whom are recruited from successful barristers. In the Con¬
tinental systems the jurist or advocate may rank above the judges; this is
most certainly not the case in England. Not only are the judges respected
because of their office, with the attendant ceremonial factors of robes,
wigs, deferential form of address and so forth, but they seem also to be
appointed almost invariably from families whose social position is already
21
assured. Abrams, states that of a hundred English High Court judges
20o p.68
21. See 'Sunday Times*, 18th August, 1963«
investigated in his sample, 56 came from upper class or upper middle class
families, and 2k- from middle class professional backgrounds. Only two came
from less privileged families. The educational background of the sample
included 81 out of the 100 educated at Oxford or Cambridge (about half Christ
Church or New College, Oxford or Trinity, Cambridge), while 39 went to Eton,
Winchester, Harrow or Rugby. Distinction at the University seems also to
be reflected in the judicial appointments, especially at the highest level.
It may therefore be not unreasonable to infer that those who are most success¬
ful at the Bar, from whose leaders the Bench is recruited, have somewhat
similar social backgrounds.
It does not necessarily follow that the majority of those admitted to
the English Bar are drawn from this background. About 600 barristers are
' called1 each year to the English Bar, and of these three-quarters are from
overseas. Admission to the English Bar is thus largely for the export mar¬
ket; a legacy of Commonwealth and Empire. It may be questioned, however,
whether the traditional eating of dinners and the life of the Inns of Court
which was distinctive of the English Bar, is meaningful in the training of
the overseas student in the standards and ethics of the bar. In this
connection it may be observed that a belated effort is being made to establish
law schools teaching English law in former colonies, but that American me¬
thods and standards are now actively competing there. There may be less
need for barristers than for other kinds of lawyers in developing African
countries, and the American tradition does not divide the profession. One
interesting legacy of the English attitude is that when a very distinguished
legal scholar and solicitor, Professor L.C.B. Cower of London, went out to
Africa, he was regarded by some African lawyers as their inferior in status
because they had been admitted to the English Bar (an achievement less exact¬
ing than to become an English solicitor).
Of those barristers of British domicile who are called to the English
Bar - of whom there are about A,000 in the country - a substantial number do
not intend to practise, but wish to enjoy the prestige of being barristers,
though they are not allowed to use this designation on their cards or writing
paper. Of those who actually started practice, many abandon a career at the
bar. The Annual Statement of the General Council of the Bar for 1959 (the
most recent figures available) prints a table covering a number of years.
The figures for the year 1958 show. . that 2A more persons ceased to practise
than started; and of those who ceased 44 of 112 had practised for over ten
years, and 68 for less than that time. Paradoxically more persons had been
actually called in that year than ever before.
In dealing with the English legal profession and with the Bar in par¬
ticular, the writer has ventured to suggest that she may assume a greater
general understanding than could be assumed when describing the position in
Prance, Germany or America. The press frequently, and quite recently the
lawyers on television, have presented varying images of the legal profession
to the public. Accordingly, it has seemed permissible to select for comment
certain factors about the English legal profession without undue elaboration
of background.
The author of this thesis believes that the definitive work on the gener¬
al historical background of the English legal profession will be published by
Professor J.1?. Dawson of Harvard Law School, who permitted her to read much
of his typescript» This in its turn acknowledges Dawson's debt to his
colleague Professor S.E. Thorne, one of the greatest living authorities on
early English law. The genesis of the English Bar is intimately associated
with the Inns of Court - colleges as it were of practising, probationary and
aspiring lawyers who intended to plead before the courts. (The solicitors'
branch of the profession which in general is now better remunerated than the
Bar lay for a long time under a cloud of relative social dis-esteem). Un¬
like the legal professions of the rest of Europe, including Scotland, the
English Bar recruited its strength from those who (until the late Nineteenth
Century) had not studied lay/ in the universities, but had been indoctrinated
with English law and its traditions through dining in the Hall of an Inn of
Court, and through moots (or argument of hypothetical cases) in these Inns.
The hierarchy of Masters, barristers and students in an Inn interacted
closely through social life and exchange of thought and experience. Though
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the Scottish and Irish Bars have their social foci in the courts themselves
and their professional activities centre on the Court libraries, or consul¬
tations at home, in England the Inn and professional Chambers are the back¬
ground to a barrister's life. Though since the late Nineteenth Century
many English barristers have studied law at the Universities, qualification
for legal practice, either as barrister or solicitor, depends upon acquiring
a professional qualification, altogether independent of university training.
Formerly English lawyers were positively hostile to university law teaching.
In the old days, as has been said, legal training was essentially based on
the Inns of Court, where students ate together, received instruction, parti¬
cipated in moots and in general absorbed the independent and insular spirit
22. M. Healy, The Old Munster Circuit.
of the English Common Law. Today the formal qualification may he gained
after eating dinners over a certain number of terms and by passing Bar exami¬
nations, themselves introduced about a century ago. These may be attempted
after attending a •crammer' or after taking a correspondence course. The
Council of Legal Education does, however, provide courses of instruction for
prospective barristers. To some extent those who set bar examinations have
to take account of the fact that many of the candidates are from overseas
and that their first language is not English. Solicitors in England take
the examinations of the Law Society. These are almost exclusively taken by
persons who do intend to practise in England and are British. The test is
considerably more exacting than for the Bar and a period of apprenticeship
of a practical kind is also required - five years, or three in the case of a
university graduate. Thus from a social anthropologists view the para¬
doxical situation is disclosed, that the English barrister is initially less
qualified and usually earns less than the solicitor, yet enjoys greater
social prestige. This paradox of status is due to history and public ig¬
norance of the solicitors' function today. Dr. Johnson's sneering refer¬
ence to attorneys as persons of low esteem still has its effect.
Though practising barristers are ejected to have had a period of pupill¬
age, the English Bar is perhaps the only profession into which a person can
be received without any practical training whatsoever. In 1574 a barrister
was forbidden to practise during his first five years after call. This
period was reduced to three years in 1614» but the rule disappeared about
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1700. Henry Ceoil (His Hon. Judge Leon) has commented 'One day there
may be a rule that no pupil shall be allowed to appear in court until he has
23* Brief to Counsel, p.66
read for one year in chambers. Unless and until that rule is made the Eng¬
lish Bar will .remain the only profession where a person is qualified to carry
on his business without ever seeing it conducted or knowing from the practic¬
al point of view how it is done.' In practice, however, most aspirants to
practise at the English Bar serve as pupil for six months or a year. Me-
pi
garry while deploring the insufficient education of barristers in pro¬
fessional skills, is content that three of the four Inns of Court have re¬
jected a proposal of the Bar Council that no one should be called to the Bar
without undergoing six months practical experience as pupil to a barrister.
On the other hand, he considers that pupillage should be required for prac¬
tice. In short, he would separate status from function, like the absentee
landlord or the sleeping partner. The cachet of being called to the Bar in
England is valued as a privilege. Though persons who have been engaged in
trade or in certain other lucrative occupations must purge themselves from
this taint, coroners, justices of the peace, journalists, and some company
directors, if not over-active, may be acceptable. Benchers of an Inn have
discretion to accept or to refuse an applicant for admission, and are not re¬
quired to state their reasons should they decide that the applicant is not a
fit person to be called to the Bar. This discretionary power in theory and
the fairly substantial dues payable for admission to the Bar and pupillage
may exclude from the profession some persons who have the required profession¬
al ability. Unlike the situation in Europe where there are several Bars or
orders of advocates, in England there is one only, but there are four collegi¬
ate societies (inns) which have the powers of admission, suspension or ex¬
pulsion. The basic powers to assert professional norms are vested in the
22f. op.cit supra, p.103 et seq.
Inns of Court. The General Council of the Bar, which was formed in 1895»
considers matters affecting the profession as a whole, such as conduct, dis¬
cipline and etiquette, but has no executive powers over the profession.
Having qualified in lav/, an English barrister v/ho seriously intends to
practise seeks admission as a pupil in chambers. This (unlike the equiva¬
lent relationship between a devil and his master in Scotland) involves the
payment of a fairly substantial fee - one hundred and ten guineas. Espec¬
ially in the present situation when many overseas students wish to gain prac¬
tical experience in England, it is very difficult to find a suitable master.
Indeed those who are most anxious to take pupils are seldom the best masters.
The problem of how to transmit the traditional professional ethics of the
English Bar to those v/ho intend to practice in former British possessions has
for some time perplexed the Inns of Court and the Council of Legal Education.
Since a very important step after pupillage is to find a good set of chambers,
the initial choice of a •master* is of considerable importance. If a young
man aspiring to practice at the Bar makes a great success of his work as a
pupil, he may be asked to remain in the chambers where he started, but if he
does not, he must find a set of chambers which will accept him. This may be
no easy matter. A man of ability accepted in good chambers may expect to
succeed. Subtle factors of association, expertise and contacts of the clerk
may help greatly. Since acceptance as a member of a set of chambers depends
on the wishes of others already there, especially the head or senior in sta¬
tus of the chambers, social acceptance is relevant as v/ell as legal ability.
Here background, connection, and other features may be very relevant. It is
unnecessary, perhaps, to develop the point that English barristers tend to
specialise in particular types of work. A man, inclined to Chancery matters
will not gravitate to one of the Temples nor join the Old Bailey Mess.
The English barrister may eventually, after reasonable success at the
junior bar, apply for 'silk', but there is less pressure on barristers to
take this step in England than in Scotland, where the patent of Queen*s
Counsel did not come into general use until the late Nineteenth century.
In England a barrister's papers are carried for him by his clerk and his bag
may be either blue or red. The accolade - the red bag - is conferred by a
silk upon a junior who has assisted him exceptionally well in some case,
though rules have now been introduced limiting these gifts because the curren¬
cy was becoming debased. Application for silk in England (for which a red
bag is an almost essential preliminary) may be refused on first request to
the Lord Chancellor, but, if granted, the barrister in effect launches into
a new career in which thepotential awards may be high or practice may dwin-
dle0 On average rather under 20 new Q.C's are created in England each year0
Of every hundred perhaps half a dozen are senior lawyers in government ser¬
vice and one or two are distinguished academic lawyers. The rest have all
been practising lawyers. It may be noted that the public image of Q.C.s
disseminated through theatre, television and the press largely in connection
with sensational causes, tends to be misleading and inaccurate. Those coun¬
sel who earn the highest fees and command greatest respect within the pro¬
fession itself seldom attract the headlines. In England, though not in
Scotland, the proximity of Westminster to the Strand has enabled many Coun¬
sel both to practise and to participate in politics as Members of Parliament.
Such duality of function has become increasingly difficult for Scottish ad¬
vocates. There is a tradition that barristers who become members of Parlia¬
ment will be granted a patent of Q.C. on more lenient terms than others, and
hence they are sometimes designated 'artifical silks' by their professionally
more proficient brethren. The effect of a political career upon counsel in
Britain would justify a separate study. The influence of politics upon pro¬
fessional mores is not altogether beneficial.
The formal dress of barristers in England corresponds in general to
that worn by advocates in Scotland though it will be noted later that the
advocate is more formal. An English barrister, if not appearing before
judges of the Supreme Court in the Strand could wear with wig, gov/n and bands
a sub-fuse suit. Those appearing in the higher courts almost always wear
black jacket and striped trousers, while Q.C.s wear a jacket of black cloth
cut on special 'Court' style. Both in England and Scotland counsel address
each other, out of court, by their surnames or, if intimate, first-names with¬
out formal style such as Mister, Sir, Lord, etc.
Remuneration of counsel in England is in theory too indelicate a matter
for discussion between barrister and either professional or lay client. The
clerk, as has been explained is the necessary 'honest broker*. A barrister
cannot sue for his fee. He himself cannot be sued for professional.negli¬
gence, yet the established counsel does not expect any longer to act from
25
charity and, as Judge Leon lias pointed out complaints about English justice
largely concern delays, expensive litigation and counsels' fees. The success¬
ful pariy in litigation seldom gets his remedy and his costs in full. If he
selects a fasionable and expensive counsel he may have to pay a substantial
proportion of the fees himself. Moreover, under the 'two-thirds rule' which
operates in England, the fee of the junior who must be briefed to support the
25* Hot Such An Ass, p.121.
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Q.C. is geared to the leader's fee up to a certain amount. Legal aid to
2^
plaintiffs of moderate means has added a further hazard. Judge Leon notes
"Not long ago a legally aided plaintiff brought a case against several de¬
fendants xvhich lasted for forty-one days. He lost it, and, while his con¬
duct was severely criticized by the judge, the defendants were completely
exonerated. Nevertheless, they had to pay their own costs themselves -
27 28
that obviously is not justice." The same learned author and also Megarry
stress that lawyers in England tend to discourage hazardous litigation, yet
those who initiate it may have less to lose than those who are forced to de¬
fend. The great increase in legal claims against doctors and hospitals re¬
flects perhaps a changed public attitude to medical men and institutions since
State services have become available, while claims in respect of vehicle and
factory accidents may well in the ultimate resort resolve themselves into
battles between insurance companies in which the parties named are but sym¬
bols. These situations alter greatly the image of the lawyer as champion
and hero, since this is largely linked in popular imagination with defence
of alleged criminals, though it is worth noting that only in 1836 were those
accused of felony permitted defence by counsel in England.
Traditionally the English Bar has upheld the very highest standard of
professional integrity and etiquette, the standards of which are fixed not
29
by the public, but by the profession itself. Megarry states 'This brings
me to one of the layman's deepest suspicions. G-ranted, he says, that there
are these and other highly ethical rules of conduct, but who knows if you
26. op.cit. pp. 124-5«
27. Henry Cecil (judge Leon) - Brief to Counsel, p.112.
28. Lawyer and Litigant in England, p.73
29. op.cit. pp.50-1.
break them? Surely it is easy enough to keep quiet about it. The answer
is simple enough. The Bar is a small and honourable profession, and with
very rare exceptions the rules are honourably and loyally observed. Often
a breach of the rules would involve something like conspiracy with a member
of another honourable profession - the solicitors. In any case, the word
gets round. Exactly how, I cannot say, but it does. With very few reser¬
vations I would accept the word of a practising barrister or solicitor as
readily as that of a bishop. This is the climate in which the Bar lives
and the neophyte takes colour from his surroundings. He can soon see why
it is that the Bench will at once accept the word of counsel from his place
30
in court without sanction of the oath.' Megarry contrasts, incidentally,
the attitudes of Indian and American lawyers (both systems derive from Eng¬
lish law) to 'trial tactics.' Another leading Q.C. in England, C.P. Harvey,
31is less starry-eyed. He writes, 'I do not suppose there is any one of us
who has been in practice for as much as twenty years who can lay his hand on
his heart and say he has never transgressed the code of honour and conduct
which he knows he ought to have observed.' Truth, perhaps, lies between
the two statements. There is no doubt that awareness of belonging to a pro¬
fessional elite has a deep influence on the conduct of an English barrister,
and this standard, as well as the screening off of the factor of financial
gain has enhanced professional status.
It is unnecessary in this thesis to rehearse the better known profession¬
al rules for barristers in England such as abstaining from advertising, or
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touting for business. Judge Leon in Not Such an Ass, raises the hypo¬
thetical case of counsel testing a lying witness, who claims to have been at
30. The Indian and American legal systems derive ultimately from English
patterns.
31. The Advocate's Devil, p.13°
32. p.163.
the theatre on a particular night, with the question "You remember, then,
the comedian slipping on the stage, and falling into the orchestra pit?"
Wo such incident had in fact occurred,, Though the author states that one
Bencher would not regard such cross-examination as culpable, he himself re¬
gards the matter as a deliberate lie quite inconsistent with professional in¬
tegrity and justifying censure of the barrister who put the question by the
Benchers of his Inn.
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Drinker recalls, in Legal Ethics, that 'In the old days a lawyer was
disbarred by literally being cast over the Bar, which was a substantial
barrier of iron or wood separating the court and its official staff from li¬
tigants and others.' Today the practice is less sensational and ceremonial.
The Inn, which has in the first place called a barrister, where he will have
shared a corporate spirit and exchanged "shop" with his brethren is also the
disciplining body. All matters of discipline - expulsion, disbarment or
suspension - are outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, but the de¬
cisions of Benchers on these matters are subject to appeal to the Lord Ghan-
3A
cellor and judges of the High Court sitting as a domestic tribunal. Com¬
plaints of professional misconduct against members of the Bar after reference
to the appropriate Inn, are first considered by the Joint Disciplinary Proce¬
dure Committee of the four Inns. This body decides whether a prima facie
case has been made out for the Benchers of the impugned person's Inn to con-
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sider. The General Council of the Bar 'Has since its inception answered
questions concerning, and given rulings regulating, the etiquette and prac¬
tice of the profession. Its rulings are matters of etiquette and not of lav;
and are not binding outside the profession.' (The procedure for striking a
33o p.34
34. W.W. Boulton, Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar, 3rd ed. 1961, p.1.
35. Boulton, ibid, p.3.
solicitor off the Rolls culminates in court action and is not a domestic
procedure like disbarring).
What has been said with regard to barristers in England applies in
general to both sexes. Judge Leon devotes chapter 23 of Brief to Counsel
to "Women at the Bar." He writes,'It is only, however, fair to warn
prospective women barristers that there is probably no profession where it
is harder for them to make headway than at the Bar. There is no good rea¬
son to think that this is due to any lack of ability on the part of women or
to any particular difference in the make-tip of a woman from that of a man.
There is still almost overwhelming prejudice against women both at
the Bar itself and among solicitors and among the public. In consequence
it is extremely difficult for a woman to find a vacancy in chambers
..Moreover, on the whole, solicitors do not care to brief women and the pub¬
lic still appears shy of entrusting its fate to a woman.' He concludes
that women have a better chance of success as solicitors.
This shrewd and sympathetic approach is confirmed by such further re¬
search as the present writer has carried out herself. A few women, like
Miss Rose Heilbron, Q.C. and Her Honour Judge Lane, have certainly succeeded.
Miss Heilbron's practice has tended to be largely identified with problems
involving women. Women are accepted as advocates in Prance on terms of
equality with men and the same is true of most Western European countries.
Perhaps significantly in these countries they may be approached directly by
their clients, and solicitor does not necessarily intervene as in England®
Judge Leon is right in pinpointing prejudice in a traditional profession as
a reason for the lack of success at the English Bar in the case of women.
There may be some slight disadvantage for a woman in her range of voice, but
36. p.160
proper training should easily overcome this ana certainly not all male coun¬
sel are audible.
Concluding this short account of the English Bar, it is suggested that
its structure and function illustrate the factors of rationality, specifi¬
city of function and unversality stressed by TaloottParsons. In status,
the successful member of the English Bar has probably figured more grandly
in popular esteem in relation to the successful solicitor than is the case
in Scotland. The English Bar has a greater monopoly of national court prac¬
tice than is the case in Scotland. The barrister in court and chambers en¬
joys high prestige professionally, but the advocate in Edinburgh fulfils a
more general social and more particular legal function which within a small
community enhances his status above the barrister in England. It may be
suggested that the pristine image of the English barrister has been to some
extent blurx-ed. As the courts become more accessible than the Ritz Hotel,
more people can form their own impression of English justice, and may regard
it perhaps as slow, expensive, ceremonious, courteous and in need of reform.
One final thought. In his review of lawyer and Litigant in England,
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Street asserts; 'It is indeed striking how little silks contribute to pub¬
lic life. Whereas every city has its solicitors who give up much of their
time to voluntary good works, one seldom reads of the Bar rendering public
service unless they are paid for it.1 It has been generally accepted that
gratuitous undertaking of public matters enhances the esteem in which a par¬
ticular group is held. Formerly the English Bar have perhaps offered public
service most conspicuously in the field of politics (before Members of Parlia¬
ment were paid) and in rendering free legal aid before the Legal Aid Acts
37. (1963)7J.S.P.T.L. (N.S.) 140.
came into effect,. If Professor Street is right in his comment, the public
image of leading barristers and solicitors should be reversed, yet this would
not seem to be the case. Perhaps this is in part due to history and in part
to distorted publicity. Both branches of the legal profession in England
have sought in a documentary television film The Lawyers, to create a fa¬
vourable public image on the public. Professional rather than public ser¬
vice was stressed - 'professional' implying a special relationship of trust
between lawyer and client rather than pursuit of gain; regard for a strict
code of ethics and the transmission of a specialised and developing body of
knowledge. Every lawyer knows that a litigant will fail to get all he wants
through delay, uncertainty and expense. The English layman who believes
that justice demands a quick and complete remedy may not have been convinced
by this film of the need for such specialisation of function that a simple
dispute regarding the spreading of tree roots must be fought out by barris¬
ters in the High Court in London. An American would be sceptical. A
social anthropological study of the English legal profession should certain¬
ly follow up audience reaction to the film.
UNITED STATES
The United States, with the exception of the State of Louisiana, share
with England what English and American lawyers call the Common Law. This is
often contrasted with the other great legal tradition of the West - Civil or
Romanistic Law. Louisiana like Scotland draws many of her legal principles
from the Civil Law, but both have been influenced by the' Common Law of their
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neighbours. The fact that so essentially ;,;i English an institution as
the English Common Law should have such world-wide importance today is large¬
ly due to the fact that the United States - which is now peopled mainly by
citizens whose ethnic origins are not English, adopted the legal system of
English Colonists when these did predominate. Despite the shared legal
tradition of the Common Law, however, the American variety has come to differ
in many ways from that of England, and the legal professions of the two coun¬
tries are organised and function in ways which contrast strikingly. It must,
of course, also be stressed that most generalisations about American Lawyers
are perilous because of the difference between State practices and traditions,
ranging from the New England States to those of the Par West and from Alaska
to New Mexico. English barristers may be considered as a concentrated
group. American lawyers cannot.
39
Riesman has suggested that in America the judge is the hero image, and
the higher the court the greater the prestige. Public attention and the
training of law students are focused on the judicial process and on case-lav/.
Riesman rightly discerns that very important functions are carried out by
other types of lawyers than court lawyers, and suggests that re-evaluation of
legal roles in society is desirable and that such re-evaluation should be re¬
flected in legal education. He seems to under-estimate, as many American
lawyers do, the importance of case law in codified systems. As a graduate
38. For a summary of the present position see T.B. Smith's Studies Critical
& Comparative, |$.XVII et seq. For the evolution of the Louisiana Bench
& Bar, see H. Plauche Dart, The History of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
133laR.ep p.XXX - also papers on the Louisiana'Bar & The Court & Juris¬
prudence read by Thos.W.Leigh & Judge John T.Hood on the occasion of the
Sesquicentiennuel celebration of the Supreme Court of Louisiana on 7th
March 1963 and now published as The Sesquicentennial of the Supreme Court
of Louisiana (1964)•
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of Harvard Law School, he appreciated at first hand the importance attached
to the 'case book* method of legal education there, and the resulting forma¬
tion of the «judge hero image. The present author is not a lawyer and would
not contradict Riesman in his specialist field. She may, however, offer a
certain gloss based on a limited period of observation and fairly intensive
discussion with leading American lawyers, social anthropologists, and in¬
formed citizens generally.
First, bearing in mind the current tradition of American legal education,
of which Harvard is the leading exponent, it is surprising that the judiciary
have become 'hero images* for the lawyer in training. The so-called'Soc-
ratic discussion' of cases involves as a rule at a very early stage intensive
criticism by students of the 'problem solving techniques' of the judges0
Under the influence of certain teachers, moreover, particular Justices of the
Supreme Court become objects almost of antipathy. Secondly, in the United
States there are many categories of judges. Some, like those on the Feder¬
al Courts, are permanent appointments; others, like judges in the State of
New York, are elected on a political basis for a period of years, but if a
New York judge gains professional esteem, he is likely to be continued in
office for his working life. Other judges are elected and hold office only
so long as the political party to which they are affiliated remains in power.
The prestige attaching to the American judiciary - if such a general expression
can be justified at all - is not necessarily uniform. In general it is not
as great as that which is enjoyed by the English judges, the prestige of whose
offices are enhanced by tradition, ceremonial and by the fact that their par¬
ty politics do not in modern times influence appointments or tenure. Never¬
theless, since the Supreme Court in the United States is ultimate custodian
48o
of the Constitution, its Justices have very great prestige and exercise great¬
er power than the judicial members of the House of Lords in Britain. The
latter have never held an Act of Parliament to be unconstitutional, though
the Supreme Court of the United States may reject an Act of Congress. Again,
by construing the basic Constitution very flexibly the Supreme Court acts de¬
liberately as a law maker and lav/ reformer, developing social trends which
appear to them desirable andc&ttrtuvjthose which offend them.^
Passing from the judges a short account of the legal profession in the
United States will be attempted. In colonial times - and perhaps to the
Americans alone this word is not pejorative - those who aspired to practice
I A
went to study at the Inns of Court in London and on their return became
leaders in their respective communities. During the early part of the Nine¬
teenth Century however, professions and privileged organisations such as Bar
Associations tended to be regarded as undemocratic and un-American. One re¬
sult was the lowering of standards in such matters as character, education and
\n
training of lawyers. Several states provided that any voter of good moral
character might practise law (Dean Griswold has told the author that this is
still true in one State, though the law has been construed to the effect that,
bearing in mind the complexity of the law, 'no person of good moral character
would resort to practice unless he had been trained1). In the period which
followed the Civil War (the late 1860s and 1870s), standards sank to the low¬
est level in legal practice. Emeritus Dean Roscoe Pound in The Lawyer from
I "Z
Antiquity to Modern Times, record's the cycle 'Prom recognition at first
that the legal profession as a whole had problems, functions and obligations
40„ See in partic. E.N. G-riswold Law and Lawyers in the United States,
Chapters 4 & 5 passimp
41. Drinker, Legal Ethics, p.5.
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transcending those of the individual lawyer or group of lawyers, to gradual
loss and finally all but giving up of the professional idea, thence to the
gradual regaining of that idea and final achievement of it again in the in¬
tegrated state bar of today.' Whether the achievement is final or complete
is a question of opinion. In the same work Pound states that in his view
•the term "profession" refers to a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common aaswae calling in the spirit ofapublic service - no less a public ser¬
vice because it may immediately be a means of livelihood. Historically there
are three ideas involved in profession; organisation, learning, i.e., pursuit
of a learned art, and a spirit of public service. These are essential.'
Not all Americans would venture to assert that public before private in¬
terests and trust relationship rather than eagerness for economic reward was
uppermost in the minds of all the legal profession. In a lecture delivered
to Cornell Law School in 1938» Professor Arthur E. Sutherland of Harvard con¬
sidered frankly the lawyer's image of himself, and his image for the public.^4"
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Could not his life have been spent more satisfyingly in other work? A law¬
yer was bound to reflect on the peculiar dislike which lawyers as a class seem
to attract, especially in times of hardship. A tricky and grasping shyster
i c
has always been a favourite subject for novelists, and Sutherland, himself
a lawyer of outstanding integrity, quotes the American adage, 'Why does a
hearse horse snicker? Hauling a lawyer away A calling which is wide¬
ly distrusted and misunderstood, is not by any to be entered upon unadvisedly
or lightly.'
Sutherland points out that their first contact with the administration




of justice will form the citizens' impression of its justice. 'Socially
speaking, the administration of justice in Magistrates' Courts may he far
more important than in an Appellate Tribunal'2^ T.B. Smith has expressed a
similar thought in connection with Scotland;2^ 'If the quality of a coun¬
try' s laws may best be assessed by considering the pronouncements of the high¬
est tribunals, the quality of a country's justice is most frequently tested in
those lower courts which handle the great bulk of civil and criminal business.'
L9Sutherland 1 observes that a lawyer 'sees an army of young men crowding to be
admitted to the Bar, and rightly ejects that his struggle for a livelihood
will be hard and discouraging. No very good remedy for this is apparent, but
if the lawyer could look for popular respect and esteem to compensate for his
small earnings, he could be more contented.' This factor of popular esteem
50is again stressed in another context. 'The professional function of the
defendant's lawyer calls for considerable art; for he must see that the accu¬
sed is acquitted if this is decently possible, and at the same time he ought
to keep in mind his duty to the administration of justice in general and re¬
late his specific case to it While very few practitioners fail to re¬
cognise that in the practice of advocacy the interest of the client is always
to be prefex-red to that of the advocate, quite a number forget that the general
public is the collective client of the Bar, and that where there is a prospect
of the improvement of judicial procedure, the Bar should be the first to wel¬
come the change, though it be at the expense of its members.' During her
visit to Philadelphia, the present writer met an eminent American practitioner
47. ibid. 548
48. British Justice; The Scottish Contribution p.53
49. op.cit. p. 547
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who resented the Bar Association's policy of requiring lawyers to- charge a
minimum fee. This he regarded as an encroachment of his right to spare the
pocket of a client of modest means. No doubt, as Professor Sutherland im¬
plies, not all American lawyers put their financial advantage as a secondary
consideration, and it has been suggested that not a few Scottish Advocates
supported the retention in Scotland of the alien system of Civil jury trial
because it suited their practice. The attitude of a minority in a profession,
if sufficiently publicised may affect the public image and, in Sutherland's
view, it is necessary to educate the public regarding the efforts of the Bar
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Association to better the administration of justice 'If the public comes to
feel that the Bar is fulfilled with a truly disinterested zeal for the general
good, and is consciously making an effort to make justice quicker, cheaper and
more certain for everyone the lawyer will begin to enjoy a new public trust.'
He also stresses that a lawyer's reputation for legal scholarship enhances his
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prestige, both with the public and with his colleagues, 'In the presence of
learning, he (i.e. the man in the street) is subdued, for he knows that the
scholar could not buy his scholarship.'
Writing his paper in 1938, Sutherland did not and, indeed, could not have
foreseen the change which war would bring in the status, both of his country
and of his profession. He looked back on the American lawyers of the past;
the young pioneer with Blackstone in his saddle-bags, the rise of the corpora¬
tion lawyer in the era of industrial expansion, the setting up of huge, de-
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partmentalised law firms. The last, he thought, might be on the way out,
•Possibly these changes may make our lawyer what his brother is today in some
European nations, an individual consultant and advocate, generally having his
51• p.552
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chambers and his library in his dwelling, with a much smaller amount of office
machinery than we now think necessary.' In short, Sutherland was describing
the ideal image of the advocate in Scotland at the time he spoke, consulting
in his own home, surrounded by his books; and with virtually no office equip¬
ment. This has not, however, been the recent trend in America. Lav/ firms
are very large and very specialised in the more populous cities, and probably
have become more prosperous than ever before. The great number of books, es¬
pecially Law Reports, used by an American lawyer in practice, seems, in effect,
to preclude him from working at home. He works long, hard office hours like
a business executive.
Other informed observers of the American scene, e.g., Harlan ]?. Stone,
5h-
'Public Influence of the Bar' noted that the emergence of new and complex
economic forces in America during the Nineteenth century, found 'the American
Bar like other elements of the life of the nation, ill-prepared for a change
so wide and sweeping. The rise of the big business has produced an inevitable
specialisation of the Bar. The successful lawyer of our day, more often than
not, is the proprietor or general manager of a new type of factory whose legal
product is increasingly the result of mass production methods. More and more,
the amount of his income is the measure of his professional success. More and
more, he must look for his rewards to the material satisfactions derived from
profits as from a successfully conducted business rather than to the intangi¬
ble and indubitably more endurable satisfactions which are to be found in a
professional service more consciously directed towards the advancement of pub¬
lic interest. Steadily, the best skill and capacity has been drawn into the
exacting and highly specialised service of business and finance. At its best
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the changed system has brought to the command of the business world, loyalty
and a superb proficiency and technical skill0 At its worst, it has made the
learned profession of an earlier day, the obsequious servant of business, and
tainted it with the morals and manners of a market place.*
55Stone observed that the American lawyer had stood highest in public es¬
teem when he dealt with great public problems such as immunity from arbitary
arrest. Today, public thought is largely concerned with anti-social business
practices, yet lawyers have been slow to deal with these. His solution to
the problem as to how the public image of the American lawyer could be im¬
proved depended largely on the Law Schools in co-operation with the leaders
56of the Bar. He observed wisely, however, *1 do not refer to the teaching
of professional ethics. I have no thought that men are made moral by the
mere formulation of rules of conduct, no matter how solemnly the Bar Associ¬
ations may pronounce them, or that they may be made good by es^rtation. But
men serve causes because of their devotion to them.' He had in mind a new
emphasis in legal education. Law Schools in America have raised their stand¬
ards to require a high degree of efficiency, but insufficient stress has been
given to'the social responsibility which rests upon a public profession.'
In the light of these statements and solutions put forward by eminent
American lawyers, the present writer will venture a fey»' short comments on
American legal education and on the Bar Associations. Between these, respon¬
sibility seems to rest for creating the lawyer's own image of his profession.
American lawyers, unlike those in England, are almost always the product
of a law School. There are State Bar Examinations but the real training and




Since there are many States, each with its legal system, generally speaking,
State laws are ignored in law teaching. Some small State Law Schools concen¬
trate oft the local system% hut the big national Law Schoolsj such as Harvard,
attract students from all parts of the United States. The legal education
which they give is thus general in the sense that Civil Law used to be taught
in Europe before the national codifications. Interestingly perhaps, the sta¬
tus of a Law Professor at a leading Law School stands high, in particular at
Harvard. Leading American law teachers are not, on the whole, 'academic types
but usually have had active professional experience and undertake many public
duties which command the esteem of law practitioners. Many are constantly
consulted at top Government level, others act as arbitraters in labour disputes
others revise legislation, others through the American Law Institute and other¬
wise put forward projects for codification and revision of the lav/. The Deans
of the Harvard Law Schools are particularly respected, and in an American Uni¬
versity, Deans generally have considerable responsibility and prestige. Train
ing in Law School is essentially professional in orientation. From the outset
a spirit of competition is inculcated, and the first year student is ruthlessly
subjected to the so-called 'Socratic' or 'case book* method. He is trained to
be a problem-solver rather than as a legal theorist. One of the most interest
ing accounts for one who is not American is A.E. Sutherland's La Formation du
Juriste Americaine, an address delivered at Grenoble on 7th December, 1956.
In particular he justifies the present pattern of American education because of
the complexity and detail of the American Legal System. professor Sutherland'
address v/as aimed at a French audience. During the writer's time at Harvard,
she attended a colloquium on legal education with a number of foreign students
(some teachers of law in their own countries). Those who had been trained in
the Civilian systems were unanimous that, though the 'case book and materials'
method was useful as a teaching technique in small groups and with students who
had received systematic instruction in subjects being discussed, this method
was not suitable for teaching civilian students in their first year. The me¬
thod was slow, and the inaudibility and irrelevance of some of the discussion
wasted the time of many in the larger classes. Already it would seem that some
modification in the system is thought desirable, even in America. It certain¬
ly has the merit of having superseded the reiterated set-piece lecture sometimes
common in our own country. After the first year, a really crucial year in the
career of an American lawyer, students are given a wide range of 'electives' to
choose from and instead of the very large classes, they may meet in smaller
groups, which are better suited for close oral discussion.
The competitive spirit which American legal training encourages is no doubt
reflected in later life by those who aspire to and gain the best paid jobs in
law firms. Those who are in the top few per cent of the first year, go on to
the Law Review, which carries status for the rest of the editor's life, somewhat
like getting a first or gold medal for the most distinguished graduate. from
this select group law firms do their recruiting, and the starting salaries
offered to the top law graduates of the leading Law Schools are very high.
These, having taken a first degree before a Law degree are very frequently
married with children. To many women a Harvard Law graduate, especially if
he is on the Review, is a very good 'investment' for matrimony. It is perhaps
also worth noting that students assess each other's status by the grades each
has earned at Law School, e.g., 'A average' at the top with ' C+ average' rat¬
ing as mediocrity. Competition is, however, man against man, not against
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Bogey, and the consequences of being one-up may determine a man's career.
Thus a student who missed one examination out of four in his first year diet,
having had an operation for appendicitis, felt that his ambitions had been
permanently frustrated. The Librarian of one Lai? School (not Harvard) com¬
plained that students would abstract books not so much to use them, as to im¬
pede the studies of competing students.
Among the branches of study most favoured are corporation (i.e. company)
law, taxation, trusts, investment and so forth. The more purely academic
subjects such as legal history and Roman Law are taken by very few. Compara¬
tive Law is attracting increasing interest, and the most ambitious clearly
contemplate a career which will have world-wide legal interests.
The most brilliant or successful students may have, in America, an exper¬
ience which has its counterpart in some European countries. They may serve
for a year as 'law clerk' to a judge. Not only does this give them insight
into how the judicial process works, but it also exposes the judges to indi¬
rect indoctrination with the latest Law School thinking. This probably fos¬
ters a closer understanding between law teachers and the judiciary, and of
course in American, unlike England, there are not infrequent instances of
judges becoming professors, and professors judges.
A law graduate in American may go into a large or a small firm, into in¬
dustry or into Government service or practise as an individual. With a popu¬
lation of over 180 millions, the United States has about 296,000 lawyers. Of
these, some 200,000 are in private practice, 26,000 in industry and 29,000 in
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Government service. Dean Grxswold points out that, though the population
57» Lav? and Lawyers in the United States, pp 5-6, The proportion of lawyers
in Scotland to the total population of the country approximates much more
closely to the American pattern - though, of course, the percentage of ad¬
vocates in the population is much smaller than the percentage of barris¬
ters in England. See M.C. Meston's review 1965 S.L.T. (Mews) 64.
of the United States is nearly four times that of the United Kingdom, it has
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more than ten times as many lawyers. Those who practice on their own in Ameri¬
ca tend to have lower educational qualifications than those in firms, and'more
often come from working class and entrepreneurial families of minority reli¬
gious ana ethnic status.1 Very large firms have specialists for each parti¬
cular aspect of legal work. Some firms specialise in finance, like those in
Wall Street, others, so well described by Horsky in The Washington Lawyer, are
largely concerned with what could crudely be described as 'lobbying in Congress.'
There are, however, very many small law firms throughout the country, and many
men do not aspire to the intensive work of the big town. They live useful and
respected lives in the smaller communities. One contrast with the situation
in Britain may be stressed - the small town lawyer may be admitted to practise
before the Supreme Court of the United States and will probably seize the chance
of a lifetime if his case has to be argued there. The Washington firms do not,
as in London, have a monopoly of ultimate appellate work. Here, specialisation
of function does not operate.
Traditionally, the legal profession combined with politics, has provided
a ladder to the most influential public positions in the country, the President,
Secretary of State, Attorney-General, and so forth. An excursus into American
politics would be out of place, but it may not be altogether irrelevant, in con¬
sidering the status of the American lawyer, to suggest that the influence of
politics on the profession has not been altogether favourable. Among the con¬
trasts which may be made with British practice, one may note that an Attorney-
G-eneral who goes out of office usually returns to the large firm with which he
58„ ibid. p.30
has been associated before. Judicial appointments are closely linked with
politics. At the top, even certain Supreme Court appointments have been
strongly influenced by political considerations, while in many States, judges
are elected and hold office, subject to re-election. If the judge's party
goes out of office he may go too, returning to practice. Such a judge has to
consider his public image and his relations with the practicing profession much
more than is the case in Britain. Moreover, relatively he enjoys less pres¬
tige in relation to counsel. Judges are robed simply in black; counsel do
not wear robes, though some of those appearing before the Supreme Court wear
morning dress. In general, their working dress is that of business men.
The author saw many American lawyers during her visit, but, even so,
visited only a few main centres of so vast a country as the United States.
It seemed to her that, however justified Sutherland may have been in 1938 in
his observations about the smallness of rewards and the unfavourable public
image of lawyers, the profession today attracts more and more recruits who are
convinced that by hard work and competition, they can earn very high salaries.
A more relaxed attitude was apparent among leading lawyers in Louisiana, where
she formed the impression that a lawyer"s life was more amiable, relaxed and
social than was possible, say, in New York. Since family tradition and a
more or less' set order of society seems to be established in Louisiana, the
general public image of the lawyer within the state may be more favourable in
some ways - though this is cut across by aspects of politics which affect the
national image. That a District Attorney in 1963 should have made political
capital out of the prosecution of * strip joints' and should have accused judges
in New Orleans of corruption, was somewhat startling. Such professional be¬
haviour would have been almost incredible in New York or Boston.
Through courses at Law Schools on 'The Legal Profession* or 'Legal Ethics'
and through lav; teaching generally in the best Law Schools by men of high prin¬
ciples, the aspirant to practice in America is made aware of the special obli-
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gatxons of his professional role. The other main influence on professional
behaviour is the formation of Bar Associations.^ These were set up to resist
the post Civil War commercialisation of a lawyer's work, and to establish ade¬
quate standards of character, education and training for the profession of lav/.
The American Bar Association was organised in 1878. Its objectives include
'The maintenance of high standards of legal education and professional conduct
to the end that only those properly qualified so to do, shall undertake to per¬
form legal service.' Bar Associations have also been set up in all the States
of the Union, and in the District of Columbia with like objects. In 25 States
the Bar is integrated, an e:q?ression which has no reference to the racial ques¬
tions, but which means that every practising lawyer must be a supporting mem¬
ber of one of the Bar Associations, and as such adhere to its canons, ethics
and discipline. In all other States, voluntary Bar Associations are estab¬
lished, but membership is not compulsory. As a result, the less scrupulous
need not accept the Associations' standards. These standards are usually set
out in 'Canons of Professional Ethics*. Some State Bar Associations have
drafted their own canons, while others have adopted those of the American Bar
Association. All are strongly influenced by the American Bar Association's
canons, and by the interpretation of them by the American Bar Association's
Ethics Committee. These canons cover the lawyer's obligations to the public,
59. Eor teaching & research material see esp. Drinker Legal Ethics and
Cheatham Legal Profession (passim)
60. Eor a realistic assessment of these see G-riswold Lav; and Lawyers in the
United States, pp. 28-29.
to the court, to his client, and to other members of the profession, and deal
with such matters as advertising and soliciting business. Among the main con¬
trasts with the English legal profession, may be mentioned the fact that • the
Bar* in America does not imply the same specialised function of the English
barrister, but comprises those who discharge barristers' or solicitors' func¬
tions. Disbarment is a function of the court, not of an Inn; 'contingent
fees' are permitted; and Bar Associations may advertise within limits. The
contingent fee, an arrangement by which a lawyer takes on a case on the under¬
standing that he will be remunerated if he succeeds, may be regarded as quite
&2.
ethical, and indeed in Scotland, before legal aid, the practice was not dis¬
approved as in England. Advertising is regarded as ethical if carried out,
not by individuals but by organised Bar Associations 'to enhance the esteem of
the legal profession' , and the judicial process. The Legal Ethics Committee
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of the Michigan Bar Association in an opinion as to the propriety of a 'radio
sketch*, stressed that the advertisement must be carried out in such a way 'as
to avoid the impression that it is actuated by selfish desire to increase pro¬
fessional employment'. Radio advertisement was permitted. Perhaps a rele¬
vant comparison would be with the film 'The Lawyers' which was sponsored by
the English Bar and Law Society, again to promote and correct a popular image
of the lawyer in society.
To generalise about the American legal profession is, because of its di¬
versity, and numbers, impossible. Unfortunately, popular television programmes
have too much promotedapublic image of the criminal lawyer, using 'trial tactics'
in courts where the formal trappings and reserved manners of British justice are
noticeably absent. The public image of a criminal lawyer is not the image he
62. ~ - "
presents in the legal profession as a whole. Indeed, those who take criminal
work are often in effect despised by other lawyers, the attitude being that a
lawyer becomes like the type of client for whom he appears. Counsel appear
in lounge suits, and sit beside an accused client. Justice Brennan in 19&3
at Harvard, stressed the need for the country's leading lawyers to take an ac¬
tive and less 'holier than thou' attitude to criminal, practice. Where, how¬
ever, the criminal law indirectly involves questions of civil rights, e.g.
liberty, racial equality and so forth, criminal practice becomes respectable.
The constitutional issues overshadow those of crime. Dean G-riswold of Harvard
Law School, presides over the Committee which investigates invasions of civil
l-iberty throughout the United States, and his great prestige has an effect on
the law student and practitioner in the general defence of civil liberties in
the Courts.^
In conclusion, we may note that, where the canons of ethics laid down by
the Bar Associations are fully observed in the spirit as in the letter, America
produces lawyers of the highest professional integrity, and the leaders of the
profession are usually such, though more commercially orientated than in Brit¬
ain. At the other end of the scale may be found lawyers, as in Houston, Texas,
who are prepared to erqplain on television the tactics which they used to dis¬
tract a jury's attention, and who perform before television cameras at capital
trials. The general public image of the American lawyer is therefore some¬
what blurred or contradictory, and the bad tends to oust the good among those
who have had personal and unpleasant experience of the law in action.
64. See generally his Law and Lawyers in the United States, chapter 5 passim
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Chapter 3
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FACULTY OF ADVOCATES: ITS SOCIAL MP PROFESSIONAL SETTING
The evolution of the Faculty of Advocates and its social and professional
setting must now "be considered in some detail. illthough the expression
Advocate is used in early Scottish Statutes such as the Act of 1424, c.45,
which provided for legal aid to the indigent, the Faculty of Advocates as
such dates from 1532 when the Court of Session was constituted as a College
of Justice. Before this time, though friends of litigants could appear as
unpaid amateurs, there had of course "been professional lawyers, lay and
ecclesiastical, variously described as 'fore-speakeris', 'procurators' or
'prolocutors'. The functions of advocate and solicitor had not yet been
differentiated, though those of the notary had been set apart for historical
reasons. In the sixteenth century the law teacher was essentially an
ecclesiastic. As early as 1455, a distinctive costume (a green tabard) for
pleaders was prescribed by Act of Parliament."'" Between 1496 and 1501, at
least a dozen pleaders can be identified as in extensive practice before the
2
highest courts, and procurators appeared regularly in the Sbea^uFf courts.
The position of Notary also flourished in Scotland as on the Continent, though
from 1469 the King asserted the exclusive right to appoint candidates for that
branch of legal practice. It was exercised mainly out of court.^ By the
Act of institution of the Court of Session, the designation 'Advocate' is applied
1. A.P.S. ii. p.43,t'H-
2. See Cooper, Selected Papers, p. 231 et seq.
3. See Introduction to Scottish Legal History, Stair Society Volume 20,
pp. 23, 29, 33: J.C. Brown, The Origin and Early History of the Office
of Notary; Anon. The Office of Notary (1792).
to the procurators who have qualified to plead-before that Court. It was
provided "that thair be a certain nommer of Advocates and Procurators to the
nommer of ten persons of best name, knowledge and experience admitted to
procure in all actions". The business of the Court soon required this limit
to be exceeded. By 1587, when Advocates were first allowed in cases of
treason and appeared regularly before the Criminal Courts'^, the Faculty of
Advocates comprised 54 practitioners. The numerical strength of the Faculty
over the centuries has fluctuated but, bearing in mind the increase of the
national population, is probably approximately the same percentage today in
relation to the national population as in the sixteenth century, and much less
than in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The exclusive privilege of
appearing before the Supreme Courts in Scotland has always been restricted
to a small group. In 1762, the number of those who had been admitted to the
Faculty was 210, in 1794 there were 236, in 1810 nearly 300, in 1826 nearly
400 and in 1832, the year of the First Reform Act, a peak figure of 442 was
reached. In 1848, numbers had fallen to 425» This was maintained up to
1861 though only about 120 were actually in practice. The status of Advocate
was sought for its own sake, even by those who did not intend to practise.
In 1876, there were 377 members of the Faculty of Advocates of whom about 130
actually attended the Courts and in 1965 there are some 300 members of whom
just over a third are in daily attendance at Courts.
The development of the corporate existence of the Faculty can be traced
with reasonable accuracy and it is clear that the present specialisation of
4. See Acts, 1587 cc. 38-91 Graham v Cutlibert, y. 1951 J.C. 25.
5. See Mackay, The Practice of the Court of Session;!yp. 103.
function did not always exist. Thus, Mr. David Ayton, a prominent Advocate
was 'doer' to the Earl of Rothes, and as late as 1762 Advocates resisted
attempts hy law agents to organise themselves as a separate branch of the
legal profession. The Society of writers to His Majesty's Signet was fully
organised in 1594- but on the establishment of the Court of Session in 1532
the Writers, like the Advocates, had been incorporated in the College of
Justice itself. Advocates and Writers to the Signet frequently united to
defend their common privileges and at one time fusion of these two bodies
g
seemed probable. Though in origin both bodies had just been associations
of lawyers like others throughout the country, through their close connection
with the Central Courts they soon established themselves as exclusive and
influential groups, restricting admission to their ranks by social, financial
and educational controls. An applicant for admission to these professional
groups was moreover required to have undergone a practical training or
apprenticeship under an established member of the group from whom he learned
not only the necessary skills but also the ethos of the group. This thought
will be developed at a later stage, discussing what is loosely called 'devil¬
ling' . The division of the legal profession in Scotland between Advocates
and Solicitors might well have taken a different course: namely, between legal
bodies incorporated in the College of Justice and those not so privileged,
i.e., those who belonged to the faculties of procurators who practised in
other courts. Indeed, a provision in the Union of 1707 provides for the
possibility of appointing Writers to the Signet as well as Advocates to the
Bench of the Court of Session. By specialisation of function, however, the
6. Introduction to Scottish Legal History, p. 29.
Society of Writers to the Signet has merged without losing its identity into
the Solicitors' branch of the profession, which has since 1949 required
membership of the Law Society of Scotland. The Faculty of Advocates shedding
the function of la?/ agents and specialising in advocacy, aire to be widely
regarded as the £lite of Scotland.
Partly through Acts of Sederunt passed by the judges and partly through
a growing sense of professional solidarity, the advocate's role and position
in the community was worked out. As from 1582 the Faculty elected one of
its number to the office of Dean corresponding to the Bdtonnier in France,
and successive holders of the office of Dean have been the acknowledged leaders
in the matters of professional etiquette and in asserting the Faculty's rights
and privileges. The Faculty has always been an exclusive 'club' restricting
membership by controls in respect of qualifications, the requirement of a
substantial financial contribution and to some extent in the past by a social
exclusiveness. To this day, the formality of a ballot for a new intrant takes
place. Admission is not a right which can be demanded on proof of professional
competence.
The custom^ of foreign study and education which prevailed until the end
of the eighteenth century provided Scots Judges and Advocates of the past with
a more cosmopolitan and European outlook on legal and social problems than may
be observed in their successors who, if they have studied outside Scotland, have
usually done so at Oxford or Cambridge. Much of the anglicising of Scottish
Law comes from the mid nineteenth century and may well be due to the cultural
conditioning of so many of those who practised and administered it after the
European trained generation had died out. The anglicisation of the Scottish
middle class is in itself a phenomenon on which extensive research could be
undertaken, and is outside the scope of the present thesis. Some consideration
7. See Boswell in Holland. Ed. Pottle passim. T.B. Smith Studies Critical
and Comparative esp. pp. 28, 53, 51 an<l 57.
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of it, in connection with the Faculty of Advocates is, however, essential
since this small group, Scottish in origin, and professionally immobile,
has been influential in the national life far beyond the field of law.
For the sake of perspective, the social setting of the Faculty and its members
will be described briefly as at different key periods before and after the
Union with England. Social and political factors rather than legal trends
should determine the divisions, but, as with any historical process, dates
indicate water sheds rather than boundary walls.
From the Institution of the Court of Session to the Union. 1532-1707
Until after the Restoration, the Members of the Faculty of Advocates had
a high status, but the Faculty itself had little control over its own member¬
ship. Those deemed eligible had either studied abroad or had gained experience
as auditors over a considerable period of time. The Judges controlled
admission - sometimes, it was suggested, without discrimination - and those
who were admitted were anxious to keep numbers low. R.3le segregation was
not, however, absolute. Thomas Hope was admitted to the Faculty in 1605.
He 'had been' servant (? devil) to an advocate in 1599 and also after admission
acted as 'solicitor' in cases affecting Crown interest in ecclesiastical
8
property. Among the privileges then enjoyed by Advocates as members of the
College of Justice were exemption from taxation and priority for the hearing
of their personal actions in the Court. In 1589, 70 Advocates who had already
been admitted objected to the institution of a Chair of Law in Edinburgh,
allegedly because they were not fully employed and because there was already
"as much law in Edinburgh as siller to pay for it". The Faculty's distrust
of legal education in Scotland except under its own control, which still to
some extent continues, may be contrasted with its encouragement of intrants to
acquire higher education in the Liberal Arts and its permissive attitude to
8. Hannay College of Justice Introduction p.xv.
legal studies ahead.
Before the Reformation, though KLphinstone's Foundation at Aberdeen was
intended to provide legal education for laymen, University La?/ teaching
in Scotland was hased on the Civil, Roman and Canon Law. Those who studied
in Scotland were largely clerks and one of the important consequences of the
Reformation was the laicizing of the legal profession. There was, of course,
no University Law School in Edinburgh and this seems to have been largely
due to the hostility of the Faculty of Advocates. Lord President Reid's
bequest in 1558 to endow a College of Arts and Law in Edinburgh was mis¬
appropriated, and, though in 1590 the College of Justice and Town Council
contributed to establish a Professor of Law, neither of the two persons
appointed taught law at all. The Book of Discipline in 1560 contemplated a
4. year course in Municipal (i.e. Scots) and Roman law, to be given at St.
Andrews, Glasgow and Aberdeen, but not in Edinburgh and significantly also
replacing the study of Canon Law with Scots Law. However, these proposals
were not implemented. It may be that frustration of the original plan was
due to the influence of the Geneva theocracy upon that of Scotland. The
Geneva ministers opposed the erection of a Law Faculty there because "those
who apply themselves in this Faculty are, for the most part, of dissolute
habits, being young men of quality". Certainly, those who aspired to practice
in the Court of Session in the mid sixteenth century were, in general young •
men of quality. They sought their basic legal education in the Law Schools
of France up to the Restoration period and picked up their kno?;ledge of the
specialities of Scots Law through observing the business of Parliament House
and through private instruction from established Advocates.
The first Advocates seem to have been admitted without any trial of
fitness, on the personal knowledge of the Judges, but in l6l0, the Faculty
petitioned, the Court that none should be admitted who had not either studied
philosophy at some university and thereafter law for 2 years or had been brought
up "under some old learned Advocate" for 7 years, and had given proof of his
ability to the Faculty. By Act of Sederunt in 1619, 12th February, an
examination and thesis in the Civil (Roman) Law was made compulsory as the
ordinary mode of admission. An extraordinary method was, however, prescribed
according to which an intrant was examined in Scots Law only. In this case
he paid double fees and composed no thesis. Qualification through the Civil
Law was regarded as the more honourable mode of entry.
An apprentice advocate acted as 'servitor' or 'devil' to his master and,
on occasions could appear for him in Court. Sir Thomas Craig, who wrote his
first treatise on Scots Law for the benefit of the students, compiled it in
the last years of the sixteenth century and first few years of the seventeenth.
He had taken an Arts degree at St. Andrews and had then studied law in Paris
before his admission to the Faculty of Advocates. He practised for 45 years.
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Of him Lord Clyde has written "the tradition of the Bar to which he was called
in 1563 has always fostered and happily still fosters among its members, a
blend of professional and public ambitions favourable to the attainment of a
poise of mind in which conscientious loyalty to precedent and authority is
balanced by broad conceptions of legal principle. Craig is never a mere lawyer,
Law as he sees it is the science of right and occupies its proper place in re¬
lation to the wider Sciences of Government, Politics and of Humanity itself".
9. Jus Feudale. i, Translator's Note xx.
Despite his eminence as Advocate, Craig was not appointed to the Bench.
The custom of appointing Senators of the College of Justice exclusively from
senior Advocates was a later development. Between the years 1538 and l60$
only one third of the Bench was appointed from the Bar.
Sir Thomas Hope who admitted in 1605 also practised for over 40 years
and for 17 years as Lord Advocate. tQwond in his Loxl Advocates of Scotland"^
observed that he "was not only a great statesman, but a very great lawyer.
He had an immense practice at the Bar and in accordance with the custom of
his profession, invested his gains in the purchase of land... Three of his
sons were on the Bench... There is a vague tradition that when pleading before
his sons Sir Thomas used to remain covered and from this circumstance Lord
Advocates acquired the privilege of pleading with their hats on. It is more
probable th„t the Lord Advocates' privilege of wearing his hat in Court
originated from the fact that as an Officer of State he sat covered in the
Parliament House and therefore claimed the right to appear covered before
the Judges in the Tolbooth"
The position of the Lord Advocate who combines the roles of political
and legal functions with those of public prosecutor must be noted properly
at a later stage. The Lord Advocate was nominated one of the Judges on the
Institution of the College of Justice, but Sir John Nisbet of Dirldton was the
last person to combine the office of Lord Advocate and of Senator of the College
of Justice. He was appointed in 1664. The Lord Advocate still sits on
a special seat within the Bar, though the Dean of Faculty takes precedence of
10. Vol. 1. p. 145.
11. cf. R.P.C. 2nd series i, p. 303, vii p.163-6.
the Lord Advocate in domestic Faculty matters. The offices of Dean and Lord
Advocate have been held by one person concurrently, but this is a situation
unlikely to recur. The institution of the office of Dean of Faculty, first
recorded in 1582, assisted greatly in developing a corporate sense in the Faculty.
As with the general framework of the College of Justice, the Precedent for
this office was presumably the Parlement of Paris. It is not certain when
12
the special costume worn there was adopted in France.
The original dress worn by Advocates before the Faculty became a separate
corporation was a green gown or 'tunikil1 but this seems to have gone out of
use at an early date. Only in 1609 was a definite system of legal dress fixed
for Judges and Advocates. Significantly, no discrimination was made between
Advocates and Writers to the Signet, who as with the Clerks of Court, were to
wear a black gown with a dark or better black lining of stuff or fur. This
13
dress was prescribed by James VT . The symbol of the Advocate's gown or
robe as a mark of office and prestige seems to have become firmly established.
In 1649, John Maxwell who had 'bought pleas', a practice condemned in all
Civilian Systems, was deprived of office by the Lords of Council and Session.
The Acts of Sederunt for for the 21st December recorded that they ordered 'the
said John Maxwell to be extrudit forth of the House and declared incapable ever
hereafter to plead before their lordships in Signe and Token w hereof that a
Maisser (Macer) should be commendit to rent his Gown in sunder and pull it over
his shoulders in presence of the said Lords and the Haill Advocates, their
12. W.N. Hargreaves Maudsley, Legal Dress in Europe, p. 95 et seq_.
13. A.P.S. viii, pp. 612-614: Bell's Dictionary I Digest of the Law of Scotland,
7th ed. Sd. Watson, tit. 'Robes'.
Servants and Agents, to be called in of Purpose to behold the same'.
The ceremony was thrown open to the public as well as to the Advocates though
the public were not normally then admitted to hear cases. The Lord Chancellor
of Scotland at the same time exhorted and admonished 'the Advocates and others
to be circumspect in their Carrsidge and Dealings with the Leidges'. It
would, seem that the Judges wished to make a public example of one who appeared
guilty of unprofessional conduct, of which considered themselves arbiters, and
that the assembling of the Faculty was intended to give a general warning by
a particular condemnation. The extract also seems to show that the Writers
and Servants or Servitors (devils or clerks) to Advocates were part of the
professional group involved.
Omond^ has little good to say of the lawyers of Scotland at the Res¬
toration. 'Lawyers and politicians they are all dull, cruel, avaricious,
ruffians, they are continually drunk both at the Council Chamber and at home'.
Relations between Bench and Bar were apparently most unhappy, the Bench seeking
to enforce its will on the Advocates and the latter asserting their independence
in an arrogant manner. Advocates apparently came to court long after the
official hour, they exacted exorbitant fees, prolonged their speeches to
15
increase their emoluments and treated the judges rudely. In 1670, as a
result of the report of a Royal Commission, maximum fees according to the rank
of an Advocate's client were prescribed. At first the Advocates refused to
16
accept this situation and for two months refused to plead. The Advocates
also resented the fact that noblemen., asserted the right to enter the Court
of Session, which was otherwise closed against the public when they were
14. Lord Advocates of Scotland, Vol. 1, p. 70
15. Fountainhall Historical Notes, passim.
16. Omond, op. cit. pp. 195-6.
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pleading. This led to remonstrances between Faculty and Bench and to armed
uproar between the Advocates' servants (who may have included 'devils') and
the 'lackeys' of the nobles".^ The attitude of the Advocates at this time
indicates true corporate spirit and the preparedness to assert their privileges
in contgst with the most powerful men in the land. In 1674-5, a substantial
and influential element were even prepared for a time to secede from the Courts
or accept banishment as a gesture of professional protest and solidarity
when Charles II, at the request of the Scottish judges, prohibited appeals from
the Court of Session to the Scots; Parliament. Among the ultimate consequences
of this action were the reassertion in the Claim of Right 1689 of the right
to appeal to Parliament and in the invocation of the jurisdiction of the British
House of Lords after the Union.
The 'Secosssion of the Advocates' led by Lockhart, Mackenzie and Cunning¬
ham was connected with the maladministration of justice in the Court of
Session itself after Lord President Stair had called a cause out of order to
oblige Lauderdale. Under Charles II, there is evidence of Advocates corrupting
18
or attempting to corrupt the Bench and an Act. of Sederunt was passed against
19
'soliciting the Lords'. There were no notable scandals such as involved
Bacon and Macclesfield in ^giarul, but modern standards of professional integrity
20
had not been achieved. A.D. Gibb has discussed the extent of judicial
corruption. It seems probable each judge has what was called a 'peat' or
'pate* being a member of the Bar who was able to influence his patron, the
judge - direct approach being apparently deemed too indecent. It is impossible
17. Fountainhall, ii passim, esp. pp. 652, 621.
18. A.D. Gibb, Judicial Corruption in the United Kingdom, p. 56
19. Fountainhall, I p. 248.
20. Law from over the Border, p. 11.
now to discern how far corrupt judges were moved by love of gain and how much
by political and social interest. It seems probable that the former was
comparatively unimportant if indeed it played any part at all, and Lord President
Gilmour's contemptuous denunciation of the Cromwellian judges as "a wheen
21kinless loons" goes to support this view. In another place G-ibb comments
'Scotland was a small country, the aristocracy a small minority, and the
administration of the law almost exclusively in their hands. The powerful
families, therefore, deemed nothing more natural than that their kith and
kin upon the Bench - no kinless loons like the Cromwellian Judges - should
favour their relatives wherever an issue arose which involved one of them.
It was not until 1762 that recruitment to the Bench of the Court of Session
had been exclusively from the Faculty of Advocates, and among the most venial
judges of the seventeenth century'' were no doubt some of the Extraordinary Lords,
nominees of the King, who could sit or not as they pleased, were not required
to have any legal training and received no official emoluments. The former
right of lay peers to vote in the British House of Lords' appeals provides a
basis of comparison.
"Whatever the faults of individual Advocates at the Restoration, their
general manners were probably characteristic of most men of their privileged
class at that time. Those most venial and cruel were not so much the body
of Advocates as such as those who aspired to office. At a time when defence
by Counsel in cases of treason or felony was forbidden in England, Advocates in
Scotland did defend those accused of political or other grave crimes. From
1672, when the Justiciary Court was founded, probably dated the Scottish tradition
22
of free legal aid in criminal matters . The Faculty image gained consequently
21. Judicial Corruption in the United Kingdom, p. 63.
22. See Graham v Cuthbert 1951 J.C. 25 per LJ-G Cooper at p. 30
in prestige both internally and in the eyes of influential groups. A fee of
07
500 marks was required hy the ^acuity of every intrant Advocate in this period
and the Faculty also gained substantial control over entrance examinations.
In 1650 Sir GeorgeMackenzie secured the founding of the Advocates' library
equipped with the leading treatises from the Continent of Europe. This
collection, like the institutional works written by Stair and McKenzie at the
time shows that the law of Scotland on paper, as in the legal background of
the leading Advocates, was European and cosmopolitan, whatever defects there
may have been in the administration of justice in the country. The Library
of the ^acuity of Advocates was to serve as the one national library of the
country until 1925 when the National Library of Scotland was established largely
on the old foundations and leaving to the Faculty of Advocates control over
the legal material. Amid the political and religious controversies of the
seventeenth century a strong sense of unity within the Faculty itself gave
it strength and authority. Members of the groups took care for each other.
Thus, Mackenzie, knovm to the frequenters of conventicles as the 'Bluidy
Advocate' seems to have warned Stair (a Presbyterian and sympathiser of the
House of Orange) to flee before action could be taken against him, for a
political offence. Mackenzie also connived at another advocate, Stewarts,
hiding in London despite his political opposition to James VII's policies
which could have grounded a prosecution. Solidarity was again demonstrated
p»
after the 1688 Revolution a The Faculty asserted in the Claim of Right 1689
the right to appeal to Parliament from the Court of Session. In 1702, the
Faculty, or at all events the Dean in their name, submitted an address to
Parliament concerning the meeting of Parliament and other public matters, and
in fact protesting against the Convening of Parliament after the death of
23. Fountainhall ii, p. 698
21+. Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution, p. 59
75.
William III. The Estates considered that the Faculty merited punishment for
acting "extrinsic to their ordinary administration", hut the fact that they
25
so acted is in itself significant. Wo punishment was ever imposed. Here
was a small professional group which contended that not more than four new
intrants should he admitted each year and yet spoke with authority and impunity
to the Estates. The last Scottish Parliament assembled in May, 1703, and
was dissolved just before the Union of 1st May, 1707. In it the Lord Advocate
sat ex officio as did the Judges. Members of the Bar had taken an active and
influential part in the work of the Scottish Parliament and it had developed
vigorously from 1688. The Union was destined to change radically the Scottish
Advocate's role in politics.
Though apparently it had been necessary in 1675 to insist that Advocates
should wear their gowns in Court, the traditional costume had on the whole
remained in use. In the drawing of the funeral procession in 1681 of the Duke
of Rothes, Lord High Chancellor of Scotland, though the Advocates' dress is in
general that laid down by James VI, there is some deviation between that worn
by the Advocates and that of the Writers to the Signet. The Advocates'
2g
gowns have braiding and tassels which are not on the Writers' gowns. The
whole Bar wore bands and full bottom wigs, the wig, of course, being part of
a gentleman's dress at that time. The only body in the procession which
seems to have vrorn plain stuff gowns like those now worn by Advocates are the
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University professors. It appears " that between 1587 and l604 a distinction
had been made between Advocates for the Inner House and Advocates for the
Outer House 'which after it had gone into desuetude was attempted to be got
25. Omond, op.cit. pp. 265-7
26. Hargreaves MaiWckley, History of Legal Dress p. 97
27. Bell Dictionary, tit. Robes
28. Forbes Preface. p. 7
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renewed in the year 1670,- hut the project being very offensive and disobliging
to the Bar, the promoters thereof thought fit to drop it'. Thus until quite
modern times, the functions and status of all Advocates remained equal.
The 18th and 19th Centuries
The information available on the Faculty of Advocates of use to the
social anthropologist is much more satisfactory in the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries than in earlier times. Indeed Boswell, Walter Scott,
Cockburn and Stevenson have presented well known images which, though distorted
occasionally in detail, are, on the whole, reliable and vivid. Cockburn has
no real successor and later Scottish legal biographies such as those of Lords
Inglis, Ardwall and Salvesen and the auto-biographical Man of Law's Tale by
Lord Macmillan, are infinitely less revealing as secondary sources than the
writings of an earlier era. Fortunately, field work can take over when source
material dries up. The Union of 1707 had immediate and also long term con¬
sequences for the Faculty. The Agreement itself safeguarded in terms a number
of the vested interests of the ruling classes in Scotland, the lav/, the church,
the royal burghs and the heritable jurisdictions. Yet it became clear very
soon that extensive' anglicisation- of Scottish institutions would succeed, partly
through English policy and partly through the sycophancy, ambition and connivance
of the self-interested sect. The effect of the Union on Scots Law as such
was immediately apparent in limited areas, due to statutory innovation such as
the Treason Act, 1708, and in. Civil cases when Scottish litigants invoked the
ultimate court of appeal, the House of Lords, in which only English judges sat
until the last third of the nineteenth century. In general, hov/ever, the
orientation of Scottish private or criminal law remained in the European
tradition until the early nineteenth century. The faculty of Advocates
remained and remains proud of its privileges even when it has been prepared
increasingly to surrender vital principles of a national yet cosmopolitan
jurisprudence under pressure of the more powerful economic and political influence
of England. Advocates, though few in number, took a leading part in the cultural
and intellectual life of the country, and the Golden Age of Edinburgh owed
much to them.
Unlike the Scots involved in British affairs - which were controlled
from London through the Palace, Parliament and various Government Departments -
the Scots who spent their lives in the Faculty and in the College of Justice
in Edinburgh became somewhat out of touch with London interests and attitudes.
The other remaining specifically Scottish institution, the Church, was riven
by sectarian disputes, while the gentry remained Roman Catholic or drifted to
Anglicanism. The great extension of British rule overseas followed the Union
and paradoxically fostered the world wide proliferation of English law.
The Scottish Bar remained essentially Scottish. Those non Scots who sought
entry to the Faculty were from Mauritius or Cape Colony where French or Dutch
Romanistic systems had survived British occupation.- In most countries, lawyers
take a leading part in the political life of the central legislature. Scotland
proved the exception. It was almost impossible to be both an active advocate
and a Member of Parliament due to the factors of distance and the existence of
different legal systems in Scotland and England. On the other hand, the Lord
Advocate's office became far more influential after the Union than it had
been before, when it had been only one of the Offices of State. After the
abolition of the office of Scottish Secretary, the Lord Advocate's control of
advancement in the profession eventually resulted in excessive political
partisanship within the Faculty, for personal rather than for public reasons.
This led to intense internal conflicts but not to destruction of corporate
spirit nor of the public image.
A full description of the organisation of the functioning of the Court
of Session and of the Faculty of Advocates in the immediate post-Union period
is contained in the preface to Forbes' Decisions. Of the Faculty, he writes
"the whole society goes under the name of the Faculty of Advocates, a very
honourable body into which none are admitted but such gentlemen as have
spent several years in the study of the laws, though many of good estates
commence as Advocates with no other view than the honour of being members of
it". Examination was in the control of the Faculty who appointed examinators
and balloted on the intrants' performance. Thereafter, if successful, the
intrant had allocated to him a text from the Civil Law and on an appointed
day "was allowed to stand in one of the Lord's places covered when he make3
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his harang". Advocates, Forbes noticed, were sometimes though rarely admitted
by trial on Scots Law, in which case the candidate has no speech to the Lords
before admission, but admission upon a trial in the Civil Law is more honour¬
able". Not until 1750 were Advocates required to pass an examination in Scots
Law. By Act of Sederunt, 28th February, 1750, the Court of Session on the
representation of the Faculty enacted that examination in Scots Law should be
necessary but that this should be preceded by examination in Civil Law one year
earlier. No-one under the age of 20 was elegible for the examination in Civil
Law. After success in both examinations an intrant completed his qualification
as before by public trial and thesis in the Civil Law. On 17th November, 1866,
the Faculty itself laid down regulations as to entrance which correspond in general
to those which apply today, that is to say, an intrant is examined in general
scholarship and in law, or more usually offers proof of having taken a first
degree in Arts at a University followed by a degree in Lav;. 'the tradition
of European study in France and the Netherlands continued until the time of
the Napoleonic Wars, though it fell off considerably towards the end of the
eighteenth century, due in large measure to the emergence of a number of
effective law teachers in Scotland, such as Erskine, Bell and Hume in Edinburgh
and Millar in Glasgow.
Yfihen the College of Justice was inaugurated, it had been installed in
the Tolbooth, but in 1632, Charles I had ordered a new building for the
Scottish Parliament and for the Lords of Session. Occupation was deferred
for some years due to Civil War and the Usurpation. Nevertheless, from 1661
the Lords had sat customarily in the Parliament House and from the Union they
sat on there. There was something of the symbolic in this arrangement.
Though the other organs of Government had their seat in London, the College
of Justice continued to occupy the Parliament House. In the Inner House,
the Judges sat at a semi-circular bench served by 6 Principal Clerks, and at
one corner, a Judge attended to Bill procedure. In the Outer House, or Great
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Hall in 1741, there was one side bar, and a raised fore bar which the Advocates
reached by climbing some steps as their cases were called. The public had
access to the hall and their noise disturbed the pleaders until new courts were
t
constructed in the' building, a development which was made particularly necessary
when the Court of Session was reorganised in the early nineteenth century.
29. In South Africa,"the Sidebar'refers to Solicitors or Attorneys as dis¬
tinguished from the Bar, the advocates.
80.
Until the early nineteenth century there were a number of central courts which
are now absorbed in the Court of Session, or the High Court of Justiciary,
which were always the most important.
In the eighteenth century specialisation in function between Advocates
and others engaged in legal business became clearly defined. The notary was
restricted to part of the chamber practice of a modern solicitor, while the
function; of the modern solicitor in litigation before the Supreme Courts was
shed by Advocates. Originally, Advocates had themselves acted as agents but
afterwards, handed over the practice of solicitors to others including the
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servitors or first clerks. In 1718, Spottiswoode states *'Generally
speaking every advocate has two servants, one who takes care of his client's
affairs and the other who waits on his person'. In this way the Advocate's
role was kept clean. He did not discuss business but offered a specialised
professional service. He did not, however, specialise as in England regarding
the type of case he would take in the higher Courts, and would accept criminal
and civil work of all kinds. The expression 'clerk' or 'servitor' has acquired
in modern use a meaning of somewhat inferior status. The designation 'clerk'
in Scots Law has often implied substantial status, as with the Lord Justice
Clerk, Lord Clerk Register and Principal Clerk of Session, the last of which
offices Walter Scott was pleased to hold. Clearly as far as social distance
is concerned, Boswell did not regard it as at all unusual that his clerk, (first
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clerk) should be of the company invited to dinner. He, it will be recalled,
was sufficiently conscious of.social distance within the profession as to question
30. Advocate General v. Moncrieff (184-9) 10D 987 at p. 989
31. Forms of Process p. 50
32. BoswellaThe Ominous Years 1774-76 (ed. Rykskaap and Pottle)
whether' judges should he so free with advocates by roistering out of court in
taverns.
At some period in the mid eighteenth century interlopers seem to have
taken it upon themselves to act as solicitors as appear from the Act of
Sederunt, 10th August, 1754, which narrates that 'several persons who are not
members of the College of Justice have taken it upon themselves without any
warrenty or authority from this Court and without any trial or admission to
manage agent and solicit causes'. The right so to act was restricted to
Advocates' First Clerks, Writers to the Signet (who for the first time were
given official sanction to act as agents) and others admitted hy the Court
under regulations to he made. The Act of Sederunt of 10th March, 1772, was
to the same effect and the Faculty itself dre\f up regulations to ensure that
First Clerks should he properly qualified. In 1774, a charter was given to
the Society of Solicitors before the Supreme Court (S.S.C.) and in 1850, the
33Advocates' First Clerks were merged in this Socis ty .
Mr. NicholasIhilipson^ in the-course of research as yet unpublished,
has from a historian's point of view examined the social structure of the
Faculty of Advocates from the Union until 1850. He concludes that the key
to the problem of how the Union was made to work in Scotland and the way in
which the administration was carried on despite ultimate control from London
is to he found in the structure of the Faculty of Advocates. He observes 'the
pool from which the native administrative talent for such a successful
administration could be drawn, lay in the Faculty of Advocates' for a legal
career hy definition based the person concerned in Scotland. It may be
33. See Mackay, Practice of the Court of Session i.p. 120. cf. Advocate
General v. Moncrieff (1848) 10 D 987.
34. The present writer is much indebted to him for valuable information
which she acknowledges gratefully.
recalled that between 1725 and 1926 (except for 5 years in the mid eighteenth
century) there had been no Secretary of State responsible as such for Scottish
affairs. The Lord Advocate v/as not only the public prosecutor and legal
adviser to the Government but was also made generally responsible for Scottish
affairs. Moreover, the Lord Advocate's powers of patronage were immense -
Scotland's 'manager', Dundas, being the classic example. He achieved his
position through membership of the Faculty of Advocates and largely from that
same body made his control effective. The Faculty was small in size and it
was a social 'elite'. The social status of the members of the Faculty
changed strikingly during the period covered by Mr. Philipson's research, and
his conclusions tend to complement certain provisional conclusions which the
present writer had reached regarding the anglicisation of the Scottish middle
class from about the mid nineteenth century. It is from that period too that
T.B. Smith in his Studies Critical and Comparative, traces a jurisprudential
decline in the confidence of the Scottish Bench and Bar in principles of their
native jurisprudence and an increasing tendency to anglicise the content of
Scots Law.
The Social Structure of the Faculty of Advocates
Philipson's research on the structure of the Faculty from the Union of
1707 to 1850 discloses how closely it reflects the state of political power
in Scotland during that time. At its beginning, only 4.5% of intrants were
bora of fathers who were not landed proprietors. However, in the last
quadijfennium this element represented 59.75%» After the Napoleonic Wars,
recruitment from the unlanded classes rose continually. One factor of course
in this striking change in the composition of the faculty was the rise of
the middle class, hut of equal or even greater significance is the altered
representation of the various landed interests. In the first quinquennium,
a third of the 48 intrants were sons of peers and baronets, while in the final
quinquennium, when the intake was 46, none of this class was admitted.
Philipson concludes that after the '45 Rising, the 'upper' Scottish gentry and
the landed class of medium importance, both gravitated towards London. With
the exception of the law, lucrative patronage lay to the South, and legal success
was usually governed by the lawyer's relation to the Government in London.
Prior to the first Reform Act, 1832, especially during the era of Henry Dundas,
patronage was a factor of tremendous importance. In Scotland, the county
constituencies corresponded to some extent to the 'Rotten Boroughs' in England.
Voting was restricted in the Scottish Counties to the 'King's freeholders',
a vejy small group. The faculty of Advocates was already concerned with land
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law as a source of voting rights. Cockburn in his life of Lord Jeffrey
observed that 'There were probably not above 1500 or 2000 county electors in
all Scotland, a body not too large to be held, hope included, in the Govern¬
ment's hand.' Control of these constituencies through patronage was the
major object of successive administrations. The influencing of the landed
men especially of the great families was important, though Dundas himself preferred
to influence individuals.
It would appear that over the century and a half covered by the Philipson's
research, though the proportions as well as the contributions made by the classes
of greater and lesser gentry to the faculty change notably, the 'minor' gentry
35. I, P. 75
(the third in importance of landed men) remain a constant force within the
Faculty. Their lack of wealth and influence based them for a much longer
period in Scotland, and the Faculty of Advocates offered the one satisfying
career for a Scotsman of talent in his own country. The great men went South
drawn by the magnet of political power, and became in effect Britons, southern
English in their interests but with estates in Scotland which gave them influence
and prestige. Men of family but of less fortune, unless they elected to practise
at the Bar in Edinburgh, were also increasingly drained from Scotland. The
Armed Forces and the East India Company, where promotion depended on patronage,
in particular provided occupation and opportunity for the ambitious Scot in
the fifteenth century. His successors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
were recruited by the I.C.S. or Colonial Service. To the general drift South
of talent and wealth, the Faculty provided at least a check. One thing which
has been very apparent before and since the Union is that the Faculty has
valued its separateness, and will never willingly accept its absorption in a
'British' legal profession. The Faculty has essentially been a national profession
except for a very few from Mauritius, South Africa and Malawi and these have
normally had Scottish connections. Cockburn in the mid nineteenth century,
reviewing the scene from the late eighteenth century, often returns to the
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theme 'the legal profession in Scotland hael every recommendation to a person
resolved, or compelled, to remain in this country. It had not the large fields
open to the practitioner in England, nor the practical seat in the House of
Commons, nor the lofty political and judicial eminences, nor the great fortunes.
36. Life of .Lord Jeffrey, i pp. 84-5
But it was not a less honourable or a less intellectual life. It is the
highest profession that the country knows; its emoluments and prizes are not
inadequate to the wants and habits of the upper classes; it has always been
adorned by men of ability and learning who are honoured by the greatest public
confidence'. The cultural gifts of the members of Faculty were particularly
apparent in the period of which Cockburn writes. This tradition has survived,
but not as a general characteristic of Advocates as a ?diole.
It may be recalled that Edinburgh's Golden Age, including its Indian
summer asm covered by the personal experience of Coclcburn and the generation
by which he was reared. Hume, Adam Smith, Robertson, and others lived in
memory as great figures. The leader of the scientific Whigs, many of whom
were Advocates, was Lord Kames, a judge. One of his disciples, John Millar
of Glasgow, an Advocate and law professor, had an enormous influence on the
education of British statesmen including Melbourne. Only after the Tory
reaction at the time of the Napoleonic Wars did Oxbridge assume nursery duties
for British politicians. The leading figures of the Golden Age largely
inspired by Kames included speculation on law in their very wide interests, and
Adam Smith came to be cited almost as a legal authority in court. It was char¬
acteristic of men like Kames that their zeal for law included Social Anthropology,
Comparative Jurisprudence, and Economics. Profoundly interested in the
historical approach, they also were champions of reform of the law. The
intellectual vigour of the Scottish lawyers has probably never been greater than
in the eighteenth century, and in a sense, they formed and led the life of the
country. In George Washington's library at Mount Vernon, there is still
exhibited Karnes' treatise, The Gentleman Farmer, written in his 80th year, after
30 years of duty spent on the Bench, and much longer as a legal author.^
37. See generally P. Stein, Legal Thought in eighteenth century Scotland (1957)
Jus. Rev. and W.C. Lehmann, John Millar of Glasgow
86.
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Yet Cockburn notes in 1853 with regret and a degree of fatalism that
the century that is passing away has every chance of leaving Scotland but an
English county, I feel my own indignation often roused. But though
particular examples may justify this, it is useless and wrong to resist the
general current. 'Old Scotland', he concluded, 'can live only in the character
of the people, in its native literature and in its picturesque and delightful
language' which, he noted was disappearing. Cockburn in the mid nineteenth
century was already recognising the increasing angliciastion of the urban
middle class: and as has been noted this element was becomming increasingly
represented in the Faculty of Advocates. Subsequent to the period covered
by Philipson and Cockburn, the trend of anglicisation extended to a much
wider section of the middle class, though the process is continuous and
its effects in varying degrees are apparent from the mid eighteenth century.
Boswell is indeed an example and a prototype. The desire to master southern
English speech has probably characterised many in the various generations of
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advocates since his time. When Jeffrey went up to Oxford in 1792 he commented:
the only part of a Scotsman I mean to abandon is the language, and language is
all I expect to learn in England. The result Lord Holland remarked was that
'though Jeffrey had lost the broad Scotch at Oxford, he had gained only the
narrow English! Of many could the same have been said over the past two
centuries.
Yet Boswell and others of his outlook were passionately attached to their
landed estates in Scotland and to their family interests. In this respect
they were Scottish in outlook though looking to London for social and intell-
38. Journal II pp. 295-6
39. See Cockburn, Life of Lord Jeffrey, I, pp. 46-7.
ectual stimulus. Boswell was almost obsessed by the idea that Auchinleck must
pass in the male line, whatever sacrifices this might involve for his daughters
whom he adored. Advocates who came from unlanded families put the seal
on a successful career by acquiring small estates. Thus, Robert MacQueen who
became Lord Justice Clerk Braxfield was the grandson of a gardener, son of a
writer (legal) but had made a substantial fortune at the Bar which he spent on
an estate. To this day, Monday is not a Court day in the Court of Session,
because in past times the Advocates and Judges required this day to look to
their estates. Moreover, when a Senator is rained to the Bench, he takes his
seat with a judicial title which may be that of his estate. This happens
less frequently today than formerly, and indeed Cockburn condemned the practice,
as long ago as 1850^ since 'good lawyers' by this time were no longer landed
men. ' At all events, the element of minor gentry which maintains its influence
in the Faculty today, though less so than in the nineteenth century, is
recruited now as then from those whose fathers were not landed, and whose estates
have probably changed hands quite frequently in the present century. The
position of the minor gentry in the Faculty probably remained constant through¬
out the remainder of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its influence
today is probably less due to numerical factors than to personalities which,
of course, have always been important in Faculty affairs.
At the present time a high proportion of Advocates are the sons of lawyers.
During the century ana a half covered by Philipson's research, 29^6 of those
admitted to the Faculty were from legal families. He designates as dynasties,
families in which over three or more generations from father to son provided
40. Journal ii, p. 260; see also P.G.B. McNeil 'Judicial Titles in Scotland;
1964 3.L.T. (News) 125 in which he exposes the artificiality of the use
by unlanded men of territorial designations. This practice developed in
the nineteenth century when judges were no longer mainly recruited from
the laitd class.
lawyers including at least one intrant to the Faculty. He also includes some
exceptional cases where one generation had not produced a lawyer. It was found
that the greater gentry produced nine dynasties, the lesser gentry 31, minor
gentry 16 and the non-landed 10. However, "the 9 dynasties of the greater
gentry produced 58 Advocates (6-g- per family) and 27 Judges (or 2 per family)
including 4 Lord Presidents. The dynasties of the lesser gentry produced 142
Advocates (or 4§" pe*" family), 39 Judges (l per family) including 4 Lord
Presidents. The 16 dynasties from the minor gentry produced 41 Advocates (or
2y per family), 13 Judges (or 4-5 family) and the unlanded produced 24
Advocates (2-y per family) and 4 Judges (2/5 per family).
By 1800 however, the dynasties have declined. Only 4 of those from the
greater gentry survived and 16 from the lesser. The same period, however,
saw the dynasties of the 'minor', i.e. medium, gentry reach its peak from
which there was subsequently a decline. The non-landed element had not estab¬
lished dynasties at the turn of the century but reached its peak of 10 in 1830,
a figure which remained constant until i860 at least. The last emergence of
such dynasties is in itself significant. Writing of Robert Forsyth who had
admitted in the late eighteenth century, Cockburn commented^* 'The Faculty of
Advocates which was then a highly aristocratic body and used to curl up its
nose at every plebeian who tried to enter, objected to his admission'. Forsyth
was eventually admitted, but to this day the formality is observed of balloting
on entrance after public examination. Professional and intellectual competence
have not guaranteed admission as a right. Moreover, toughness of moral fibre
has been required of each successive social group to gain acceptance into the
Faculty.
41. Journal, ii, p. 153.
Until the time of Dundas, the 'establishment' of the Parliament House,
its established legal aristocracy, controlled preferment in the profession.
As Advocates, however, became more dependent on fees and less on their own
private fortunes, they were inclined to look more to political influence for
preferment, a situation which still survives in large measure. Before Dundas,
however, preferment especially to the highest offices was a dynastic matter.
During the century from the Revolution to 1787 with short interruptions, the
Lord Presidents were appointed from the houses either of Dalrymple or Dundas
of Arniston, and until 1831, nomination to that office still lay in the gift
of Robert and his son, Heniy Dundass
Chapter A
THE FACULTY OF ADVOCATES TODAY
In its organisation and function the Faculty of Advocates would appear
to be unlilce other professions and indeed differs in a marked way from the
legal professions in other countries. Though there is in Scotland as in
England a division between the Bar and the solicitors' branch of the
profession, as will be shown the life of an advocate is unlike that of the
barrister, except that both have the right of audience in the highest courts.
Professional Life of an Advocate
Intrants are now admitted after examinations which proceed upon a
remit from the Court following upon a petition presented by the intrant.*'"
Nine members of the Faculty are appointed annually to act as examinators, a
function which in modern times seems mainly concerned with formalities. Intrants
must satisfy the examinators in the 'private examinations', which are written,
of their qualifications in law and general scholarship. In practice, though
the Faculty will itself set examinations, the great majority of intrants are
exempted from such examinations by proving that they hold an Arts degree and
a Law degree from a Scottish University comprising certain prescribed subjects.
After the intrant has passed three 'private examinations', the Dean assigns
to him for his public 'examination a title from the Pandects or Digest of
Justinian; and the intrant has to write a short thesis on this title in latin.
1. Encyclopaedia of the Laws of Scotland, Vol. 1, pp. 173-4
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In fact, however, most intrants are permitted to rely extensively on theses
written by advocates in past times when a knowledge of Ha tin and Roman Lav/ was
more extensive than is customary with the present generation. The candidate
must, however, formulate three propositions which he is prepared to 'defend',
and if the thesis (as almost invariably happens) is marked 'imnugnetur' the
public examination takes place. As a condition of admission, however, the
intrant must satisfy the Dean that during the year immediately preceding he
has not been engaged in any trade, business or profession either on his own
account or in the employment of another. He may, however, have been pupil
or devil to a member of Faculty. This rule which has been enforced for a long
time seems designed to ensure that Advocates shall be set apart from
commercial money-making activities and also from too close connection with
solicitors who might send work to a former associate. An advocate must also
pay on or before admission the sum of approximately £450, of which £300,
represents entry money and £80 goes to the Advocates' Widows (or Widowers)
Fund to which by virtue of a Private Act of George I? each member of Faculty
must also contribute annually. It is apparent that the requirement to
produce so large a sum on admission to a profession which at least hitherto has
been notoriously badly remunerated at the outset is bound to operate in favour
of the wealthier classes and to discourage those of modest means. Since,
however, the relationship between master andpupil or devil is gratuitous in
Scotland (unlike England) and an advocate does not have the heavy expense of
chambers in an Inn like his English counterpart, the cost of the first few
years of an advocate's career is now undoubtedly less than that of an English
barrister.
Before admission an intrant has usually spent a year as pupil to an
experienced junior advocate. This is generally (though incorrectly in
Scotland) described as 'devilling'. The pupil attends his master's consult¬
ations, sees his papers and tries his prentice hand in drafting summonses,
opinions, notes and the like for his master. A close personal relationship
is usually established in this way that lasts for their lives, and advocates
among themselves like to trace their 'genealogies' through the masters who
have taught them and those who taught their masters,.
The 'public examination' which directly precedes admission as advocate, as
a rite de passage is attended with considerable formality. The intrant
appears in 'tails' and white bow tie but with a black waistcoat. He is
conducted before the assembled Faculty (or such as choose to attend) and
there 'defends' his thesis orally and in latin against the challenges of three
members of Faculty. (in fact the questions and answers have been pre-arranged.)
The candidate then withdraws and the question of admission is decided by the
Faculty voting by secret ballot. In modern times no one has been rejected
after passing the examinations though within living memory an unconfirmed
report suggests that a small group contemplated using their powers to exclude
intrants of whose race or religion they disapproved. (it may be recalled that
the Faculty is almost exclusively a profession of Scotsmen. There has recently
been admitted one African intrant from Malawi, who had connection with
Scotland through the Church in his own country. Everything possible vras done
to help his entry). After admission, the new intrant or intrants are conducted
-in procession before the Lord Ordinary to take the oath of allegiance in open
Court. Thereafter the Dean of Faculty introduces the newly admitted advocate
to the Lord Justice-Ceneral, and. he is then welcomed by his professional brethren.
Prom the day of admission he is the professional equal in status if not
in knowledge of all other advocates. He will address them by surname (or
by given name if he knows them well) Out of Court and never by a style such
as 'Mr.', 'Sir' or 'Lord'. In Court such styles are used - but not
designation such as 'professor' or 'doctor'. Another symbol of equality within
the profession and its distance from others appears from the convention that
advocates do not shake hands with each other at social or professional meetings -
though at a consultation attended by several advocates they will greet and take
leave of lay clients or solicitors in this way.
On admission an advocate becomes a member of a community which has remark¬
able professional solidarity, though, since partnerships are not permitted,
each member of the community is in competition with the others for the
limited work available and for eventual promotion to the highest offices in the
profession including the Bench. Even out of Court the community of advocates
is largely maintained. Each advocate must have a dwelling place or accommodation
address within one mile of the Parliament House, which in modern practice means
the New Town of Edinburgh. Though since the Second World War there has been
a growing practice for advocates to acquire chambers or an accommodation address
in this area but to live out of it, the older tradition still,largely continues
that advocates (60-6$%) actually have their houses there and form an identifiable
element in the community. Indeed they are themselves a community in which
professional and private life is interlocked. This has many practical advantages.
Consultation can be held with solicitors, and lay clients after Court hours;
solicitors can deliver papers in the evening knowing that counsel can work on
them at home on the night of delivery; the Juridical Library in Charlotte
Square (open at night) is close at hand; the bagman who delivers and collects
the traditional bags contained advocates' papers drives the 'Faculty taxi' round
this relatively small part of the town. This is the traditional way of convey¬
ing "briefs and other legal papers to and from the Parliament House, though
some of the younger advocates whose work is not substantial do not use this
service which has to be paid for specially.
At the English bar, barristers' papers are conveyed in red or blue cloth
bags, the 'red bag' being awarded to a junior by his leader in recognition of
some outstanding work in a leading case. (Recently the English bar has re¬
stricted the excessive use of this type of recognition which had resulted in
some inflation of the status currency.) The Scottish advocate's bag is a
capacious repository of leather and canvas or cloth carrying a small metal phte
or leather label inscribed with the owner's name. These bags are placed on long
shelves in the corridor outside the Division Court rooms. In the evening
an advocate's papers are placed in his bag by his clerk or by one of the
bagmen, and the latter take the bags each evening by taxi or motor car to the
New Town, proceeding from door to door in the 'Quarter'.. In the morning they
collect them from the advocates' homes and take them up to the corridor
in Parliament House.
More or less immediately above his bag an advocate has his 'box' on a
higher shelf. This is of wood, about two feet long, one foot deep and a
foot wide. On the front is a brass plate bearing the owner's name. These
boxes containing any legal papers on which the advocate is not actually work¬
ing at.the time stand open during Court hours» It has occasioned surprise
to those not brought up with the system that the most confidential papers
may be exposed in this way» Etiquette in the profession virtually excludes
the possibility that an advocate or solicitor should look at papers in another
advocate's box unless he were (in the case of a brother advocate) appearing
for the same parties. In such an event one advocate might look at the rele¬
vant papers in another's box but at no other whatsoever. There is mutual
confidence in the complete professional integrity of all who practice at the
Parliament House.
On the outside of the advocate's house (or chambers) he is expected to
affix a brass plate with the simple legend Mr. A.B., Advocate. This plate
will be polished ana exhibited with pride so long as the advocate is in
practice. The legend will not be altered to include any honours or academic
distinctions, though one - and only one - advocate who had taken a Ph.D.,
degree elected to designate himself Dr. X.Y., Advocate - thereby acquiring
the sobriquet "The Doctor', with somewhat satirical overtones. Advertising
or touting for business is strictly forbidden by the Faculty. Only by his
plate and by his designation as 'advocate' in the legal directories and tele¬
phone directory can a member of Faculty make known that his services are
available.
The uniform of an advocate out of Court is also worn by a few solicitors
but is, on the whole, sufficiently distinctive in modern Edinburgh as to
make it possible to identify a man as an advocate on his way to or from
Court or in the University Staff Club after he has taken a tutorial on a
part time basis. At the time of the General Assembly or of a Royal visit to
Edinburgh a few judges and members of Faculty still walk up to Court in morn¬
ing dress with silk hat and umbrella. This was, of course, the standard
costume prior to the first World War. Today the standard costume is short
black jacket, striped trousers, and a bowler 01* black homburg hat - with
umbrella» Since the advocate in Court wears a wing collar, with white tie
(or, if a silk, with fold of white linen) he will often go to and fhom court
with this type of collar worn ¥dth a bow tie or dark ordinary tie.
In Court the uniform of an advocate is of great importance. As one of
the leading Scottish institutional writers^ has pointed out, an advocate's
go?<n is his mandate. He needs to show no other authority that he is empowered
to appear on his client's behalf. Clearly the style of dress for advocates
has changed over the centuries to some extent, but the gown has been worn
constantly since 1675 - in which year pressure had to be applied to persuade
advocates to resume the practice of wearing gowns.^ By the end of the eighteenth
century the dress of an advocate was a long black go?m with black velvet
collar, bell sleeves fastened half way up the arm and a short wig. The modern
gown is identical with that of an English barrister, being of stuff with
bell sleeves and with tucks at the shoulders0 Only if an advocate has appeared
before the House of Lords does he wear a purse and ribbon on his gown. For
this the reason seems to be that before that Court Scottish advocates formerly
had to dress like English barristers, and those who did so continued to wear
in Edinburgh what was in effect a mark of distinction, signifying that they had
appeared in the highest civil court. Similarly juniors in the House of Lords
had to wear bands like English barristers, but since the Second World War
advocates have regained the right to wear the white bow tie in London as in
Edinburgh.
3. Erskine Institutes 3.3.33.
4. See on this and generally, W.H. Hargreaves-Mawdsley, A History of Legal
Dress in Europe, p.97 et seq.
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The earliest recorded example of the wig being worn with legal dress is
in the portrait of Sir George MacKenzie (King's Advocate A cen¬
tury later advocates in Edinburgh had bag wigs, though other styles of short
5
wig seem also to have been worn. It may be suggested that the wig unlike
the gown was not in fact part of the advocate's official uniform at that time,
but rather the ordinary adornment of a gentleman. At all events Hargreaves-
Mawdsley suggests^ that through the influence of the French Revolution, after
1790, many advocates gave up wearing wjLgs. Walter Scott was among those who
wore their own hair. However, the bob wig has been a standard article of
dress for an advocate in Court since the early nineteenth century - perhaps
due to the dressing customs imposed on advocates appearing in the House of
Lords. Though the eighteenth century gentleman wore his wig as a mark of
elegance and kept it powdered and clean, today too white a wig denotes that an
advocate has recently been admitted. Accordingly a dirty grey wig is the badge
of age and experience.
Advocates who have not taken silk wear in court an evening tail coat or
dinner jacket with silk facings and striped trousers. There has been no ten¬
dency, as in England, to accept any generally 'sub-fuse' clothes under the gown.
The neck linen worn by advocates has.gone through successive changes as the
modern form of collar and tie evolved. Bands were abandoned in 1766 and for
a time a white folded neck cloth was in use. Today the wing collar and white
bow tie are vrorn by advocates in Court.
The dress of the few women advocates as worn in Court is an adaptation
5. op. cit. pp. 100 "I.
6. ibid.
of the male 'uniform' - a severely cut black suit with white blouse. A
stiff white collar is not worn with the white tie (or in the case of a Q.C.,
fold). In 1965 a woman advocate has so far been successful in discarding the
white tie as unfeminine, and wearing instead a high necked silk blouse. Wig
and gown are as worn by men. The late Lord Justice G-eneral Cooper (a bachelor
of blameless life) reputedly sought to institute the wearing' of black silk
stockings by the first woman Q.C. (Sherriff Margaret Kidd). It is said that
not even the Pope can control the dress of female religious orders, and the Lord
Justi. ce-G-eneral of Scotland failed to introduce to the Faculty what vra,s then
(if not now) regarded as the linge bas of the Moulin Rouge.
If the costume of the advocate has come to be a formalised version of the
eighteenth and nineteenth century dress, the dress of Queen's Counsel conforms
more clearly to an earlier eighteenth century pattern. Traditionally the
equality of function of all advocates was highly regarded,and there was opposition
within the Faculty itself to the idea that some should be given a higher rank
than others. The status of King's (Queen's) Counsel was not conferred upon
Scottish advocates - except upon the Lord Advocate, Solicitor General and Dean
of Faculty - until 1897. At this time members of the Scottish Bar of great
seniority and experience were offended by the attitude of English 'silks' who
claimed precedence over them in the House of Lords, Privy Council and in
Parliamentary Committees where Scottish and English counsel had the right of
equal audience. Accordingly in 1897 the Faculty petitioned the Queen to create
a roll of Queen's Counsel in Scotland. This was granted. Unlike the practice
in England, a Q.C., does not sit 'ydthin the Bar'. This privilege is restric¬
ted to the Lord Advocate and the Solicitor General. There is, however, an order
of seating on Counsel's "bench according to whether counsel appear for
pursuer or defender and in relation to senior or junior counsel. An advocate
seeking this rank and dignity of Queen's Counsel must apply to the Crown
through the Lord Justice-Ceneral and Secretary of State for Scotland. Before
sending his formal request "by letter to the Lord Justice-Ceneral, an applicant
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must give notice of his intention to all members of Faculty senior to him
according to date of admission. This acts as a check on premature application:
moreover, the Lord Justice-Ceneral uses his discretion in considering whether
to recommend any particular individual. 'Silk' is probably easier to achieve
in Scotland than in England and within the profession itself does perhaps not
command the same prestige as in the South. It is rather ironical - in view of
the origins of this rank in Scotland - that the press should foster the popular
image of an advocate in general as a 'Q.C.'.
Out of Court the uniform of a Queen's Counsel is the same as that of
other advocates. In court he wears a silk gown, linen fold (instead of tie)
a braided coat which resembles that worn by high ecclesiastics of eighteenth
century style and a wig. Usually the short wig is worn, but on very formal
occasions and in the House of Lords the bag wig is worn. Etiquette regarding
Queen's Counsel in Scotland is largely unwritten and of relatively recent
origin due to the historical factors desaibed. Senior counsel cannot appear
in a case in Court without a junior; there are, as has been mentioned,
conventions as to where senior and junior counsel should sit on counsels' bench -
buty they do not (apart from the Law Officers) sit within the Bar as in England.
To the conventions of dress just described, which separate an advocate
from others, one exception may be noted. In advocate who is on military service
6a. Who have not yet taken silk.
may appear before the Court in uniform. In Sir Walter Scott's time
uniform and gown might both be worn, but this is not the custom of the present
century. During the Second World War there was an unprecedented occasion when
for the first time an advocate (the present Lord Wheatley) appeared in the
uniform of an N.C.O.
The Court Life of the Advocate
In studying most occupations a hard and fast distinction might be made
between the official and private aspects of life. So far as the advocate is
concerned this cannot easily or appropriately be done, since in most cases his
professional life is largely based on his private residence, and his profession
in Court brings him in daily contact with a close brotherhood in which he is
likely to make his friends and acquaintances or even to find a spouse. (Women
are not on the whole successful at the Scottish Bar largely because of the
conservatism of the profession, but though the sample group is too small for
generalisation, women advocates may tend to marry those of their profession).
In describing the daily round of the advocate it may be appropriate to
regard it as beginning at night. As has been mentioned an advocate's papers
are brought to his home in the evening by the bagman, and solicitors also
deliver urgent work through advocates' letter boxes as the law offices close.
Consequently it is not until after dinner that an advocate gets down to work
preparing for the next day in Court and clearing incidental paper work and
opinions - though these last may to gome extent accumulate for the week-ends
or vacations. The busy advocate does much of his work at night. In the
morning-most walk up the Mound before 10 o'clock to the Parliament House which
is the focus of their official lives. If several travel by public transport,
etiquette requires the senior to pay. Their principal function is to plead
in Court. They may also, however, work in the Library, secluded from all
but advocates: they may hold consultations formal or informal with solicitors
and lay clients; they will (especially the less employed) spend a considerable
amount of time talking at the fires in the Robing Room or in Parliament Hall,
or pacing the Hall. Lunch at Parliament House used also to be a pleasant
social occasion where groups of friends of varying seniority meet constantly
at particular tables which by tacit acceptance become appropriated to these
groups. Catering for small numbers is not economic and in recent years
standards have sunk to more or less cafeteria level. There are no lunching
or dining facilities corresponding to these of the Halls of the Inns of Court
in London. But, of course, the social life Y/hich a barrister finds in his
Inn, the advocate finds in his closely knit community based on the New Town.
At 4 o'clock when the Courts rise, most advocates return home. They
may see their wives and children briefly, and the former will be expected to
keep the latter happy and silent during the next stage of the day. Consul¬
tations with solicitors and lay clients usually take place in the advocate's own
home, or, if he. is a junior, at that.of his senior. In recent years a number
of sets of chambers - accommodation addresses for delivery of papers and for
consultations have been set up in houses in the New Town. Whether this trend
will increase cannot be predicted with confidence. Advocate and wife should
be reunited for dinner, after which the advocate returns to his study to work
until a late hour.
The advocate's life in Court calls for special consideration, but first
the Courts should be described. This may be done most conveniently by adopt¬
ing with full acknowledgment and adding as an appendix"^ a summary on which it
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would be difficult for a non lawyer to improve. In his second Hamlyn
Lecture 'The Machinery of Justice' (which is published as chapter 2 of British
Justice: The Scottish Contribution) Professor T.B. Smith has sought to describe
the organisation of the Scottish Courts in simple and untechnical language.
Revised diagrams of the organisation of the Courts are published in his
Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland. The present writer is grateful to
him for his permission to publish excerpts from his Lecture and diagrams showing
the organisation of the Scottish Civil and Criminal Courts. She would, however,
suggest that one of his statements is too broadly stated or oversimplified.
He states of solicitors and advocates - '... there is no atmosphere of strati¬
fication between the two branches'. It is true that both branches of the
profession take, generally speaking, the same legal training in the same classes
at the Universities, and it is also true that in Edinburgh some solicitors,
especially Writers to the Signet, feel no sense of inferior status to members
of the Bar. Both are, or regard themselves, as belonging to an ilite
interlocking professional group. As young men they probably frequent the
same social clubs or are admitted to the Speculative Societ^ which, since the
eighteenth century has been an exclusive club for cultivating literary criticism
and public speaking. On the other hand, in the West of Scotland in particular
there are many solicitors who earn more than most members of the Bar, are
confident that they are better lawyers than most members of the Bar, and resent
the traditional privileges and accepted social status of the Faculty of
Advocates. .Among such solicitors not a few would favour fusion of the two
8. See Cockburn Memorials p. 73 Among the members of the Speculative Society
have been most advocates destined for success in their careers.
branches of the profession and the promotion of the Sheriff Court to be the
ordinary Court of first instance for all matters - including actions of damages
for death and injury (which must go- to the Court of Session if there is to be
a jury trial) and divorce (which is a relatively simple branch of the lav;).
Many solicitors also grudge the promotion of so many advocates of moderate
talent to the Shrieval bench when there are available many solicitors of at
least equal gifts.
The advocate is professionally set apart. He may not be approached
directly by a would-be litigant or accused person. There are interposed the
solicitor, who deals directly with the lay client and the advocate's clerk
who fixes the advocate's engagements for him and arranges for an appropriate
fee. Unlike the position in England, the Scottish advocate usually accepts
emuneration on a fixed 'tariff for each piece of work. The solicitor
who deals directly with the lay client also takes precognitions of witnesses
and deals directly with the solicitors acting for the other party. A
solicitor is liable to his client for professional negligence and inay sue for
his expenses. Indeed the law gives him special advantages to recover what
is due. The advocate, however, has not hitherto been regarded as liable for
negligence, and in theory he offers a service incapable of evaluation in money
terms. Hence he either does not or cannot, according to professional
norms, siie for the honorarium which has been agreed by his client with the
solicitor concerned. There are only four advocates' clerks serving the v;hole
Faculty - of which about 110 are in attendance at the Parliament House. These
clerks exercise great influence on the professional prospects of the advocates
on their list, at least at the outset of their careers, and provide an essential
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link with the instructing solicitors. One of the advocates' clerks is himself
a solicitor, and all are remunerated "by the professional client (not by the
advocate himself) on the basis of a1 percentage of the advocate's fee in a
particular case.
Lord ^resident Inglis in Batchelor v. Patiison^ stated categorically
that an advocate cannot sue his client for his fees, and this view is
supported by the opinion of the Father of Scots law, Yiscount Stair.10 The
theoritical position has been reopened very recently by Mr. D.B. Smith,
Advocate. In an article on 'Counsel's Fees' contributed to the Scots Law
Times11 he refers to two mid-sixteenth century cases where actions for fees
12
by advocates were held to be competent and quotes Bankton " in the mid-eighteenth
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century and Shand in the mid-nineteenth century for the view that in strict
law this is the correct view. If this is so, the profession has considered
its social prestige more important than its remuneration. From a social
anthropologist's view both Shand and Bankton are worth quoting. Shand wrote
in 1848 'Now that the profession of an advocate is followed to obtain a livelihood
much as the business of a law agent or any trade it does not seem that there
is any propriety in placing the remuneration on a different footing. This
opinion is, however, very different from that entertained in quarters entitled
to respect'. Lord Bankton had expressed the opinion that an action for fees
was competent but dishonourable - 'though action be competent for such grati¬
fication^ advocates who regard their character, abhor such judicial claims,
and keep in mind the notable saying of Ulpian upon the like occasion, Quaedam
etsi honeste accipiuntur, inhoneste tamen oetuntur'.
9. (1876) 3R.914 at p. 918
10. Institutions 1.12; 5.
11. 1964 3.1.I. (News) 137
12. Institute 4.3. 4.
13. The Practice of the Court of Session vol. i. pp. 80-81
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The role of the advocate from a Scot's lawyer's viewpoint has been so
well expressed by Lord President Inglis that his words in Batchelor v. Patt¬
erson and Mackersey ^ may be quoted, 'An advocate in undertaking the conduct
of a case in this- Court enters into no contract with his client, but takes
on himself an office in the performance of which he o?/es a duty, not to his
client only, but also to the Court, to the members of his own profession,
and to the public. Prom this it follows that he is not at liberty to decline,
except in very special circumstances, to act for any litigant who applies
for his advice and aid, and thathe is bound in any cause that comes into
Court to take the retainer of the party who first applies to him. It follows,
also, that he cannot demand or recover by action any remuneration for his
services. Another result is, that while the client may get rid of his counsel
whenever he pleases, and employ another, it is by no means easy for a counsel
to get rid of his client. On the other hand, the nature of the advocate's
office makes it clear that in the performance of his duty he must be entirely
independent, and act according to his own discretion and judgment in the conduct
of the cause for his client. His legal right is to conduct the cause without
any regard for the wishes of his client, so long as his mandate is unrevoked,
and what he does bona fide according to his own judgment will bind his client,
and will not expose him to any action for yrhat he has done, even if the client's
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interests are thereby prejudiced. Mackay adds 'A client is bound by the
admission of his advocate in matter of fact and by all pleadings signed by
him. It is in his discretion to refuse to examine his client as a witness,
and lead as much or as little evidence as he pleases. He may abandon a case
14. sup, cit. note 9
15. The Practice of the Court of Session, i, p. 110
or give up a defence or consent to a judicial remit, or refer a case to the
oath of his client's adversary. After a case has gone to a jury, it is in
his power to refer it to an arbiter, or even to consent to an adverse verdict'.
In Scotland advocates do not specialise as in England and America. They
may be briefed to appear in criminal or civil cases and are 'general purpose'
specialists as pleaders in the higher courts. One result, is that much
specialist work such as admiralty, taxation and patent problems are usually
dealt with by specialists at the English Bar with a Scottish advocate often
briefed to comment on possible specialities of Scots Law. Specialisation
would be contrary to the traditions of the Faculty, but it may be a harsh truth
of the times that specialisation is necessary in modern society and failure
to regard this fact creates dangers for the future of the Faculty. In the
United States specialisation has been highly developed in the large law offices,
as in commercial enterprises. The role of the lawyer in such a setting differs
greatly from the essentially 'one man' practice of the Scottish advocate.
Until the introduction of legal aid for civil cases in 1949 and Tor
criminal trials in 1964 the Faculty of Advocates provided free legal aid to
those admitted to the Poors' Roll. Indeed a system of free legal aid for the
poor was first instituted in Scotland as early as 1424. Advocates who appear
for 'assisted litigants' today are now paid a fee at a lower rate than in other
cases, and a great deal of litigation and criminal work is covered by the legal
aid schemes. This could alter substantially the image which goes back to the
seventeenth century at least, of the advocate giving his services gratuitously
to plead the cases of the poor or to defend poor persons accused of crime.
Hitherto counsel for the poor have been appointed each year by the Faculty, and
it has also been a tradition that a Q.C. would also give his services
gratuitously in a murder trial. Indeed in 19!3o when Peter Manuel dismissed
his counsel during his trial for a series of murders, the Dean and Clerk of
Faculty went over to Glasgow to offer their services if required. "The
days in ?fhich the doctor and lawyer were the rich men of the community and
could afford to spend a fair proportion of their time on unremunerative work
of a charitable nature may be past.' This factor and the modern system of
State subsidy to these professions may well alter the public image. Already
it is clear that doctors and hospitals are sued on a scale which would have
been unthinkable before the introduction of the National Health Service in
1947.
Advocates are absolutely privileged in their written pleadings as well
as in speaking in Court, provided, of course, that their words are pertinent
to the case. They cannot be sued for defamation in respect of statements made
as counsel. Moreover, consultations between party and legal adviser are
regarded as confidential and immune from disclosure.
Advocates may be censured by a judge improper conduct in Court -
such as using insulting language, and in grave cases of misconduct it would
appear that the Court of Session, in theory, may punish by censure, suspension
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or deprivation of office. However, in modem times disciplinary control is
exercised within the Faculty itself - which may censure or strike an advocate
off its rolls. This has very occasionally happened when an advocate has been
guilty of misconduct, but in such a case in 1874, the Faculty ruled that a
widow's rights from the Advocates 'Widows' Fund' would not be affected by the
16. Mackay op. cit vol. i p. 114. All the examples date back to the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
striking off of her husband provided the rates continued to be paid. Professional
rejection of one member of the group did not involve total severance of the
ties which had been established.
The Faculty Community
There are some 300 contributors to the Advocates' Widows'Fund and of
these about 110 are in daily attendance at the Parliament House practicing
as advocates. For many purposes, however, it -would be true to say 'once
an advocate always an advocate'. Those who are elevated to the Bench as
Senators of the College of Justice or Sheriffs in Edinburgh still meet con¬
stantly with their friends and acquaintances at the Bar. Others who are
appointed Sheriffs or to administrative legal posts or to University Chairs
still take part from time to time in the life of the Faculty Community.
In England the Attorney-G-eneral is leader of the Bar. In Scotland the
Dean of Faculty is its head. The whole Faculty (whether those voting are in
practice or not) elects its Dean and, before an election, considerable
canvassing of opinion takes place. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries political factors counted considerably, and since the Second World
War on at least one occasion a 'party' spirit has been apparent at an election,
which was unwelcome to many of the electors. On the whole, however, the
Dean of Faculty is the man who has gained the highest esteem of the practising
bar for personality and professional success. Usually he has been one of
privileged social background. Other Faculty Officers include the Vice Dean;
Treasurer, Keeper of the Library and Clerk. These all combine their duties
as Officers with practice at the Bar, though the Clerk and Treasurer have
often had sufficient private means to act as Officers without relying on
professional earnings. Such may he minor gentry or come from families which
have built up substantial fortunes in commerce. None of the Faculty Officers
is remunerated.
The Deanjelects a Council, drawn representatively from the Faculty as
a whole, but including, of course, those on whose good will and judgment he can
rely. This Dean's Council considers matters of professional ethics and
censures conduct which it considers unprofessional. An advocate who has a
problem as to correct behaviour may seek the advice of the Dean or Vice Dean
who deals with most minor matters of etiquette or discipline. An informal
warning may be given by the Dean or Vice Dean. To the Dean is entrusted the
honour of upholding the independence of the Faculty even against the Bench
when necessary. This may be by private interview with a judge who has seemed
to treat counsel without proper respect. Alternatively the Dean may proceed
formally to the Court where he is informed counsel is being badly treated, and
baton in hand take his proper seat at the centre of the Bar. This usually
has sufficed to make the Court aware that its conduct is under scrutiny, though,
if this did not suffice the Dean would address the court in vindication of the
honour and independence of the Faculty. The Dean's formal intervention has
only very rarely been invoked in modem times.
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The Faculty of Advocates, as has been explained, is a closely knit community,
and is jealous of its public reputation. Scandals are, so far as possible,
kept within the family. When an advocate's divorce comes on for hearing, care
is taken that the case will be heard at a time and place which is least likely
to attract public attention. If a socially unacceptable situation arises,
and the advocate involved is a Faculty Officer, he will be warned by a senior
member of Faculty that it is his duty to resign rather than implicate the
Faculty's honour. This has happened in one case in living memory when an
Officer had been living in Edinburgh with another man's wife and in another case
after the 1914-1918 War when an Officer had (through carelessness rather than
dishonesty) put his name to a company report which, due to the fraudulent conduct
of its secretary had been the subject of severe comment by the English Courts.
In both cases the Officers had outstanding professional capacity meriting
elevation to the Bench, but in neither case did successive Lord Advocates (though
on friendly terms with the advocates involved) recommend such preferment.
There is perhaps a certain reluctance to prosecute an advocate for crime except
in the clearest cases, and, where there is no public scandal, the image is
preserved. It is characteristic that when an advocate does stand trial or
becomes the victim of public scandal, he will be treated with special consideration
by his brother advocates - even by those who do not particularly like him
personally.
This general attitude is the more understandable when it is remembered
that the nature of his profession sets the advocate apart to- some extent. His
hours and days of work do not conform to the general pattern. Thus the Court
of Session does not sit on Mondays. In modern days judges and advocates are
more likely to golf together on Mondays than attend to their estates. Most of
the work of the Courts involving the more senior counsel finishes by lunch time
on Friday, and there is usually a substantial gathering of an influential group
of these men at the New Club by one o'clock p.m., and their conversation is
largely of matters ?fhich concern the Faculty.
Wives and families, in a sense, form part of this close community. Many
advocates marry the daughters of judges or other advocates. There are still
legal dynasties in the sense that the sons of judges and advocates tend to
follow in the profession. Six of the sixteen senators of the College of
Justice have at present sons practising at the Bar, and the daughter of at
least one Senator is married to the son of another.
An anonymous article, obviously written by a very experienced advocate
was entitled On Choosing a Fife."*""^ Though it is witty it is also perceptive.
The Faculty as a whole identifies itself with the marriage of its members.
At the outset of an advocate's career he is required to make some provision for
his widow by contributing to the Advocate's Widows' Fund. There is (in
1965) still one widow who has been drawing her pension since 1901. The original
idea was no doubt that the impecunious should be excluded and that no Faculty
widow should be left with the stigma of poverty after her husband's death;
though the annual payments now made would not rescue her from such a state.
If the advocate was expected to present a public image, so also was his wife.
One illustration may be quoted, from 1947. An advocate's clerk of the old
school encountered an advocate's wife who had recently come from the South and
had lived in a tradition of war time shopping. She was carrying a parcel of
fish. The clerk raised his hat, with grave courtesy explained the impropriety
of an advocate's lady carrying a paper parcel in the streets, relieved her of
it and carried it himself to her home. Obviously this could not happen today,
17. 1949 3.L.T. (News) 153.
but there are pressures - which some resist - to set patterns for advocates'
wives.
Before an advocate's wedding his friends at the Bar will organise a Bar
Dinner in his honour at which the former 'devil master' will have an honoured
place, and his marriage will usually be an occasion where the same friends and
their wives meet again socially. The bride will probably have been too
preoccupied to learn from previous experience that there are inconveniences in
marrying a man whose home is also his office and who (if successful) will have
little time to spare for her entertainment or even for much conversation. If
there is conversation, so much does the legal mind think in terms of facts and
arguments that this flavour may linger in domestic discussion and in his attitude
to the children. Again, a man holding consultations or grappling with
difficult points of law can seldom abide noise - which creates problems when
there are children in the house.
The anonymous author writes 'I do not pretend to kiow how the wives of other
advocates spend their time during their husbands' working hours ... However
helpful your wife may be, the fact remains that unless she is herself a lawyer
she cannot take any real share in your professional work. Apart therefore
from providing an atmosphere of domestic peace and security she cannot share
your evenings ... Inevitably, and regardless of what the truth may be, in season
and out of season, she will boastfully complain to the wives of your competitors
that her poor husband is terribly busy. Who', he concludes 'is qualified for
the r&Le of an advocate's wife? Someone who is accustomed to loneliness and
finding her own companionship and amusement - perhaps a sailor's widow! ' Many
of the wives find companionship and amusement with other advocates' wives in like
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situations. Others opt out.
Faculty Patronage and Politics
The Faculty itself exercises patronage in various fields and Crown
patronage affecting members of the Faculty is a consideration which many have
in mind at various stages of their career. Crown patronage is in effect
exercised on the advice of the Lord Advocate who is himself a member of
Faculty. Generally speaking, few members of Faculty who experience financial
difficulty through insufficient practice have been allowed to lapse into a con¬
dition which drives them to a change of occupation unconnected with the Faculty
itself.
Various Law Chairs at Edinburgh University are in effect wholly the Faculty
of Advocates' gift, while the Faculty has also a say in certain other University
appointments. The Chairs which are filled on Faculty nomination are those of
Public Law, Scots Law, Civil Law and Constitutional Law. In fact, in the past
as has been explained, there was a measure of hostility on the part of the
Faculty towards la?/ teaching in Edinburgh University, and this seems to have
been assuaged only through Faculty participation in making appointments. Too
often this right of patronage has been used to nominate men with few claims to
outstanding scholarly ability and in effect as a 'perquisite' for a young
advocate or as a subsistence for an older advocate who had failed to succeed.
18
Part of the story is told by Lorimer in Studies National and International and
■ 19
by T.B. Smith in Studies Critical and Comparative. ^ Lorimer who was appointed
to his Chair in 1862 deplored the fact that none of his predecessors, despite
16. esp. at p. 235
19. p. 69 et seq.
their professional legal ability, persevered in the tradition of scholarly lay/
teaching.
The Faculty puts forward two names for certain Chairs of Law to the
Curators of Patronage of the University of Edinburgh, and by custom the first
of these is then appointed by the University. On one occasion where the
Faculty feared that the true nominee might not be accepted, they put as the
first name on their list that of the Dean of Faculty, well knowing that he would
refuse. As in the cases of Bell, Hume, Lorimer and Candlish Henderson this
Faculty patronage has been wisely exercised, but there have been occasions when
the candidate selected has been a member of Faculty Yihose qualifications were
minimal. In 1947 the Normand Committee on Legal Education in Edinburgh
University recommended (with one dissenter, an advocate) that the patronage over
Law Chairs at Edinburgh University should be abolished. At the present time
abolition is still being urged, but with special vigour in certain academic
circles as University education as a whole and legal education in particular
acquires a new look.
Another important appointment in the Faculty, but not on its nomination,
is the Procurator of the Church of Scotland - its legal adviser. This is
one of the medium 'plums' of the profession, and carries considerable prestige
and influence in the country as a whole.
The Sheriffs-Principal are Commissioners for the Northern Lighthouses
(corresponding to Trinity House in England). Appointment to the post of
Secretary lies in their gift and in the past they have appointed advocates if
any suitable were available. However, themost recent appointment was of a
man with maritime experience. As Lighthouse Commissioners the Sheriffs
Principal have, as it were, a special club within the Faculty. Each year
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they go on a voyage of inspection of the Northern lighthouses in the 'Pharos'.
This is an occasion of considerable social importance, and its traditions are
of long standing as appears from the Scott notes to 'The Pirate'. The
Commodore of the day (one of the Sheriffs in rotation) presides at table with
ceremony. Yachting caps are worn with a special badge during the day, and
the Commissioners dress for dinner. They are served with every attention to
detail. 'The waters' are placed on the table at regular intervals and are
served ceremoniously; the catering is luxurious and the intimate and healthy
life aboard the Pharos brings together in special intimacy those senior members
of the Bar who have been appointed Sheriffs Principal. One of their staple
topics of conversation is the importance of their office vis-d-vis the Sheriffs
Substitute, many of whom regard the office of Sheriff-Principal (except of
the LothiansS, Peebles and of Lanarkshire) as in the nature of a sinecure.
At this stage it may be appropriate to mention the rdle of the Lord
Advocate and the factor of politics in the preferment of members of Faculty
to judicial and other appointments. From the time when the Office of Scottish
Secretary was put in abeyance (1725) until 1885 when a new office of Secretary
of Scotland was created, the Lord Advocate was not only a Lav/ Officer but also
the Government's adviser on Scottish affairs generally. He also controlled
patronage to appointments in Scotland. Since 1926, when the Office of Secretary
of State for Scotland was created, the political influence of the Lord Advocate
has declined, but he still controls preferment to legal appointments. Hitherto
the Lord Advocate has normally been a Member of Parliament supporting the party
in power. This has, however, not invariably been so. The late Lord Macmillan
was not, and during the years 1962-64 Lord Advocate Shearer was not a Member of
Parliament nor officially committed to any political party. Neither of the
present Scottish Law officers are Members of Parliament and this may be the
pattern of the future - with .important repercussions on the Faculty. At the
end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries; as Cockburn's
Memorials clearly illustrate no advocate of the party out of power could hope
for preferment. Since then political affiliation has been .a considerable
factor in securing preferment. Indeed on the 'knock for knock' principle
affiliation with one of the large political parties may be more useful - even
when the other is in power - then political neutrality or adherence to the
Liberals.
It is virtually impossible for an advocate to combine attendance at
Westminster with practice at the Bar. If, therefore, an advocate is elected
to the Commons and his party is out of power, his situation is unenviable.
If his party is in power, he may be given office as a Law Officer. In practii
only advocates who hope to become Law Officers or have private means, wish to
enter Parliament. Thus Britain's lawmakers in modern times include virtually
no Scottish lawyers - which contrasts with the situation in almost every other
country. Paradoxically this does not deter advocates from associating them¬
selves with party politics and even standing for Parliament - sometimes in the
hope that they will not be elected if their party does not succeed in gaining
control.
Perhaps nob unnaturally the Lord Advocate who controls legal preferment
in Scotland has his own future in mind., Cockburn's opinion of the office of
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Lord Advocate written in 1854 is still substantially true; 'He knows that
the probable shortness of his reign as Lord Advocate makes it not worth his
while, and scarcely possible for him, to acquire the public and Parliamentary
20. Journal ii, p. 310
qualifications of a statesman. No sane man takes the position of Lord
Advocate except to get well quit of it'. If there is a vacancy for the
Chair in either Division or for a Scottish Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, the
Lord Advocate (if he has put in a reasonable period of office and lias confidence
in his gifts) will normally nominate himself for the vacancy. Thus, apart
from the short tenure of Lord Moncrieff prior to the appointment of the late
Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson who died in 1962, the two top appointments in the
Court of Session have been held in modern times by former lav/ officers who had
been affiliated to a political party. Other appointments to the Bench of the
Court of Session may also, but need not necessarily, result from political
associations. Professional distinction is usually expected. The Dean of
Faculty (who need have no political party affiliations) is normally promoted
to the Bench, and others whose elegibility is usually uninfluenced by party
factors are the Vice-Dean and Procurator of the Church of Scotland. It is
rare, however, for a former Law Officer not to be elevated to the Bench, even
though elevation may come through the party in opposition to his political
allegience.
Appointments to the office of Sheriff Principal have often in the past
been influenced by the fact that the advocate appointed has stood for Parliament.
Moreover, the Advocates-Deputy who represent the Lord Advocate as public
prosecutors change with the administration and are normally selected from those
who support the party in power. The Lord Advocate also appoints standing
counsel to various public bodies, and in maiding such app ointments usually
exercises his patronage to assist some junior whose practice could benefit with
encouragement. These appointments do not change with the Government, and
political considerations do not seem to influence selection. Appointments
as Secretaries to the Lord Advocate Department are made from members of
Faculty with suitable qualifications.
The life of a busy advocate as it has been described is undoubtedly an
arduous one. Apart from legal and forensic skill and determination, a succ¬
essful advocate requires good health and stamina. The profession is not one
which can be practised in partnership. Therefore, in a highly competitive
group, a spell of illness or ill fortune, especially for example after taking
silk, may have serious consequences on prospects. Fox- those advocates who
seek security rather than the glittering prizes as advocate thei-e is always
the office of Sheriff-Substitute which, especially since the last War, has
attracted able men to the more important Courts. The designation is misleading
as the Sheriff Substitute is for most purposes the territorial 'judge ordinary'
in Scotland. Since the 1939-1946 War the status and emoluments of these judges
has been raised considerably, and those appointed to the more important Sheriff
Courts are men of' acknowledged ability in the profession. Practically all such
appointments are made from the ranks of the Faculty of Advocates who are, of
course, a small minority of the Scottish legal profession as a whole. It is
also generally recognised that advocates who have not been of outstanding
quality have not infrequently been appointed Sheriffs Substitute in the less
important Sheriff Courts. The preference for advocates over solicitors for
appointments to the Shrieval bench has been the subject of some criticism from
the solicitors' branch of the profession who assert that an advocate of
indifferent ability may be preferred to a solicitor of recognised quality.
Advocates may also expect appointments as Chairmen of various public bodies;
such as the National Assistance Tribunal.
To summarise, with so many offices available to a small group of advocates,
all of whom are reasonably well known to the Lord Advocate and to their
professional brethren, few if- any who are admitted to the Faculty fall by
the way. Even the younger advocates are encouraged and given opportunity to
show their abilities through commissions to take evidence granted by the Bench.
Some advocates may be tempted to better salaried posts as advisers to large
industrial and commercial concerns, but on the whole advocates finish their
professional lives in places for which they have qualified themselves by membership
of the Scottish Bar and for which such membership gives them a priority when
selection is made.
Summation
An analysis from a social anthropological point of view will be made
presently. To sum up on the purely descriptive level a few provisional
conclusions may be stated.
The classes from which the Faculty is now recruited have changed noticeably
from the period described by Phillipson. Subject to the heavy initial financial
outlay required, the Faculty is in a sense democratic in recruitment but aris¬
tocratic in function. There remains an inner group of minor gentry, sons of
judges, advocates or of wealthy professional mercantile or industrial families.
Sons of the manse and sons of solicitors are in particular a substantial element.
These come from an essentially Scottish professional tradition. There has been
a tendency for advocates in these groups to have taken a degree at Oxford or
Cambridge, and since the law degree there is designated B.A., many take their
first degree in Law there, and are permitted to count it as a qualification in
general scholarship. This has increased the trend towards anglicisation of
the Faculty of Advocates in the sense that many of its members speak and think
much as their opposite members at the -English Bar, though in some cases the
greatest enthusiasts for the Scottish legal heritage have shared their educational
background between England and Scotland. Though increasingly the lav/ of
Scotland is being influenced by English law, and advocates rely, when it suits
their case, on English authority, the faculty would resist to the uttermost
any encroachment on its particular privileges - either through fusion with the
English Bar or fusion with the solicitors' branch of the profession in Scotland.
The advocate's place in the community is still widely respected, ensures high
status and gives good prospects of a reasonable livelihood. The moderately
glittering prizes of the Bench in the Court of Session are reserved for
advocates who have managed to persevere in practice. There are other openings
for those who do not, and these are respected in the community. Leading
solicitors may earn more or be equally able as lawyers, but their public image
is not on the same level.
Nevertheless, the image of the faculty is not what it was in Cockburn's
time. He deplored the falling off of work in the Parliament House, a tale
taken up more bitterly by Professor A.D. G-ibb in the 1930's in his 'Shadow
over the Parliament House'. Probably at the present time the complaint is not
of less work but of less interesting vrork. State subsidising of litigation has
been a monetary blessing to the Bar, but may ha.ve lessened the status of
advocate. Writing so close to the introduction of legal aid in Scotland it
would be unsafe to reach firm conclusions on this issue. Large enterprises,
whose managers and directors command larger remuneration than advocates, are
accustomed to employ specialists, and regard advocates much in the same way as
they do other specialists. Moreover, as SO/o of all enterprises in Scotland
employing 200 or more employees are controlled from the South, those in control
tend to view the Scottish advocate as operating in a provincial setting. The
advocate's image in Scotland is more distinguished than in Britain as a whole.
Within the legal profession in Scotland, the successful solicitor may regard
the advocate with some envy on account of his popular image, but would not
concede that it rested on professional ability. The Sheriff Court where the
solicitor has equal right of audience, has extensive jurisdiction. Were
divorce jurisdiction to be transferred to the Sheriff Court and were civil jury
trial to be abolished the junior Bar would suffer severe loss of earnings.
Neither of these classes of litigation belonged to the original jurisdiction
of the Court of Session until the early nineteenth century. Retention of
the status que is defended by some on the grounds not of logic and convenience
but by the argument that any change would imperil the survival of the Faculty
as a separate group. This argument indicates a sense of insecurity regarding
the future. It may well be that this present study is appropriately timed.
The traditions of centuries have given the Facility of Advocates a special
status in the community. It remains essentially Scottish in recruitment and
essentially Edinburgh in location. Whether in a changing social and economic
environment it can retain its privileges and relative status in the community
cannot safely be predicted. Ultimately its privileges are safeguarded by the
Union Agreement, as were those of other aspects of 'the establishment' such as
the Church, royal burghs and heritable jurisdictions. That Agreement has not
proved an adequate safeguard for these other aspects. The Faculty may yet
for some time prove more fortunate, but is unlikely to recover the prestige it
enjoyed in Edinburgh's Golden Age.
PART II
Chapter 5
INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
The first part of this thesis has been devoted to sociographic description
of the Faculty of Advocates in an historical., comparative and contemporary
context. This was an essential preliminary task. The development of the
structure and function of the profession must be seen in crder that its present
condition may be understood. The institutional framework within v/hich the
advocate's professional activities are carried on, his rights and duties and his
place in the legal system have now been described. At this stage it becomes
necessary to attempt analysis and interpretation from the standpoint of social
anthropology. After this introductory chapter it is proposed to discuss the
advocate's status and role in general; to consider his professional 'life
cycle' as he progresses in his career, and to evaluate his status and role in
relation to the wider world - his public image. Following on this it is
proposed to examine his role-set and to identify and categorize the various
devices used to prevent role-conflict and to enable him to play his part
according to the stated norm of behaviour laid down by the court and by the
profession itself. When this ground has been covered, it will be appropriate
to set forth in the Conclusion the main findings which seem to be justified
by interpretation of the descriptive material.
A famous dictum of Malinowski 'There are no facts without problems' is
quoted by his pupil Raymond Firth. Malinowski himself expresses this idea
in mating in a rather different form •'What we are demanding is ... the study
hy direct observation of the rules of custom as they function in actual life.
Such study reveals that the commandments of law and custom are always organically
connected and not isolated .... that they only exist in the chain of social
reactions in which they are but a link .... With this the theoretical arguments
of Anthropology will be able to drop the lengthy litanies of threaded state¬
ment...' Much of this thesis has been descriptive of the history of the
institution, its training (compa,red with training for lawyers in other Western-
systems), and what anthropologists might call the sociography of the group.
The second part of the work, the analysis of some of the material described,
has had to be limited mainly to one aspect of the advocate's life and his role
playing. What are the norms of his professional role? How does he perform
them? Where does any possibility of role conflict or of role contamination
lie? This is the problem which has been investigated and there may seem, in
Part I at least, to be an excess of facts for its explanation. The writer had
hoped to analyse more of the descriptive material than has been possible in
this one thesis. She still hopes to analyse much of it at a later date.
Since most social anthropologists, including those with great success and
reputation, have worked in societies that have or had no written history, that
is to say among preliterate or non-literate peoples, it is not surprising that
the anthropologist has failed to indulge in the interests of historians,
further, most small-group descriptions and analyses in modern society have
similarly dealt with subsystems lacking any prolonged history. Such illum-
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inating studies as that of Roetlisburger and Dickson in the 'Bank Wiring
3
System' and of W.F. Whyte in 'Street Corner Society' and 'Human Relations in
1. Crime and Custom in Savage Society pp. 125-6
2. Management and the Worker passim.
3. Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry. Street Corner Society, passim
the Restaurant Industry', which have "been of the greatest importance in the
analysis of group norms, role-fulfillment, leadership and social control had
no need of historical description. In the study of this particular small
group in Scotland the writer is of the opinion that its present state must
he seen in relation to its long and well-documented past history. The large
amount of factual and historical material had to he collated before any analysis
could he begun. In addition to the academic reasons for this process, there
was the social reason that this group of people have a tendency to introduce
the theory 'Palsum in unQ.i, falsum in omnibus; which, however illogical it may
he, is a readily available stick with which to beat any poor recorder of their
system.
Durkheim/1" so often divorced sociology from history that the effect of his
writings seems often to have been that the sociologist - and more particularly
the anthropologist - deliberately (or faute de mieux) denies himself the help
that the past may shed on the present. Marx and Weber certainly followed the
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opposite path; the most recent translation of a work pf Sartre in the same
tradition has confirmed the writer in her view that the history of an institu¬
tion can only illumine the hypotheses that the observer in the field might
construct. . The comparison between several systems of Western lavr development
has also seemed to be necessary because the roles of judge and of lawyer have
emerged differently in different Western countries. This it is hoped is
demonstrated in Part I, Chapter 2. The comparison between the Scottish system
and the four others described shows that much of the material has had to be
seen both in time and in space. Lawyers and 'the law' - at least in the
Western world - remains ethnocentric in the fundamental sense that it is the
4. Division of Labour etc. passim
5# The Problem of Method, passim.
"'law' of a particular jurisdiction or bench, or board of officials".^ It does
not do to confuse the systems nor to indicate in however small a point that
the exact differences in their development and structure have not been noted.
The writer has been greatly interested to note that in twenty two years
of observation of one small group and in four years intensive study and parti¬
cipant observation, she has so frequently been wrong in theory-construction.
She is rather surprised that many social anthropologists, without the advantage
of knowing the language or customs of those whom they observe, manage to be
so certain of their theory and knowledge of any given aspect of a society after
two or three years residence within the territory of the group. The nuances
of social behaviour amongst this small group of lawyers in Scotland would, she
believes, not be revealed in any such period of time to any 'outsider'. That
the 'insider' may lack objectivity is clear; yet it seems even more clear
that it is too easy to jump to conclusions after even ten or more years of
'field-noting'. The 'pattern' of 'structure' might be clearer after a short
view; the reality could hardly be so.
The mere collection and narration of facts, whether historical,
comparative or sociographic is of little use unless these facts are relevant
to a particular problem. Malinowski's^ views on this matter have already been
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discussed. It is interesting to note that Mayhew over a hundred years ago
made the same point, as did Malinowski in 19&6. 'Facts', he said, 'according
to my ideas, are merely the elements of truths and not the truths themselves;
of all matters there are none so utterly useless by themselves as your mere
matters of fact. A fact, so long as it remains an isolated fact is a dull,
dead, uninformed thing: no object nor event by itself can possibly give us any
6. Riosman op. ci i*.
7. See p J23 supra
3. London Labour & the London Poor, iv vols. 1861.
knowledge, we must compare it with some other, even to distinguish it; and
it is this distinctive quality thus developed that constitutes the essence of
a thing .... To give the least mental value to facts, therefore we must
generalise them, that is to say, we must contemplate them in connection with
other facts, and so discern their agreements and differences,their antecedents,
concornmitants and consequences. It is true that we may frame erroneous and
defective theories in so doing ... nevertheless if theory may occasionally
teach us wrongly, facts without theory or generalisation cannot possibly teach
us at all.' The only addendum the present writer would make to the excellent
advice of Hayhew and Kalinowski would be a- parody of the equally famous Mrs.
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Beeton 'first catch your facts'.
The object of this thesis is not simply to describe the Faculty of
Advocates, however, illuminating such a description might be; it is to see
in this structural-cultural-functional pattern the role the advocate plays,
how his training fits him for it, how he is helped both institutionally and by
symbols to play it and to examine the strains and conflicts that might prevent
his giving a proper performance.
What is the system in which he plays his role? There are many and diverse
systems of social control based on varying kinds of legal and judicial procedures.
Some recapitulation of the development of this unique Scottish legal system
may illuminate why the role of the advocate is as it is, and, by comparison with
other models, show why it has to be so. Other western systems share most of
the basic reasons for the structuring of their legal professions. Some
, „ ,, , , . . T-, t » an<l a further discussion
comparative account of these has been given m Part I '
of their evolution would be out of place here. The Scottish system differs in
9. The actual mis-parody is from one Hannah G-lasse (1747) who, according to
the Oxford Dictionary, wrote 'Take your hare when it is cased' and is
always misquoted as writing 'First catch your hare'.
10. esp. Chapter 2.
particulars, and, therefore, a few main points may be made to explain the
need for the system to be serviced by professionals at all and for the
segregation of the roles which has led to the creation of the status 'advocate'.
Only by tracing the system from its origins will the specificity of function,
of role and of nomas inherent in the status eraerge.
Historically the basic influences on the development of western type
legal systems are the Roman Law, the Church and the 'Barbarian-Feudal' systems.
During the Dark Ages the Church through Canon law kept the Roman system still
in operation as did the vulgarised Roman law of the Barbarian Kingdoms. After
the General Reception of rediscovered Roman law,from the twelfth century onwards,
the secular courts tended to adopt and follow the Romano-Canonical procedure
of the Church Courts, and the early professional lawyers were ecclesiastics.
Two different attitudes were taken to 'representation' of parties by
the 'Feudal Barbarian' and by the ecclesiastical courts. In the former
representation was the exception, since parties were expected to appear in
person to assert or defend their rights. In the Middle Ages the judicial
process and the pleadings in court could be loosely compared with Gluckman's
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account of the Barotse. The litigants presented their own case, produced
their own witnesses, there was no fiction of judicial ignorance and the
procedure was inquisitorial. The communities in which trials were heard were
small, the character and general behaviour of the litigants were known and
were relevant to the decisions that might be reached. There were at this
stage no institutionalised 'pleaders' with specific functions. The Scots
feudal courts were presided over by the feudal superior, or often his delegate,
and the assizers were vassals who owed 'suit of court'. These vrere the origin
of the jury. (in Scots the word 'assize' still implies a criminal jury).
11. Max Gluckman. The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern
Rhodesia passim.
The attitude of the ecclesiastical courts differed and it was in them
that representation of the client first appeared. Clearly abbeys, churches
and the like could not appear 'in person', and the Canon law tradition was to
allow appearance by procurator. This privilege was also granted to these in¬
stitutions in the civil courts - as to women, children, towns, guilds and
the like - for the same reason, and they were allowed to appear by champion
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in trial b battle - which was, of course, a legal process. 'Law is many
things'The society comprised by this time specialised institutions beyond
the kindred and the priest. This is reflected in the development of the legal
system and its need for functionaries with specialist knowledge. Eventually
the privilege of representation became a right"^®" largely, it may be thought, for
the convenience of the courts as the law became more complex and the jurors ceased
to be able to decide according to their own knowledge of fact and law.
It may be relevant to note here that a recent 'fashion' in Scotland for
accused persons to defend themselves, begun by Peter Manuel, the murderer, in
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1958 has ca.used considerable Inconvenience to the Courts, as does the pleading
of the litigent in person anywhere in the modem western system. Hie rigid
rules of evidence and procedure, unknown to the layman, are ignored, relevance
is unknown, and the time of the court Is largely wasted. The system has to
adapt to this ignorance of its specific rules and functions by becoming mere
inquisitional, the prosecutor and the judge must help and question the accused
or party litigant instead of listening to the plea of his trained defender.
The specialised, institutionalised role of the advocate has become a necessity
for the proper conduct of the law within a highly differentiated society where
the intricacies of the legal system cannot be known to the laymen.
12. Jenks. Short History of English Law p. I98
13. Mao; G-luckman, quoted by Michael Banton
14.. Brissaud History of French Private Law p. 544
15. J.C. Wilson The Trial of Peter Manuel, The Man who Talked too much
For the development of this role and its normative order it is necessary
to go hack to the late thirteenth century when, in addition to the ecclesiasti¬
cal lawyers, a law profession-emerged - though these were often clerks in
minor orders - while during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the lay
profession came to he organised with strict discipline and definite ranks.
Scotland, which lay out of the mainstream of European advance, developed
hoth law and a legal profession later than France or Italy, which were her
earliest models and influenced the structuring of the Scottish profession.
Further, until the establishment of the College of Justice in the first half
of the sixteenth century, much of the legaL.work not handled in the local
feudal courts was dealt with in the Church Courts hy ecclesiastical lawyers.
The same lawyers might appear in the lay as in the ecclesiastical courts.
Leaving aside the judges and the notaries as having specialised functions,
there are references in the earliest known Scottish Acts to 'forspeakers1 and
•procurators'. Their functions came to he merged to a large extent hut imply
different ideas. The differentiation of the system at this time differs in
orientation from that obtaining today. The 'forspeaker* or prolocutor was
the 'prisoner's friend' - adviser - who is found in many legal systems. In
the Njal Saga he is to he found in a similar form and with the same function.
He is an intermediary figure in the development of a legal system because he
lacks two of the main functions of the modern advocate or barrister; he owes
no duty to the court and he is not yet part of a professional group with
norms and ethics to which he has to conform. The sociological importance of
the further differentiation of his function and his role is clear. Lacking
a duty to the court and to a professional norm he has an irresponsibility which
society cannot tolerate. He is still recognised in Britain in military law.
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In Court Martial procedure the status 'prisoner's friend' still exists. This
16. Rule of Procedure 87D under the Army Act, 1955»
person may advise the accused on all points hut, unlike a defending counsel
or a defending officer, he may not examine or cross-examine or address the
Court.
The procurator (attornatus in English Law) did not just support a party's
case. He represented his person and his cause under a mandate, and might
appear in the latter's absence. Moreover, one of his functions seems to have
been as a 'man of business'. The two branches of the profession were still
one. So closely were pleaders identified with their clients that, since the
party himself had to take an oath (which significantly is still required in
Scottish Divorce proceedings) that he believed his cause to be just, so the
procurator had to take a like oath,"^ and indeed to abandon the case if he
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came to consider it unjust. Originally it would seem that the procurator
did not merely require to be appointed by the party but also to have the
consent of the Court, thus emphasising the responsibility which the procurator
or advocate owed to the Court as well as to the client.
The earl;/ procurators or advocates (the terms are used as interchangeable)
were sometimes reluctant to act in unpopular causes - especially against the
Government. There is an instance recorded in 1522 of an advocate 'taking
instruments', i.e. having it 'on the record' that he had been.'compelled'
to procure by the Lord Chancellor and the lords. In 1587 the Act 150? 38
giving general right to engage advocates in cases of crime and treason ¥/as
reinforced by the Act 1507 c 91 which ordered the judge to overcome advocates'
fears of unpleasant consequences by compelling them to procure and use all
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lawful defences. By these steps the responsibility of the advocate to the
court (and of the court to the advocate) as well as to his client was stressed,
17. 1430 A.P.S. ii c.16, 19.
18. 1534 B.S. ii, f.31
19. See also Lord Balrnerino v. Forrester (l605) Mor. 341-Advocate compelled
under pain of deprivation to act against a Lord of Session.
as was his independence of the state. (This may be contrasted with the
concept of the professional in Communist countries where the lawyers' co¬
operatives allocate work and expect advocates to observe the basic norms
of the 'people's democracies' rather than follow a set of norms set up by
\ 20their relationship to the court or to their profession) The advocate's
membership of an organised professional body also dates from the establishment
of the College of Justice, of which a certain number of procurators were
made members.
In Scotland it is the incorporation of advocates in the College of Justice,
which has led to a specialisation of function. Only those so incorporated
had a right of audience there. The other societies of procurators (and many
are still so designated e.g. the Royal Faculty of Procurators in Glasgow)
who were not entitled to plead in the Supreme Courts of Scotland continued to
discharge an undifferentiated function as men of business and as pleaders in
the local courts. From the establishment of the Court of Session as a College
of Justice in 1532 the two branches of the profession - advocates and the
solicitors - begin to emerge, and, though it was not until the eighteenth
century that advocates shed all the functions of men of business, t. ey specialised
in advocacy as the most honourable and distinguished aspect of the legal
profession. The development of the law into a more complex and technical
science after the establishment of a permanent, professional judiciary made
such a corps of specialists necessary for the efficient conduct of business.
The role of advocate developed in relation to the role of the judge as well as
in relation to the needs of a growing society, and the pleader was given a
special status in order that he might discharge a special function in the
20. Schlesinger, Comparative haw, p. 205
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highest courts. In 1532, though the practice of engaging professional
representation was recognised by the selection and licensing of eight
21
'rrocuratoris or advocatis'of-'best name, knowledge and experience'j It
was also contemplated that parties appearing in person might attend in
court. The securing of the best available advocates to assist the highest
court is in itself significant. They would be best able to unravel legal
technicalities and (perhaps) save the Court's time. The segregation of
the role of advocate was intended to lead to increased justice and efficiency,
and the advocates required the services of clerks and agents in order that
they might concentrate on their primary task. The work of the lower courts,
e.g. the Sheriff Courts, only became complex and involved considerable sums
or property in quite modern times. There was not the same need for special¬
isation there and the lawyers below the rank of advocate vrere therefore per¬
mitted to practise in those courts.
It may be observed that, unlike the development in France of a number
of local Bars, in Scotland there was only sufficient high level work to
22
justify a College of Justice in Edinburgh. Hannay suggested that the
original College of Justice was modelled on the College of Justice at Pavia,
but this idea has been scotched by Professor Stein.^ The Collegesof Judges
and Advocates of Italy provided, however, a sufficient general description of
what James V had in mind for the purposes of correspondence with Pope Clement.
The incorporation of judges and advocates in one college undertaking specialist
and high level work assisted role-segregation within the legal profession in
Scotland from the start, and centralised appellate jurisdiction as well as the
concentration of the most important litigation in the Court of Session in
time confirmed the monopoly. Moreover, the highest prestige attached through-
21. Hannay College of Justice p. 137
22. op. cit. p. 49 et seq
23. Stein. The College of Judges at Pavia (1952) 63 Jur. Rev. p. 104 et seo.
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out Western Europe to those who practised in the Central Royal Courts. The
high ranking of the status advocate stems from this time.
Had the function of advocate extended in the direction of the 'man
of business' the small numbers of the group would have proved inadequate.
This would have led to dilution and less specificity of function. Partner¬
ships might have developed with lawyers specialising in different types of
case. Had the law not been technical the role of 'forspeaker' (who might
2i,
be seen to have his counterpart in the modern 'actor advocate') r might have
gained greater prominence. Combined concern with fact and law on the part
of judges and advocates alike encouraged mutual reliance not only on
professional skills but also on professional integrity.
25It may be recalled that in the second third of the nineteenth century
there was a reaction in the United States against the professional skills and
traditions which had been carried over from Colonial times and in many states
every voter of good character was allowed to practise law. This led to a
serious deterioration in professional standards. It also proved to be an
impossible ideal in a society growing ever more complex in its division of
labour and its social institutions. That it could have happened at all was
probably due to the idea that 'lawyer's law', was 'undemocratic' and that with
an untechnical approach to legal problems a 'forspeaker' was sufficient. The
need for the specific, status and role of the lawyer was ignored. Thus law
became a money getting trade without a sense of public or professional duty.
The reaction against this and the modern insistence on specialised training
and legal ethics have already been discussed. The ethics of criminal
practitioners have perhaps been more under suspicion than of those acting in
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Drinker, Legal Ethics, p.19
See p. 48 supra
27
defend its probable criminals. Quite recently in G-ideon v. Tfainwright. the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the fourteenth 4nendment requires
counsel to be assigned in a criminal prose.aution. It ?jas not until 1836
that a person accu/sed of felony in England, for which the penalty was death,
was entitled to representation by counsel (except for argument on a mere
point of law). This stresses another distinction in counsel's function -
the difference between legal adviser (agent or solicitor) and professional
representative undertaking all aspects of a client's defence. The functions
of 'mouthpiece' and of the 'procurator learned in the la?f' have both been
blended in the role of the Scottish advocate from earliest times in civil
cases and in criminal cases generally at least since the end of the sixteenth
century. This has assisted technical efficiency and dispatch of business,
and in a small profession vshich does not specialise in types of cases but in
advocacy the norms respected in civil causes are observed also in criminal
causes. ^here is less danger of counsel becoming contaminated by the standards
of a criminal sub-culture through specialisation in criminal work, as is allegedly
feared by some lawyers in the United States. Perhaps even in England the repute
of the Old Bailey practitioner does not stand as high as that of barristers in
other branches of practice. Rather than attempt comps,risons vdth models of
less developed systems described by anthropologists, it seemed more illuminating
to use an historical approach to show in the growth of this particular legal
system, the unfolding of a social system and the changes in its structure which
were necessitated by the growing complexity of the community in which it had
to operate. As division of labour, differentiation of institutions and of
27. 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
the relationships between persons grew more complex so did the lav; which
controlled and administered them. The function of the advocate within the
structure of the legal system and the necessity for his existence became
clear from the examination of his origins. It is possible now to see the limits
given by the system itself, within which the occupational role can be played.
28
It also becomes clear in Parson's words that the 'results have become so
closely interwoven in the fabric of modern society that it is difficult to imagine
how it could get along without basic structural changes if they were seriously
impaired'. There is little if any structural disharmony either in the legal
system itself, within which the advocate's function and norms are so clear,
29
or in its relationship to the wider social system. Again in Parson's words
'hence, the elements of conflict are more those of scope and concrete content of
interests than of structural disharmony as such'. The possible existence of
these elements of conflict will be discussed in later chapters. It is suggested
here that the rationality of the system, its specificity of function, of norms
and of roles leave very little room for conflict, and that in the 'concrete
content of interests' conflict is controlled by the-high degree of technical
and professional training inculcating as it does emotional neutrality, and by
the smallness and homogeneity of the group. In the limited sphere in which
role-conflict or role-contamination might be found it is suggested that informal
controls have a predominant place and lead to a high degree of social harmony.
The system itself with the rigidity/ and specific role-playing it demands
of the advocate, places strains on him. His relationship with those profess¬
ionally nearest to him, with his 'role-set', to use Merton's terminology,^
will be seen to be controlled to a large extent by informal sanctions and by
28. Talcott Parsons Bssays in Sociological ^heory. ^he Professions and
Social Structure p. 34
29. Talcott Parsons op. cit. p. 46
30. See p.i9i infra
devices, symbols and professional mores long known and accepted, and, as yet,
unaffected by any substantial degree of social change. Megarry suggests
much the same state in England. 'The powers of the Disciplinary Committee
and of the Benchers, are, of course, important in the last resort; the two
branches of the profession must have adequate powers to purify their member¬
ship. But what in many w&ys is more important is the existence of strong and
effective professional opinion. This not only dissuades from conduct that
would fall within the ambit of disciplinary proceedings but also cheeks much
conduct which, though outside that ambit,is undesirable. Most important of
all, this professional opinion is not merely a deterrent to misconduct but
also encourages and maintains all that is best. The existence of such a body
of opinion in England is neither mirage nor aspiration, but solid reality;
and for that all must be grateful.' In examining the Scottish system Megarry's
judgment has been amply confirmed, and indeed within the smaller and closer
community evidence of the informal professional sanctions is more readily
available.
The institutional features which differentiate the system and therefore
the patterns 'in terms of which the actor is orientated towards his situation
32
of action' are now disclosed clearly as the legal system itself, the judiciary
and the profession. The three have grown together, and are part of the same
structure. The professional group Is differentiated and is itself structured
in clear relation to the total system. The group is small, it must be
33
remembered, and unusual In the modern ?festern world. GoMe writes 'Character¬
istic of each of the established professions, and a goal of each aspiring
occupation, is the 'community of profession'. Each profession is a community
31. Megarry Lawyer and Litigant in England, p. 54-55
32. Taljc^t Parsons, 'The Theoretical Development of the Sociology of Religion
33. Community within a Community. ™he Professions p. 194
without physical locus and, like other communities with heavy in-migration,
one whose founding fathers are linked only rarely by blood with the present
generation. It may nevertheless be called a community by virtue of these
characteristics: (l) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2) Once
in it, few leave, so that it is a terminal or continuing status for the most
part. (3) Its members share values in common. (if) Its role definitions
vis-a-vis both members and non-members are agreed upon and are the same for
all members. (5) Within the areas of communal action there is a common
language, which is understood only partially by outsiders. (6) The community
has power over its members. (7) Its limits are reasonably clear, though
they are not physical and geographical, but social. (8) Though it does not
produce the next generation biologically, it does so socially through its
control over the selection of professional trainees...'
The Faculty of Advocates is, however, a community with 'a physical locus',
it has no 'heavy in-migration', and its founding fathers are often linked by
blood with the present generation. Goo&e's list of characteristics delineating
the 'community' apply to the Faculty to a great extent, but it is worth noting
that he does not even suggest that there could be a professional group whose
limits were physical and geographical as woll as social. The Scottish Bar is
such a group, and is in all senses a 'community within a community'. In
the later description of this fact it will emerge that in its stability and
continuity, its clear role models, the interdependence of its members and
their role set, its relationship to outsiders, its high degree of informal
social control and even in its kinship and marriage links it is a close and
homogeneous community. It will be seen also that its social density is high
as would be expected in sucha situation, and that this social density leads
to the expected results. The self-government of any profession must be strict
or the wider society might step in to control professional behaviour. The
diffuse sanctions in this close knit community add immeasureably to the degree
of control exercised by the governing professional body.
How does the general public see the system and the place of the advocate
within it? Is it a 'wonderful, accommodation to human fallibility' as one
informant suggested? To the public the law may seem infallible, and in a
sense the intention of the judge and the lawyer is that the public should so
see it. The individual trained in the lav/ knows that it is not infallible,
and the initiate alone knows that, though the lav/ will be done and be seen to
be done, justice is not always obtained. 'Even in a relatively static society,
men ha.ve never been able to construct a comprehensive, eternised aet of rules
anticipating all possible legal disputes and settling them in advance .... Our
society would be strait-jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance
of the lawyers, constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities
of over-changing social ... conditions .... Much of the uncertainty of the
law is not an unfortunate accident; it is of immense social value.Cardoso
also warns against the tendency 'in determining the growth of a principle or a
precedent, to treat it as if it represented the outcome of a quest for certainty'.
35The principles and precedents are 'in truth provisional hypotheses'. Lawyers
are aware of the impossibility of erecting a completely satisfactory system of
rules in which everyonemay obtain justice. The public is more likely to believe
that justice could be done if the judge or lawyer would only try. This accounts
for the fact that, while one public image of the lawyer is as the defender and
34. Jerome Prank, Law and the Modern Mind, p. 6-7
35. Benjamin Cardozo, The "-rowth of Law p. 70
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supporter of individual rights, another public image is unfavourable and. arises
through the lawyer's apparent failure to procure a just outcome for particular
clients. The public has a tendency to see the system as infallible, and when
it appears not to work according to public ideas of 'justice' to blame the
lawyers for its failure.
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Riesman suggests that sociologists themselves 'assume, though they know
he (the lawyer) may not have practiced law for ten years, that he has some
magic formula for them at his fingertips; moreover that there is a formula.
They are astonished to find that he, as a lawyer, is much more casual about
legal matters than they are; that he goes on the principle ... that the law
in any given case is uncertain. In spite of their skepticism, they are
surprised, for at bottom they, believe in the certainty and majesty of the law'.
Informants who were anthropologists and sociologists confirm Riesman's statement
that their beliefs about the law- and lawyers differ little from those of the
educated general public.
The advocate's place in the system is to assist the judge in decision
making of a high order and in a highly visible situation. A comparison with
the necessary-' decision making of the policeman will indicate the difference
between it and the nature and importance of the court's task. The public at
the greatest social distance from the legal profession may see the court simply
as an extension of the police-force. One informant from the working-class
who had been involved in a small court case in which he sued the driver of a
motor-car and failed in his action saw his own counsel as a kind of 'enemy'
vri.th.in a system which started with policemen and ended in front of 0. judge.
36. David Riesman, American Journal of Sociology (1951) Vol. 1 vii p. 121
Yet for the larger part of the community it appears that the law itself is
seen as a protector and guarantor of rights, and therefore that the judge or
lawyer appears as often failing to implement what the public imagine the la?/
is.
The la?jyer himself knows what the la?/ is, or, more accurately he is
taught legal techniques and the system. The advocate is trained to recognise
and to reconcile his role within the system, his rights and duties as officer
of the court, as a member of his profession and in his relationship with his
client. His training ideally should help him to avoid any possible conflicts
involved in the three-fold nature of his role. A member of the criminal
classes might consider the advocate's attention to his duty to the court as
being excessive; some of the advocate's role-set in Scotland might claim that
his loyalty to his profession could be seen to be greater than his loyalty
to the systea which he serves0 The advocate claims, and from the evidence
adduced in later chapters claims rightly, that little role-conflict arises
when the technical and social training of a member of the Bar has been thoroughly
accomplished. That there is occasional deviant behaviour he will admit:
that the system allows corruption or that conflict or contamination are real
problems he denies.
37The service of the professional as Marshall says is 'unique andpersonal'
and yet at the same time it must be governed by known training shared by all
his colleagues. Only thus can the interchangeability of colleagues be assumed
as it is in this as in most professional associations. The advocate is
trained to dissociate his professional from his other roles in order that his
objectivity in the conduct of his cases may be as complete as is possible.
37. T.H. Marshall op. cit. p. 134
The role-training must lead to such objectivity if the system is to work.
Personal involvement in the client's case is a sign of undertraining of which
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examples will he given later. J Roman Catholic judges and advocates must
conduct divorce cases; their role as members of their Church must he completely
separated from their roles within the legal system. Trade-Unionist litigants
may have as their counsel High Tories; here the advocate's political role in
the wider world will he irrelevant. The importance of relevance in all
matters is so basic a part of the training in law that the advocate has very-
little difficulty in noticing and obeying his sense of what is relevant to the
role he himself is playing. A Norwegian professor of the Sociology of Law has
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said, 'The real significance of law to the sociologist is to be found less
in deviations from found patterns than in the law itself. The legal profession
applies a structured style of thinking, conceptualisation, and decision-making
to the solution of practical tasks. It is interesting that these tasks
apparently have persisted for thousands of years In the European tradition.
And it is significant that the methods applied, and the underlying theory, have
not drastically changed since the 3-oman Law'. This ' structured style of
thinking and decision making' can be seen in the lawyer's attitude to his own
tasks and behaviour as clearly as It can be seen in his tackling of a client's
problems. To be partisan or to be irrelevant is to be wrong are ,two maxims
by which the lawyer lives, and by which his actions are determined. It some¬
times seems to the family and friends of a member of the Bar that over-training
has been achieved. In his non-professional roles the advocate rarely loses
sight of these maxims. His skills in making a point, keeping to that point
and eschewing partisanship can be a great strain on those with whom he interacts
outside the professional situation. His training is so successful that in
38. See p. lifl infra
39. Vilhelm Aubert The American Behavioural Scientist, p. 16
Researches in the Sociology of Law.
argument or discussion on any subject it gives him an advantage over others.
In his work role the laws of evidence often limit the information that
the judge might have in deciding a case. Counsel must know and obey these
laws, thus his training includes the learning of great self-control in the
presentation of any argument. Even the greatest of counsel sometimes so
far forget themselves in their training as to express an opinion rather than
to lead evidence in support of their case. One of the most famous rebukes
v/as delivered to counsel in this respect by the Lord Justice-Clerk in his
charge to the jury in the trial of Madeleine Smith^. 'You are not to give
the slightest weight to the personal opinion of the guilt of the prisoner,
which I regret my learned friend the Lord Advocate allowed himself to express.
Nor are you, on the other hand, to be weighed in the prisoner's favour by
the more moving and earnest declaration made by her counsel of his own
conviction of her innocence. I think on both sides such expression of opinion
by the counsel ought never to be brought before a jury. Neither of them are
so good judges of the truth as all of you are ... As Lord Campbell said in
his charge to the jury in Palmer's case - 'G-entlemen - I must strongly fecommend
to you to attend to everything that fell from that advocate, so eloquently,
so ably and so impressively. You are to judge, however, of the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner from the evidence, and not from the speeches of the
counsel how ever able or eloquent these speeches may bei' The advocate's
training should prevent his making such mistakes and receiving such rebukes,
and it usually does. The public may expect his 'eloquence' to resound in court,
and his public image may suffer from the fact that it so rarely does.
40. Trial of Madeleine Smith ed. A. Duncan Smith p. 253
That the training and socialisation of the advocate in his professional
role is paramount in preventing role-conflict will he discussed further in a
later chapter^" together with a description of some of the devices vfhich serve
to segregate his role and the symbols which indicate its differentiation
from that of others ±1 his role-set. The use of lierton's concept 'role-set'
will he examined and in its light the advocate's relationship with his closest
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associates, the solicitor and the clerk, will he described.
3?or the client seeking advice the first link in the chain of decision¬
making is the solicitor or agent. The .client goes to the solicitor, as does
the patient to the doctor, at a time which is for him a point of crisis. Iiis
inability to understand that it is no more than an ordinary piece of 'work' for
the professional must inevitably cause some disappointment on his part and an
alteration or confirmation of the image he has of the lawyer. The agent may
at this stage decide that counsel's opinion should be taktn - in short that
further expert help should be invited to assist in reaching a further decision
on the matter. Counsel, having considered the case, frequently advises against
litigation. The client is often more ready and anxious to test his case in
Court than are his legal advisers, a situation of which the public is almost
entirely unaware. The image of the advocate as a man determined to make money
out of his client though it means risking the latter's wealth and property, or
his good name, is one that is commonly held. It is far from the true picture.
No advocate wishes to risk his reputation and face certain defeat in an inde¬
fensible cause. If the advocate decides that court action is necessary then
the next decision in the matter will be taken by the judge or by the judge and
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a jury. Scott has described the process in Redgauntlet in a conversation
41. See p.2l^> infra
42. See p.J91 infra
43. Sir Walter Scott ReAgauntlet, p. 176
between Mr. Fairford, a solicitor, and his client Poor Peter Peebles. (it
should he nested that 'Poor' in this "context means that the client is on the
Poor's Roll and may litigate to his heart's content without having to pay
for the pleasure). Mr. Pairford says to Peebles, 'and you, who are acquainted
with the forms, know that the client states the cause to the agent - the agent
to the counsel - '. 'The Counsel to the Lord Ordinary', continued Peter
once set agoing, like thejbeal of an alarm clock, 'the Ordinary to the Inner
/
House, the President to the Bench. It is just like the rope to the man, the
man to the ox, the ox to the water, the water to the fire -'
Peter Peebles, finding as he does his greatest joy in litigation is never¬
theless impatient of the law's delays and due processes. It may be said that
in this respect the public image is much the same today as it was in Sir Walter's
time.
The Advocate's place in the decision making is high since it is on his
advice that thematter is put before a judge at all. His advice may well be
wrong, but it will rarely if ever, be given in bad faith. The fact that his
own reputation depends on his ad.vice being 'learned' and good, added to his
training in the ethics of his profession ensures that the client is safe¬
guarded against the pursuit of frivolous or of unsuccessful litigation.
kb I
Riesman suggests that with the increasing psychological need of lawyers to
be liked by their client's the lawyefs usefulness may be impaired'. Such need
would almost certainly impair the usefulness of the lawyer's role but the writer
has found no evidence of it in her investigation of the Faculty of Advocates.
A5
As Riesman himself writes earlier in the same paper: 'Hence, is the lawyer
44. Riesman, op. cit. p. 131.
45. " op. cit. p. 12.8.
something of a scapegoat? ... what does distinguish lawyers in this role is
that they are feared and disliked - "but needed - "because of their matter- of-
factness, their sense of relevance, their refusal 'to be impressed by magical
'solutions' to people's problems.' The advocate's usefulness to his client
as a 'man learned in the law' is of far more relevance in the discussion of the
counsel-client relationship than is any consideration Cf either 'liking' or
'disliking' the other, at least in the situations examined in Scotland.
Finally, in the advocate's role-set the judge must be considered. Little
has been found to say on this matter because the system so clearly structures
the judge's role in relation to the advocate, and the training for the roles
is the same bearing a similar relationship to the legal system they both
h-G
administer. As has been explained all the judges of the Court of Session
have been practising members of the Bar. They have been 'on the floor' of the
Parliament House for many years and know the function, the role and the norms
of the advocate. They acquire new skills in decision-making with their
elevation to the. Bench, but these skills a e closely related to the same system
within which their skills as advocates were acquired. They have the same ration¬
ality, matter-of-factness and sense of relevance on the Bench as they did at
the Bar. Their duty is to be impersonal and objective and to dissociate
their role as judge from their other roles, just as is the advocate's duty.
In the ideal system the advocate and judge are partners in arriving at a
solution which is just in x^elation to the law.^ 'To the Court, for example,
he (the advocate) owes the duty to disclose all relevant authority. For long
there was some uncertainty as to how far this duty went. But, since a
46. See p. supra
47. Glebe Sugar Refining Co. v. G-reenock Harbour Trustees. 1921 S.C. (H.L.)
73 at pp 73, 74.
judgement of Lord Birkenhead's in the House of Lords in 1921, the legal, and
lO
I think the moral, duty is quite clear. Lord Birkenhead's words were these:
'I think.it right to make this observation at once. It is not, of course,
in cases of complication possible for their Lordships to be ay/are of all the
authorities, statutory or otherwise, which may be relevant to the issues which
in the particular case require decision. Their Lordships are, therefore, very-
much in the hands of counsel and those who instruct counsel in these matters,
and this House expects, and indeed insists, that authorities which bear
one way of the other upon matters under debate shall be brought to the
attention of their Lordships by those who are aware of those authorities.
This observation is quite irrespective of whether or not the particular authority
assists the party which is so aware of itl It is an obligation of confidence
between their Lordships and all those who assist in the debates in this House
in the capacity of counsel'. The Advocate's duty is stated here clearly:
it is to assist the court in arriving at a just solution in law.
The late Sir Randall Philip, a distinguished Q.C. of the Scottish Bar,
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goes on to say that the art of advocacy 'centres round the advocate's relation
to the judge'.., Unlike most public speakers, the advocate has repeatedly to
address 'the same judge or Court. The personality and mental outlook of the
one becomes only too well-known to the other. Much therefore, depends on the
counsel's general reputation for reasonableness. If that stands high, then
the Bench is more likely to understand-:his persistance, and the client also
more likely to understand when he deems further persistence unavailing. There
are two cures for the advocate's own foibles. The one is advice froman elder
friend at the Bar. The other is, some personal experience in a judicial capacity
48. Ibid.
49» J.R. Philip, The Art and Ethics of Advocacy p. 6-7
himself, even if only for a day,' The advocate is frequently in a position
to acquire this experience as an Honorary or Interim Sheriff at any stage
after the earliest years in his career and as a Sheriff'-Principal almost always
before he himself is appointed to the Bench of the Court of Session. The
judiciary and the Bar know the system, having been similarly trained and are
likely to play the roles allocated to them in so far as their capacities
permit.
The most important members of the advocate's role-set, the clerks and
the solicitor, and their relationship and interaction with him are discussed
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later. Their roles have developed, as has his, with great specificity within
the system. Any idea that these roles are diffuse has been destroyed by the
examination of the growth of the system. Its complexity calls for expert,
specific functions and roles, and its needs have been met in the pattern that
can be observed in the Parliament House today. 'I'his small group of expert
professionals, trained to administer the law within a clearly structured
system are unlike any group of workers described by anthropologists or sociol¬
ogists in the Western world. That they are a community with a geographical
locus makes them unique; that the development of their professional norms
and functions has been gradual and clear has been seen in. the description of
their history.
1'he public in Scotland may today be barely aware of the exact meaning
of the word 'advocate'. The advocate has neverthless the monopoly of practice
in the highest courts of the land and has enjoyed for many centuries the top
professional ranking in his country and the many privileges that go with such
ranking.
50. See rCiK. 8 , infra
It is difficult to see the Scottish advocate in David Riesman's analysis
of lawyers. For example, he states: "The law has a long tradition of
rationalising ... by an ethic of 'invisible harmony' which assures each practitioner
that if he fights hard for his client within the rules the general interest
will be somehow advanced. Though obviously the matter is very hard to document,
it appears that this ethic is breaking down and that lawyers consequently
feel either the need to be partisan or to be iron-clad cynics'. It is perhaps
easier to 'document' in this small group of Scottish advocates, but such a
conclusion as Riesman reached could not be drawn from the evidence prsented.
The training, both technical and social, that the advocate undergoes is
specifically and successfully directed to helping him to avoid these pitfalls.
Of all the citizens of his country he is most cdfefully taught not to be
'partisan' and most unusually he appears to avoid cynicism. The American
i~2 S3 Sk
lawyer as described by Riesman, Singei, Horslcy, and others appears to have
little in common with the Edinburgh advocate. The latter's rigid training
for his specific role and his life in a small and homogeneous society will be
discussed and it is hoped will demonstrate an unusaily high degree of role
specialisation and lack of conflict or of contamination in the playing of the
£5
role.
s\. Riesman, op, cit. p. 131
52. Riesman op. cit. -passim
53. Erwin 0. Schigel, Interviewing a Legal Elite, i'he Pall Street Lawyer, passim
Charles A. Morsky, The Washington Lawyer, passim
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Chapter 6
THE STATUS MP ROLE 01? ADVOCATE
Social Standing in General
The Faculty of Advocates in Scotland provides an excellent and possibly
unique example of role-segregation. The professional group is very small
(approximately 108 in actual practice and approximately 300, if one includes
those who no longer practise but have retired or moved on to some other
professional activity - usually legal and most often judicial - for which
membership) of Faculty provided the entree). To some extent those who no
longer remain in practice nevertheless participate in the corporate life of
the Faculty. Advocates as a professional group are, moreover, geographically
and as a work group immobile. As has been explained, Advocates have a
monopoly of practice at the bar of the Supreme Courts in Scotland which sit in
Edinburgh, so that only when the Justiciary Court is on circuit, or if an
advocate is briefed to appear in a lower court or local inquiry or similar
tribunal does his work in Scotland take him out of Edinburgh. He cannot
practice as a advocate out of Scotland (except before the House of Lords, Privy
Council or at a Parliamentary Enquiry). Apart from a very few posts still
open to advocates in the Overseas Legal Service, and some appointments in
Industry, the Scottish advocate, unless he has private means and need not work
at all, must live and work in Edinburgh. Both at Parliament House (the seat
of the Supreme Courts) and (in most cases) at his home in the New Town, he is
in daily contact with his peers and indeed with the larger part of his role-set.
The Faculty, then, is a group, isolated (in a sense), immobile, close-knit and
virtually entirely recruited from the more - but not most - privileged classes
in Scotland.
The professional status of advocates is not open to question. Dr.
1
Pox in the 'Lancet' has suggested that 'A profession is a group of people
united by sharing two things (l) a body of knowledge, which they try to
increase and transmit to new entrants; and (2) a code of ethics v/hich they
try to follow in their work.' This seems to be a somewhat inadequate
definition, especially where it isolates and stresses the tradition of a body
of knowledge, which is a phenomenon encountered in other occupations not
recognised as professions. More important seems to be the special relation¬
ship of trust owed by the professional man to his client and his responsibility
to the self-controlling corporate body which has admitted him to membership.
The advocate owes these duties not only to his client, but, as already
explained, a duty to the Courts before which he practices. This is so clearly
recognised that his word will be accepted without question.
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Surveying the 'professions' Carr-Saunders and Wilson have noted certain
characteristics which are typical in general. -Legal techniques were among
the few round which professions could be built in the Middle Ages, when there
was a pronounced impulse to association, which later became a powerful instrument
for the safeguarding of privilege. In most cases, they observe, regulation by
the State supervened to control professional associations by granting privileges
corresponding to duties imposed, and by prescribing rules for registration,
admission and expulsion. A professional association regulated by the State to
some extent loses its freedom. The Faculty of Advocates has been subjected to
very little State control. The College of Justice, of which the Advocates form
part, was erected by Bull of Pope Paul III dated March 1534 and confirmed by Act
of Parliament in 1541, and, though there are some early statutes affecting
advocates, State intervention has been minimal, and even Acts of Sederunt
1. 13 October 195&
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(delegated legislation promulgated by the Judges) have not been used as
formerly in modern times to affect the freedom of the Faculty. Until the
introduction of Legal Aid in Civil (1949) and criminal (1964) cases the
State's only direct interest seems to have been to collect stamp duty from
intrants. The private Act of George XV" prescribing contribution to the
Advocates' Widows Fund was not so much imposed on as requested by the advocates
themselves. Participation by the ihculty of Advocates in a State supported
legal aid scheme was received with considerable suspicion at the outset, but
most advocates have come to accept it, and the post-1949 intake no doubt
regard it as in the natural order of things so far as civil cases are concerned.
The effects of the 1964 extension of legal aid to criminal cases cannot be
evaluated so close to the event. Provisionally it could be suggested that
acceptance of money from State sources diminishes the professional independence
of advocates to some extent, and may tend to promote a less scrupulous attitude
to litigation than hitherto, when the client alone provided an advocate's fee,
if he were to receive one at all. The present writer, however, hopes to sho?/
that the status of the advocate has not as yet been affected by state legal
aid and that his role playing is unlikely to change owing to his rigid training
and to the nature of the group in which the role is played. Legal aid, it
may be stressed, is available to people of moderate means, and they may be called
on to make a contribution. The relationship between counsel and client and
counsel and solicitor is not comparable with the old 'Poors Roll' which was a
benevolent service offered free to the least privileged.
Admission, expulsion and testing of professional competence are all con¬
trolled by the group itself, though the Faculty does not itself organise academic
professional training.^ Ultimately the Faculty's privileges do not depend on
3. See
state protection, but on the norms of the legal profession itself which
protect the monopoly of the advocate's role and the exclusive nature of the
profession. Similarly norms of discipline and professional ethics are not
imposed by the State or by any outside body, but are evolved and enforced by
the group itself, usually by informal and highly effective sanctions which
will be described throughout the text. The la?;, however, recognises the
secrecy or confidentiality of the advocate client relationship as essential
for the proper discharge by the advocate of his highly fiduciary function.
Thus at practically every point the Faculty as a profession appears to be a
'mystery' which only the initiated can fully comprehend. The public, the
State and even other branches of the legal profession are kept at a distance,
to ensure the proper fulfilment of the advocate's role as the Faculty
conceives it.
On admission to the Faculty of Advocates an intrant acquires a certain
status irrespective of such qualities or skills as he may have beyond those
which are prescribed. An accident of national history established the
legal profession in Scotland, as the career of highest prestige available to
a Scotsman in his own country. Those of greater personal ambition had to
pursue it outside Scotland. This applied not only to the socially mobile
professionally, but also to those who had inherited the highest social status
and who for social or political reasons gravitated to the Southern metropolis
soon after the Union.
Recruitment
Recruitment for the professions has been the subject of several studies,
notably perhaps those of Merton and G-oode,^1' but none has been concerned with
so closely knit a profession as the Faculty of Advocates, where social selection
is a very important consideration. The various studies have stressed socio¬
economic position, ethnic and religious affiliations and sex as the three
principal considerations determining who will enter a particular profession.
In the case of the Faculty, socio-economic position is obviously of great
importance. Philipson has traced the changes in the social composition of
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the Faculty up to 1850 and has noted the virtual disappearance by that time of
the aristocracy from its ranks. In the course of the 19th century the landed
element in the Faculty diminished; an increasing number of intrants had their
wealth based on urban industry ana commerce and had no claim to a territorial
designation unless they purchased an estate.^ During the present century
recruitment has mainly been from the sons of the■professional classes, notably
advocates, solicitors and ministers, and from the commercial middle class.
The initial cost of admission and precarious prospects of earning a livelihood
in the first years of practice have tended to deter those of limited resources.
As formerly with the Foreign Service and the Brigade of Guards low initial
remuneration operated (and to some extent operates) as a social check on
admission. This is clearly a factor giving great prestige to the status of
advocate. In modern times, however, there has always been a proportion of the
Faculty intake ?jho have first established themselves as solicitors or have
sufficient confidence in their talents to back them with limit.d private means.
4. Their definitive study (with Mary Jean Huntington) The Professions in
American Society is not yet available, but some of its ideas are
discussed in Cheetham The Legal Profession, by P.M. McFarlane (6th Feb.
1958) in a paper on the Recruitment and Training of Professionals.
5. M/5 u n po U ishel.
6. P.G-.B. McNeill 'Judicial Titles in Scotland' 19^4 S.L.T. (News) 105
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Ethnic considerations affect recruitment in an unusual way. Almost all
intrants are Scots, and, though there is no discrimination against other
nationalities, few other than Scots apply. It may, however, he noted that,
though the Faculty is virtually entirely Scottish in recruitment, a substantial
proportion, and a very influential minority, are culturally anglicised or have
been exposed to anglicisation through public school or Oxbridge education
before qualification for the Scottish Bar. There is, moreover, a fashion
for judges or advocates who have not themselves this background to provide it
for their sons who follow them in the Law. The anglicisation of the Scottish
middle classes has been progressive since the mid nineteenth century, and in
few fields,, if any, can the consequences have been more significant than in
this small and influential group, which, essentially Scottish by birth or
domicile and by residence and jealous of the traditions and privileges of the
Faculty, yet is jurisprudentially (through the House of Lords) and through
education largely orientated towards London. Significantly, however, it is
from among the cultural repatriates that the main contenders for the Scottish
legal tradition, have emerged. This in different contexts is a recurrent
phenomenon in Scottish history from the time of the Bruce. London, which
until recently, had virtually neglected the problem of establishing centres of
legal education overseas, had established a virtual monopoly of legal training
and recruitment for Commonwealth lawyers through the Inns of Court and
English Bar Examinations. There is at present only one coloured - Malawi -
member of Faculty, and great efforts were made by his brethren to encourage
him in his ambition to be called to the Scottish Bar, He had been influenced
by a Church of Scotland minister in his own country. Recently the Law Faculty
of Edinburgh University has entered into a special arrangement with the
University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to train lawyers who can
no longer look to the Republic of South Africa for training in Roman-Dutch
law, a close analogue to that of Scotland. It is not anticipated that the
ethnic polarity of the Scottish Bar will change.
Regarding sex and religion, as has been noted in the ethnographic
presentation, the Scottish Bar, though open to, does not in general provide
reasonable prospects for women. In the past many members of Faculty have
been closely associated with the main branches of the Christian Church in
Scotland, and this is still true of the elder age groups. Though not dis¬
criminated against by the Advocates' profession itself, few Jews have in fact
been admitted to the Faculty, 'The first, admitted in 1956 and no?? on the Bench,
proved a popular and highly respected member of Faculty throughout his practice.
The admission into Faculty of intrants of Irish-Roman Catholic background
came late, reflecting the slow rate of integration of Irish immigrants into
the Scottish population and economy, especially in the higher social and
economic strata. Few of this background have yet achieved positions of
highest prestige in the Faculty or on the Bench of the Court of Session, the
culmination of a highly successful forensic career. It is possible that the
solicitors' branch of the profession has proved less liberal in its attitude
to sex and religion than has the Faculty itself.
What, it may be asked, determines the decision to enter the Faculty of
Advocates? Merton and G-oode"'7 are of opinion that when a researcher asks such
a question in relation to a profession he is asking the person interrogated
something which he does not know himself. One leading Scottish legal figure
certainly knew although his reason for becoming an advocate was unusual. As
a young man he was heard to remark: 'Well, they wouldn't take me in the Army
so I had to come to the Bar'. Socio-economic background, ethnic and religious
affiliation and school education are important factors and are usually relevant.
7. see note ifc AOjmt
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gThe educational requirements for entry into the Faculty of Advocates ' are
moderately high, but within the range of attainment of most of those who
vrould qualify for admission to a Scottish University in present conditions.
Leading advocates have frequently in their training proved most promising law
students in their Degree course, but this is not invariably true of many v/ho
have made successful professional careers at the Bar. Given health and
personality, and in some cases by supporting a political party, the advocate
of moderate intellectual talent may rapidly overtake those of greater academic
promise and reach the Bench of the Court of Session, for which continuous
practice until appointment seems no?/ to be indispensable. The present Bench
comprises judges whose degrees lay at the opposite ends of academic distinction.
The public image of a profession is also important. The present writer has
discussed the question with a substantial number of advocates and also with
those who, as la?/ teachers over many years, have had opportunity to form an
opinion of a considerable sample group. Apart from the very important factor
of 'self recruitment' for the Faculty, the main considerations influencing
decision would seem to be socio-economic and 'public image'. Though the Law
Society of Scotland is at present conducting what is in effect a recruitment
campaign for solicitors, of ?/hom there is a shortage, the Faculty has never
consciously resorted even to indirect self-advertisement. For centuries the
attitude seems to have been that there are more advocates in Edinburgh than
opportunities for full employment. (This situation may alter with the intro¬
duction of legal aid in criminal cases, but with legal aid generally and prospects
of making a livelihood much sooner than formerly, may stimulate recruitment in
8. See p.r-i supra
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the next few years). The socio-economic factor has, with rare exceptions,
been determinant as to whether an individual would consider the Faculty as a
career. The 'public image' especially for the youngman or woman is often
misleadingly romantic and cast in terms of the forensic battle. Some
disillusionment may supervene at the stage of legal education when the student
is confronted with the 'tougher' subjects and with aspects of law which offend
his logical or moral faculties. When the intrant becomes a 'devil' he tends
to discover that the really lucrative aspects of practice are those which have
little popular appeal and may not involve appearance in Court. After the
natural excitement of appearing in a few criminal trials, undefended divorces
and jury trials in damage claims, the original magic which determined decision
is radically revised.
By this stage, however, there has come strongly into operation
'socialisation' or role acquisition, learning the role to be played and learning
it in terras of others' expectations, especially those of others in the legal
role set. The initiate, in short, learns to think as an advocate and to
reorientate his general attitude to the extent that, for those who will go
furthest in the pi-ofession, a highly technical legal point gives metaphysical
9
satisfaction. George Herbert Mead has suggested that learning to play a
role is 'much like learning the rules of the game' and has indicated how these
ru}.es are internalized and structured into the personality. Further Talcott
Parsons has introduced"*"^ the concepts of 'imitation' and 'identification' to
11
assist understanding of the process of role acquisition. Ellsworth Farris
has considered the same problem in terms of 'conscious imitation* and 'imitation'.
9. Mind, Self and Society p.
10. The Social System
11. 'Imitation' (1926) XXXII A.J.S.
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Studies by Homans, W. Foote Ihyte and Eecker and Carter have indicated
how norms and attitudes develop through constant interaction and how in conse¬
quence 'closed' groups develop because of common interests and attitudes.
This is particularly true of the Faculty of Aidvocates. To some extent this
process of 'socialisation' begins to operate at the University stage of legal
education, becomes more influential vihen practical training (or 'devilling'
is undertaken and continues after the young advocate is admitted, since much
still has to be learnt in the actual course of practice.
Associated with this process is the acquisition of the language or
'jargon' of the profession. Every profession or academic discipline has its
jargon, which for the initiate is a useful 'short hand' for expressing complex
technical ideas. This technical language will first be encountered in law
classes at the University. It may be suggested moreover, that with the
lawyer as with the clergyman, a professional manner of expression and attitude
to conversation or controversy tends to indicate his profession even in private
non-professional association. "Whatever his previous background, the individual
comes to bear the distinguishable mark of 'advocate'. So far, the discussion
has primarily concerned the decision made by the 'outsider' to seek admission
15
to Faculty. The 'self-recruitment' element is, however, of particular
16
importance. As explained sons tend to follow their fathers in the law, and
a substantial proportion of the Faculty intake has always been in this tradition.
These have or should have, a clear idea of what is involved and do not re/ly on
a distorted public image. Beyond the limits of what could strictly be described
as 'self-recruitment' - i.e. sons following fathers as advocates - other
12. The Human G-roup
13. Street Corner Society
14. 'The Development of Identification with an Occupation' (1956) 1 A.J.S.
15. see p. I S3 supra
16. see p. 87 supra
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intrants may be expected to be partially initiated. It might be anticipated
that sons following fathers as advocates would climb more rapidly to the
highest places in the profession - the Bench of the Court of Session. This
does not seem to be established by modern trends."'""'7' On the whole the sons
of judges of the immediately past generation have been content with the
moderate success of appointment to the Shrieval Bench.
Almost as prepared for the role of advocate as the son of an advocate is
the son of a solicitor - who having operated as part of the role set is aware
of what is ejected of others with whom he interacts professionally. A
career at the Bar carrying as it does higher prestige, is often suggested by
a solicitor to his son, not infrequently with conscious or subconscious envy
associated with the realisation that, given the socio-economic background,
the father would have considered himself no less suited for such a career. A
family connection with a firm of solicitors has been one of the most useful
assets for a young advocate at the outset of his professional career.
Again, especially in Edinburgh, many families of the socio-economic group
from which the Faculty is recruited are on sufficiently intimate terms with
members of the Bar to ensure that they, or their sons on the threshold of a
career, will have a fairly clear idea of what is involved. Sons of ministers
of religion have always been prominent in recruitment for the Faculty. Though
in economic terms the minister is now not on terms of equality with the
lawyer, his status to some extent is assured by tradition as middle middle
class, and the interaction between Church and Law has been, and to some extent
is, a special phenomenon. It may be of deceasing significance in the general
context of modern life, but within the social network in which both operate in
17. cf. p. %~j J:sepsupra
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Scotland today, its significance is greater than in the national life as
a whole.
The economic or financial factor in determining to seek admission to the
Faculty is complex. It has, generally speaking, been true in the past that
without private means or support few could venture on a career at the Bar.
18
Carr-Saunders and Wilson discuss and condemn the element of 'exclusiveness'
in the profession which may shut men out on grounds other than failure to
attain proper standards of competence. The exclusive factors include any
period of enforced waiting v/hich does not involve training to acquire
proficiency, a period of pupilage which is not efficiently organized so as to
be as brief a,s possible, premiums exigible on entry to the profession and
annual subscriptions. So far as the Faculty is concerned, there is no
equivalent of 'keeping terms' by eating dinners as at the English Bar, but
the 'idle year' which must be spent before admission may be an exclusive
factor. Designed to purge a prospective advocate from contacts with trade
or solicitors' practice, this year is profitably and necessarily spent by
young intrants in 'devilling'. The same restriction, however applies to
older men, such as solicitors who have had many years experience of the lav; -
even in the Parliament House - but have not been indoctrinated isfl the norms
of the Faculty itself. The Faculty has declined to relax its rules so as to
enable solicitors to transfer immediately from one branch of the profession
to another. Annual membership subscriptions especially for newly admitted
advocates are very reasonable, but the initial dues of approximately £^50
may well be the highest of any profession in Britain, and are certainly
18. The Professions p. 381 et seq
resented bp a number of lawyers who have been deterred from seeking admission
because of the initial outlay involved. Part of this outlay is required
by the Statute II Geo. IV C.41 and the rest on Faculty resolution. For the
return in services and facilities the Faculty dues are reasonable, spread over
a number of years, but they provide a serious obstacle for a man who is not
earning and has no private means. Apart from the initial payments which an
19
intrant must make the considerations which formerly governed the situation
do not apply to the same degree. Grants are available for a University degree
carrying a professional qualification and legal aid makes it easier than
formerly for an advocate to earn a livelihood within a few years from admission.
An able advocate should be self supporting after two to three years practice.
It may well be that the subsidising by the State of all but the leaders at the
Bar (who are busy enough to practice outside the Legal Aid Scheme) will diminish
the prestige of the profession generally and increase the esteem of the few.
It is probably true to say that very large remuneration which usually
confers high status, has not been an inducement to recruitment in the case of
the Faculty of Advocates. The status conferred by membership does not have
money as its symbol. Those who have sought the financial glittering prizes
in Birkenhead's phrase have tried their fortunes at the English Bar. The
fabulous fees commanded by men such as Stafford Cripps, Gerald Gardiner,
Patrick Hastings or Wilfred Greene in England, were the subject of legal and
general gossip and speculation. This seems to have no counterpart at the
Scottish Bar, though the remarkable earnings of some Scotsmen such as Erskine
at the English Bar in past generations were much talked about. The widow of
one exceptionally successful Scottish advocate has donated his fee book to the
19. See p. I supra
Faculty as a record of the accelerating financial success of an advocate of
exceptional talent. The later very large earnings were, however, largely as
a result of practice in England at the Parliamentary Bar.
It seems probable that some of the most successful advocates in practice
earn more than the most successful solicitors in Scotland, but these solicitors
(who are more numerous than the practising Bar) earn more than all but the leaders
of the Bar. Yet this does not alter relative status. The average earnings
of the established advocate certainly exceed those of the average solicitor
20
counterpart. It has been estimated that the average reasonably conscientious
solicitor aged 30 - 34 earns £2,000 per annum and at the age 55 - 64 earns
£3,000. At 64 the upper quartile earns £5,000 and the median £3,500. An
advocate who decides not to remain in practice, in thehope of elevation to the
Bench of the Court of Session, may reasonably expect to be appointed Sheriff
with a salary of over £4,000 even at the lower;- grade plus non-contributory
personal and widow's pension rights. The most successful advocates accept a
substantial reduction of income by accepting a seat on the Bench of the Court
of Session with a salary of £6,600 (Lord President £8,000). The drop in
income is compensated for by an increase in prestige. Yfiiether commercial and
industrial leaders would share the legal profession's own estimates of relative
status v'pis-a-vis themselves is doubtful. They are accustomed to employing
experts and to evaluating them in terras of efficiency and income.
The attraction of the Scottish Bar has not,- it is thought, been very high
remuneration, but largely because within the community where the advocates'
role is worked out his status commands high prestige; and because each performs
his role as an individual, rather than as a member <f a partnership, organ¬
isation or G-overnment Department, the successful by their performance command
20. John G-raham 'The Scotsman' 150 l6th Feb. 1965 adjusting figures set
out in the Report of the Royal Commission on Doctors and Dentists
Remuneration i960 (i.e. 1955 figures) and using those supplied in a
Law Society of Scotland Survey, i960.
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particular esteem especially within the professional role set. There is in
addition the attraction of becoming part of a closely knit and exclusive
group in which professional and private roles are both involved.
The Advocate's Role
21
As has been demonstrated already until well into the nineteenth century
the role of advocate assumed the rendering of 'inestimable' services by a
privileged section of the community, i.e. services which could not be
evaluated in money. Advocates were gentlemen of private means who offered
their services without the primary object of making money, though some might
22
in fact prosper by the honoraries they received. The real rewards of the
advocate were prestige and influence often political. Though the Faculty no J
longer comprises many advocates of independent means, the ideal professional j
image is influenced by the past stereotype, e.g. in the rule or custom that
23
no action may be brought for fees. To-day an advocate himself and his
family are very much concerned with what he earns, but, restricted as he is by
the rules against advertising and by other norms, the public image of his role
is not that of a money getter. Commercialism is the antithesis of the
professional image, both its public image and its stereotype of itself.
Moreover, the advocate's role as presented to the public is that of a professional
offering liberal services of a unique and personal kind. The advocate does
not only give forensic skill, but offers his whole personality, a personality
which has partly been formed by training in skills, but also, and perhaps more
importantly, by the tradition and ethics of his profession. His ideal role,
in the public image, is to do for his client what the client would wish to do
21. see p. 10 if supra
22. cf. Marshall Sociology, at tie Crossroads p. 151 et seq
23. see p. iOij. supra
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if he knew the law, and were also a man of absolute integrity. The client,
unlike the customer is not always right, and an advocate has complete control
over the presentation of his client's case while his mandate is unrevoked.
Accordingly, except perhaps for a few 'actor advocates' appearing in criminal
or jury trials who may manifest some flamboyancy or eccentricity of manner,
the advocate must maintain at least the facade of a respectable private
life as well as exhibit a public life beyond reproach. The norms of
professional behaviour Yfhich maintain the public image go substantially beyond
the minimum required to maintain professional competence in the sense of
technical skill. Certain standards of public responsibility and private
conduct are regarded as necessary for the adequate discharge of the professional
role.
It is, of course, an oversimplification to think in terms of the public
image of any profession. The stereotype may alter with time, through social
and economic change, by the emergence of other professions or by the shedding
of part of an accepted role. Public image will be differentiated to some
extent by age, sex, educa/tion, occupation and social distance of the evaluator.
Thus the public image of the profession of advocate may be very different for
the young man considering entering it, on the one hand, and the hire purchase
24
financier who has considerable experience of litigation on the other. Merton
Goode and many others have noted that 'images increase in complexity, detail
and variability and decrease in clarity as between individuals or groups with
an increase of direct contacts with the profession.' Few members outside the
profession of advocate have the same amount of contact as with (say) the family
24. See'e.g. Social Theory and Social Structure p. 376
doctor, schoolmaster or solicitor. In general, therefore, the public image
of advocate is fairly uniform and definite, and this stereotype structures
the advocate-client relationship in particular.
Thus the first contact between advocate and client is strictly structured.
The client in difficulty or distress brings his problem for solution. This
problem, even if it has a technical content, will frequently involve his private
life in some way and the factor of personalities in the relationship is
important. Absolute confidentiality protects communications between counsel
and client. The advocate's status is professionally middle-class, while the
client may be of any class. In all cases, however, the client is expected
to show deference and respect for the advice offered, and the advice is given
with authority. ?/hereas the client is often deeply involved emotionally,
the advocate for the proper discharge of his role must be emotionally neutral
and his training is directed to making him so. He is concerned with the
facts of the case and the technical solution of any legal problems involved.
He may consequently have to advise the client against the latter's strongly
held preconceptions or views of his rights. The advocate's function is
fiduciary in character and he is not employed to secure the result which his
client desires. (it is not irrelevant, however, that, if an advocate is given
a problem for his opinion, he wishes to know the interest of those on whose
behalf it is required). An advocate is bound to accept a brief for any party
who retains him unless he is retained by the other side. In Court the advocate
stands out obviously as the champion of his client's case, and will be held
in esteem if he succeeds. Should he fail, however, the task of explaining
what went wrong will be left to the ingenuity and tact of the instructing
solicitor. An advocate is not called on to rationalise his failures, nor
indeed can he be sued for professional negligence.
25
Marshall concludes that, despite faults and deficiencies in the prof¬
essions, professionalism is an idea "based on the real character of certain
services. 'It is not a clever invention of selfish minds.' In short the
public image does, in fact, reflect the professions' concepts of their ovm
ideal role. II e asserts also that the individualistic bias of the major
professions was the product of circumstances and is not of the essence of
professionalism. Stimulated by external pressures, and reacting to these,
but also making contributions of their own, the professions 'are adapting
themselves to new standards of socia.l service'. So far as the Faculty of
Advocates is concerned, as has been observed, no State organized social service
of legal representation exists comparable, for example, with the National
Health Service. On the other hand, most advocates are willing to appear
under the legal aid schemes which provide for a state guaranteed but restricted
tariff of fees. This may modify the traditional stereotype of the advocate
to some extent. Though there was talk of 'socialism' within the Faculty
when the scheme was first introduced, in fact there is no state interference
with the advocate's role. Even though there may be a general trend for the
professions to be socialised and the social services professionalised, this
trend has had little impact upon the Scottish Bar.
The public image of the advocate has perhaps lost more in prestige in the
assessment of an influential element of the community. The leaders of industry
and commerce are accustomed to employ experts of all kinds, and are not
necessarily deferential to the mystique of the advocate's role, more than the
role of an accountant, engineer or research chemist. In the first place,
advocates in Scotland unlike barristers in England do not specialise in particular
branches of law such as mercantile law or taxation, and few are therefore
25. op. cit. p. 166
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likely to impress deeply the leaders of the business world who have had
dealings with the specialist experts in London or prefer arbitration by
commercial men. In Scotland the experts in commercial law are frequently
specialist solicitors rather than advocates. Secondly, the concentration of
economic power in the South has resulted in a drift from Edinburgh of much
of the most prestigious and remunerative legal workj in particular mercantile
and maritime work and taxation, has now gone to London. It has been estimated
that 8Ofo of all concerns in Scotland employing 200 or more persons are controlled
26
from outside Scotland. Much of the work which enroloys the Scottish Bar today
l;4He,
is, compared with 50 or 100 years ago, of/intrinsic legal interest or difficulty.
Thirdly, even within the country a considerable amount of work which was
formerly exclusively within the lavjyer's province has been taken over by
other professions, such as Shartered accountants. On the other hand, through
Commissions of Inquiry, which are very often presided over by senior counsel
employment of the Bar has probably increased over all - especially as many
interests may have to be represented at such inquiries.
The altered character of the business of the Courts may well have affected
the image of the Bar from the solicitor's viewpoint. It is apparent to him
that no exceptional skill is required to conduct divorce or reparation work
such as actions of damages for personal injury nor to present local or particular
interests at inquiries. Advocates cannot expect to command special esteem or
prestige from solicitors who consider that they could handle the work as
competently themselves. It is a tentative assumption, based on a limited
number of opinions that what could be described as 'jealousy' of the Bar is more
apparent among solicitors outside Edinburgh, especially in the West of Scotland,
than in the Capital itself. The monopoly enjoyed by the Bar in divorce actions
26. T.B. Smith 'Legal Imperialism and Legal Parochialism' 1965 Jur. Rev.
(galley proofs).
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and civil jury trials would "be difficult to justify "by convincing arguments.
The strongest argument suggested is usually that this work provides training
and subsistence for the small group of advocates, and that without it a strong
Bar conducting cases before the higher courts could not be maintained. The
leading silks and juniors who plead in the more complex and legally important
type of case do certainly command prestige and esteem from the solicitors,
but general deference to the Bar is not as great as formerly.
There is a determined and vocal element among Scottish solicitors which
would favour 'fusion' of the legal profession, a step which would deprive the
Faculty of Advocates of its monopoly, and allow firms of lawyers to comprise
both 'chamber lawyers' and court specialists as in Australia and the United
States. Increased contacts between Scottish lawyers and others of the
Commonwealth may have stimulated that attitude, and also the fact that the
academic legal training of advocates and solicitors is now largely assimilated.
Some would go further and seek fusion between the Scottish and English legal
professions, and complain that a Scottish.legal qualification alone restricts
unduly the range of professional mobility. It may safely be assumed that
the Faculty of Advocates would resist any such fundamental challenge to its
privileges, and not even the most radical Lord Advocate would be likely to
associate himself with legislation to destroy the Faculty, the group to which
he owes a special loyalty. Though the aristocratic element in the Faculty
is now negligible it includes besides those from middle class and professional
backgrounds a few from working class and lower middle class origins. The
Faculty's interests would be defended by its 'political' members no matter
what government was in power. Further, the traditions, professional solid¬
arity and influence of the Faculty are powerful factors, giving it strength out
of all proportion to its numbers. The part which the Faculty itself and its
individual members have played in the national life, and the fact that, as
part of the College of Justice, it has enjoyed special protection under the
Union Agreement would deter most governments from encroaching on its privileges
or even subjecting them to the scrutiny of such a body as a Royal Commission.
Certain privileges would be difficult to defend, such as the heavy dues imposed
on entry and monopoly of certain types of work. On the other hand, the
independence, individuality and integrity of the advocate's role could scarcely
be preserved as they have developed if the State intervened to regulate a
profession whose roles and norms have developed essentially by the corporate
sense of responsibility and privilege of the group itself.
The stereotype of the advocate no doubt does not appear the same to the
public and legal profession in Scotland, Edinburgh in particular, and to the
observer in London or New York. Unlike most other professions that of advocate
is restricted to Scotland. Some advocates leave practice to act as legal
advisers to large British concerns or to teach in Universities outside Scotland
or (in the past) took up appointments in the Colonial or Overseas Legal
Service. Those who remain in practice are limited in their professional life
to appearing in the Scottish Courts, except for occasional appearances in the
House of Lords or more rare even before the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. Lord Macmillan as an advocate was one of the few to be successful
and command high esteem at the Parliamentary Bar. Scottish affairs are
seldom of interest to London, and so far as legal matters are concerned really
only impinge when a House of Lords decision may influence English law0 In
a number of the most important Scottish cases of this kind, such as Revenue
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cases and the recent very important Burmah Oil Case English counsel have often
27. Burmah Oil Company •• v.. Lord Advocate 1964 S.L.T. 218.
■been "brought in to reinforce those from Scotland. Even in opinion work,
especially Revenue work, this also happens. The fees earned "by specialist
English counsel are very much higher than Scottish counsel normally earn,
and this to some extent reduces the esteem in which the Scottish Bar is held.
The designation 'advocate' is unknown in English legal circles, and indeed
rarely
the popular press^/uses it even in Scotland. The designation 'Q.C.' is,
however, familiar in England, and it is generally assumed that the Scottish
Q.C. is the equivalent of the English Q.C., though cheaper. In short the
prestige and esteem in which an advocate is held are high in Scotland but
would not rate high on a United Kingdom rating. If most Englishmen and many
Scotsmen are unaware of the differences between the two legal systems and legal
professions, except vaguely perhaps that the Scottish is a provincial version
of the metropolitan with a few peculiarities, the foreigner is probably
seldom aware of the existence of the Faculty of Advocates at all. His deal¬
ings with the law of Scotland are often conducted through London agents or with
firms of solicitors in Scotland who deal with commercial and trust matters or
rights of succession to property. The general English and international
image of British life is that of London, and this is very largely true so far
as the stereotype of the legal profession in Britain is concerned. It is far
from accurate as an image of the Faculty of Advocates.
Most other professions in Britain have mobility, and their roles may be
evaluated with, reasonable accuracy by the British public in general. However
desirable it might be theoretically to compare the Faculty of Advocates with
other professions, its unique character defeats the making of useful comparisons.
In a series of nine articles published in the Scotsman between 13-23 Feb. 1965
John G-raham analysed and discussed the earnings of the professions in
Scotland in 1964. Actuaries and doctors were shown on average to earn more
than solicitors, but solicitors appeared to have had a profitable time over
the past ten years, median earnings for the age group 30 - 65 being in the
region of £2,700 p.a. The author discerned a trend for a levelling off of
professional earnings over the next five years, the general expectation being
in the region of £3,000 p.a. So far as those figures may be relied on and
so far as income provides an index of status, it may be said that the average
advocate's expectations, whether in practice, or in employment for which
membership of Faculty qualifies, are certainly greater than those of average
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solicitors. In fact, however, as CarrSaunders and Wilson asserted in 1934
information on most professional incomes is meagre. Some people in a
profession may earn very large incomes and others very little. This scepticism
regarding 'income information' remains largely justified despite the evidence
summarised in the Report of the Royal Commission on Doctors' and Dentists'
Remuneration in i960 and despite John Graham's researches in 1964 which were
largely based on it. Wo true picture of remuneration at the Scottish Bar can
be gained from the Report because of the smallness of the sample, nor is the
information available from other published sources. The general living
standards and dress of advocates indicate reasonable prosperity without
ostentation, though, especially with advocates at the outset of their prof¬
essional careers or on taking silk, there may be simulation of greater prosperity
than is actually enjoyed. In Scotland most of those outside the group would
accept that the prestige of the profession of advocate ranks above solicitor
and that of solicitor near the top of the status ladder. Perhaps only the
28. The Professions - reprinted I964 - p. 460
leaders of the medical profession rank equally, and the self image of the Faculty
would probably not concede equality.
Time may well change, as in the past it has changed already, the image.
To some extent the present evolution depends on historical considerations
including inherited status from the social position of the most influential
and well known advocates of an earlier era. As defenders of personal liberty
and of those accused of crime, advocates in discharging their role appeal1 to
the public imagination though, of course, the most successful advocates may
not engage much in the type of case which the press reports. 'The professional
techniques of the Bar do not demand exceptional intellectual qualities or
training more arduous than that required for most other professions, but the
fact that advocates are a very small group performing a specialised function
by exercise of individual skill gives their role special prestige. In fact
the myth may be more important than reality in creating a public image, and
also in maintaining a self image, which influences professional ethics and
standards generally. These are controlled strictly by the group itself,
which cannot be compared closely with any other professional group in Britain
today. None other is so small in number and yet so influential; none other
exercises monopoly powers; none other is so exclusive in its admission policy;
none other is so free of State control in matters of training, discipline and
right of expulsion; none depends so much on an unwritten code of professional
behaviour and on tacit sanctions to enforce its norms. The high social density,
solidarity and control implicit in the structure of the group is unique among
accounts of professional associations.
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Chapter 7
THE PROFESSIONAL LIFE CYCLE OF THE ADVOCATE
The 'briefless barrister* has been a tragic-comic figure in fiction,
and the transformation of his life from frustration and anxiety, to prosperity
and success by one intervention of Fortune has a romantic quality. From
Dickens and Thackeray to Henry Cecil the story has been told of England.
Beyond the realm of fiction such stories are sometimes authenticated, and the
virtually briefless Srskine pleaded memorably in Captain Baillie's case,
imagining as he spoke that his children were plucking at his gown saying
'Now, father, is the time to get us bread'. He left the court besieged by
importunate solicitors. In fact, however, patterns of counsel are rarely
determined in Scotland or England by one wave of Fortune's wand pointing
to opportunity. This is not, however, to say that luck plays no part in
the professional success of an advocate; indeed as with the G-eneral so with
the Advocate. Nevertheless the factor of luck is too often exaggerated, and
other more constant factors operate disregarded by those outside the profession
who conjecture as to the reasons for gradations in esteem among advocates.
Before admission"'" an intrant 'devils' to an experienced junior, attends
his consultations, drafts opinions, pleadings and other papers for him, and
is admitted gratuitously to the confidence of his 'master', in all professional
matters. Throughout his career he will defer to the man who initiated him.
He will necessarily have many dealings with his 'master's' clerk and meet
the solicitors who have instructed the 'master'. Already the 'devil's'
1. See p. supra
professional capacity mil "be under scrutiny by some of those who will
influence his future at the Bar, certain solicitors and the clerk. Usually
on 'passing advocate' the newly admitted member of the Bar will be taken on by
the clerk (one of four in the Faculty) who acts for the 'master'. At this
stage the advocate's status vis-a-vis the clerk and the solicitors whom he
has encountered as a 'devil' undergoes a certain change. They are well aware
of the limitations inherent in inexperience, and their esteem is suspended,
but his role is set. In small matters, probably those with which he has come
into contact with as a 'devil', he may be instructed if his former master is
not available. His pattern of life (in which professional and private aspects
overlap) and his dress set him apart. The youngest and least experienced
advocate seems noticeably to gain in confidence and authority when he plays
his role in wig and gown. These also add a certain mystique in the eyes of
the average, if not of the most sophisticated, lay client. In some countries
such as the Soviet Union and Sweden, and generally speaking in the U.S.A.,
special professional dress for lawyers is disapproved because it is thought
'undemocratic' and creates distance between laymen and profession. The
Faculty of Advocates prefers to maintain that distance which assists the
advocate to perform his role as the professional group itself thinks most
appropriate. On admission, as has been said, an advocate's status is est¬
ablished. There is equality and interchangeability of roles. Yet seniority
within the Faculty is also determined by date of admission and is never altered.
Thus on an omnibus in which a number of advocates are travelling from the
New Town to Parliament House, the senior will pay the fares of the junion on
every occasion. This may possibly encourage some of the more senior to walk
up the Mound. Seniority on the role of Queen's Counsel is also fixed in the
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patent declaring an individual's appointment.
In his first few years the young advocate will he largely concerned to
gain the esteem of the legal profession in all its branches, from judges to
clerks, but most important, for financial reasons, of solicitors. For less
tangible but no less important reasons he will seek to gain the esteem of his
brethren at the Bar. There are many situations in civil and criminal
proceedings in which counsel may best further his client's interests by
informal discussions with his professional opponent. Interaction between
two counsel discussing (say) settlement or compromise or the citing of a
witness or the possibility of the Crown accepting a plea of guilty to a lesser
charge than that stated in the indictment, is influenced by considerations
of mutual confidence and esteem.
As has been observed already, however, the esteem of solicitors is
for an advocate the most important for success. To gain that esteem he must
have adequate opportunity to show his skill in practice, and this has been
notoriously difficult for certain groups at the Bar. An advocate who has
the backing of influential interests, such as a relative in a solicitor's
firm which does a great deal of Court work or an uncle in an insurance company
or a father on the council of a local authority, may expect to have opportunity
to prove his skill reasonably soon. The importance of such 'influence' on
the advocates' careers is discussed later.^ He will be tried out on small
matters, often in association with" an experienced colleague. If he is able,
preserves his health and does not offend against the ethical standards of the
2. See p. \~jio .
176.
profession he should be well set to asceneL the ladder of promotion. Influence
of this kind will not be used indiscriminately by responsible professional
or commercial men who owe a duty to their own clients and customers, nor
will influence compensate for lack of professional skill. It can, however,
give a young advocate an early opportunity to gain esteem, and, if he gains
it, to increase it.
Without influence at all a number of advocates manage to establish
themselves fairly rapidly, while others may have to wait a considerable time
before building up a substantial practice. Some of those who have risen to
the highest positions on the Bench and at the Bar were not earning even a
modest livelihood at the end of five years from admission. The extension
of legal aid to criminal as well as civil v/ork may, however, cut down this
category considerably. According to the 1964 Report of the Trustees of the
Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland all of the young advocates
who had received grants for research projects in the History of Scots Law
had abandoned them because of the increasing demands which growing practice
made on their time. Those who can afford to wait are often advocates from
the more privileged economic groups. The dues for admission in themselves
operate to exclude from the profession of advocate lawyers of talent.
Possession of adequate financial resources to survive the 'lean years' after
call increases the chances of an advocate eventually reaching the top of his
profession. Throughout the life cycle of an advocate capacity to 'hang on'
financially, physically and emotionally is important for advancement both in
prestige and in esteem. Apart from private means, a young advocate is
permitted to supplement his income while in practice by law teaching and
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writing, though in Scotland the rewards in either case are very moderate.
Another form of speculative investment is politics, which has been a considerable
factor in securing preferment at the Scottish Bar. Paradoxically few
advocates really wish to be elected to Parliament unless they have hopes
of becoming a Law Officer, because it is impracticable to combine attendance,
at the Parliament House with attendance at Westminster. Nevertheless,
association with a political party may lead at least to appointment as one of
the Advocates Depute, who change with the Government in power. These
offices change with the Government and are greatly coveted. The song 'The
Vicar of Bray' was altered by a wit at the Bar into: 'And whatsoever Party's
in, I'll still be an advocate-depute'.
Some of the advocates most likely to reach the top are already recognised
as such within two to three years of admission. If at the end of five years
an advocate has not established himself in reasonable practice, which presupposes
the esteem of a sufficient body of solicitors, his prospects of achieving
eventual success at the Bar are slight. In Scotland, though there may now
be more talk of, and conjecture at, the amount of counsel's earnings than formerly,
this may well be due to the introduction of legal aid for which the tariff had
to be argued domestically and with the state. Certainly a clerk remarked
to one of his counsel: 'The Facialty is more commercialised than it used to be'.
If this is true it would suggest a major change or a breakdown in the social
system, an alteration in role and in structure. No evidence has been found
to support this belief. Moreover, there may be a certain tendency for some
counsel to prolong a case on legal aid longer than they would, were their
clients unassisted. Field-work has, however, revealed that such practices
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were more attributable to deviant behaviour than to a general lowering of the
professional ethic. Statements about Health Service doctors 'passing off
patients quickly' have proved to be equally unsubstantiated. There have always
been individuals with poor professional standards, including doctors and lawyers.
Nevertheless, prestige is assessed within the legal community not according to
earnings directly but in terms of how 'busy' a particular advocate may be.
Thus, for example, advocates' wives loyally complain to each other of how busy
their husbands are; and not a few young advocates exhaust themselves each day
in the Parliament House in their efforts to appear employed. There are
subterfuges such as keeping old papers in the box in the corridor outside the
Divisions, being seen on the floor, but not too long or too often, and
retreating to the Law Room or Reading Room where solicitors may not penetrate.
An advocate's practice need not be large in the sense of having numerous clients.
An advocate who has a 'high class' practice may do much of his work in chambers,
only being instructed on relatively few occasions to appear in court; but
these are lucrative appearances and he enjoys theesteem of the Faculty. Another
who is frequently instructed in undefended divorce or criminal work may in fact
be held in less esteem by the Facility itself and by the more influential solicitors.
This is an important consideration in the next phase of an'advocate's life.
It is the esteem which an advocate commands within the legal profession itself
rather than the public stereotype which is important for advancement. Indeed
the profession attempts to prevent the public from awarding status. This may
be contrasted with the profession of acting in which the public rather than the
3
group itself determines an individual's place. T.H. Marshall suggests that
the successful barrister and medical specialist may most often fall below the
3. T.H. Marshall Sociology at the Crossroads p. 158
professional ideal and deviate from strict professional standards. There
seems possibly to be some element of truth in this suggestion, if by 'success¬
ful counsel' one supposes the flamboyant type of fashionable counsel. This
type in fact corresponds quite closely to the actor (cf. the Roman orator),
and may to some extent succeed by reason of a popula,r stereotype. He may
cultivate eccentricities of dress or manner which appeal to the public but
not to the professional group. His practice will be largely criminal or
involve appearance before a jury. This is not, however, the type of practice
which gains the esteem of colleagues or of high class solicitors - who may
indeed regard such employment as undesirable and reason for disesteem. There
have been great advocates who have been great lawyers like the late Lord
Birkett or Lord Aitchison. ' On the other hand the famous counsel Marshall Hall
Q.C. was sometimes slightingly referred to by other barristers as 'Necessity'
on the grounds that he knew no law. Except perhaps in the criminal courts,
the era of the actor-advocate seems to be a thing of the past, and American
observers of Court of Session proceedings have been impressed by the almost
detached presentation of a client's case by an advocate of to-day. A careful
argument and unemotional approach seem to be the most acceptable forensic
techniques for purposes of gaining professional esteem.
In England it is not at all uncommon for a barrister to spend his whole
professional life as a junior or 'utter' barrister, and such a man may make
a very substantial income. If he considers that the kind of work undertaken
in
by a Q.C., in p particular leading^Court, is not that at which he is likely
to be outstandingly successful, he may elect to retain esteem as a 'busy-
junior' . Certain kinds of work, such as the drafting of pleadings, are
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reserved for the junior^1" Bar. In Scotland there was for centuries a
tradition of complete interchangeability of role within the faculty. There
might be differences in the esteem accorded to individuals according to their
abilities, but no formal distinctions of status were made. Attempts to
5introduce such distinctions were discouraged. Thus Cockburn in 1831 wrote
'The honour would be certain to be abused in its distinction, and where it is
rightly conferred, of what use is it in addition to the natural prestige of
merit? I have never known a vestige of professional jealousy at our Bar.'
However, as has been explained already^ for reasons ezternal to the Scottish
Bar as such, the creation of a roll of Queen's Counsel for Scotland was
authorised in 18977 This innovation has created a difference of status and
function of relevance to an advocate's 'life cycle'.
The etiquette relating to 'application for silk' has already been
discussed. An advocate who has rapidly built up a heavy junior practice may
apply for silk in his mid thirties to relieve himself of more work than he
can carry. Each application to the Lord Justice General must be prefaced by
intimation by the applicant to advocates senior to himself of his intention to
apply, so as to give his seniors the opportunity to take the step first.
Accordingly, each time an advocate declines this invitation he is usually tacitly
accepting that he cannot compete on equal terms with one of less seniority.
Those who apply young and succeed as Queen'sCounsel gain not only in status but
also in esteem; those who defer decisions may be in danger of losing esteem
within their status. (This is not an invariable result. Thus the Standing
4. Megarry Lawyer and Litigant in England p.90
5. Journal^ i p. 3 also p •75 supra
6. p.cfg supra
7. P .235 infra .
Junior Counsel for Revenue matters may regard his esteem secure and his fees
beyond what most Q.C.s earn, even though he allows his juniors to precede him
on what Mr. Megarry has termed the 'Silken ladder'). In Scotland today an
advocate is virtually forced to take silk eventually or to seek an appointment
outside court practices. In England a barrister contemplating silk may
8
elect to 'take the plunge' : in Scotland an advocate may be 'pushed in'. At
a certain stage of seniority - perhaps about fourteen years after admission
to Faculty, an advocate may be expected to take silk as a matter of course.
Thus it 'would be fair to say that thejminimum standard of professional skill
which is required before silk is granted in England is substantially higher
than in Scotland - though of course leading Scottish Q.C.s may surpass the best
in England. One consequence is that in Scotland, though a formal difference
in status and prestige result from taking silk, the tradition of interchange-
ability of function in the profession is to some extent retained. The
profession itself will accord greater esteem to a busy and successful 'junior'
advocate than to one who has been virtually compelled by his seniority to take
silk.
Instead of facing the prospect of starting professional life at a new,
hazardous and more competitive level as Q.C., an advocate may apply for
an appointment, outside Court practice, for which his status and seniority have
qualified him. Thus after five years practice he is qualified for an appoint¬
ment as sheriff-substitute. Within the past decade the salaries of sheriffs-
substitute have been increased substantially, and are reviewed with those of
higher civil servants. Accordingly appointments, which formerly were often
8. Megarry, op cit. p. 87 et seq
accepted as a 'second best' solution even financially and as a symbol of falling
behind in the contest for forensic esteem, are now sought competitively by
quite successful advocates. Though the less important appointments as sheriff-
substitute may be made from the junior bar, the important posts today are often
filled by men who have done well, taken silk, but have not been among the
most successful in practice. The work of a sheriff-substitute in the larger
towns and cities is responsible, respected and satisfying, yet few probably
accept office without a certain regret - and the same may be said of some
academic lawyers and advocates in the Civi^. Services. SherifS-3ubstitute are
well remunerated and respected as such, but the decision to accept office
removes most from the focal centre of their professional life hitherto,
Parliament House and the New Town, while the sheriffs-substitute in Edinburgh
itself cannot compete in prestige with the Senators of the College of Justice
across the High Street. In the country sheriffdoms where work is not pressing
an advocate may sometimes find life boring by contrast with life in the
Parliament House, and take to 'county life' or even to drink. On the other
hand, others become invaluable members of the local community or contributors
to legal writing. It has been the practice to appoint advocates to most
vacancies for the office of sheriff-substitute, a discrimination which is re¬
sented by solicitors who are much more numerous and may be at least as able.
The likelihood of being appointed as sheriff-substitute is generally regarded
as an insurance against the hazards of an advocate's life such as ill health,
and the strain of busy practice is severe. Notoriously, while many advocates
appointed are first class lawyers, some, especially in the past, would never
have been considered for appointment on a competitive evaluation of merit.
Moreover, when solicitors are appointed sheriffs-substitute it is usually at
a substantially older age than in the case of advocates. In a Memorandum
of Evidence submitted by the Faculty of Law of Edinburgh University to the
Grant Committee on the Sheriff Courts in 1964 it was estimated that of 60
sheriffs substitute, 49 had been appointed from the Faculty of Advocates.
The average age at appointment of a sample group of 26 recent appointments
was 39.8 years, though for B and C class sheriffdoms the average age on
appointment was considerably lower. It appeared that of 104 advocates
admitted in the period 1945 - 1*963 inclusive, 23 never entered practice in
Scotland, and of the remaining 81, 33 novj on the Shrieval Bench. An
advocate's expectation of appointment is therefore substantial. The few
solicitors appointed were substantially older than advocates on appointment.
On average they were 52 years old on appointment.
Any study of indivisualisation within a group is rewarding. In the case
of the Faculty of Advocates individualisation is achieved within a particularly
small and compact group. An advocate's life, within the solidarity of the
group, is intensely competitive, though the role must be played according to
strict professional norms, and to opt out of the competition before the top
prize of a judgeship is achieved, is in a sense to accept, to be regarded
as having ceded, the possibilities of highest prestige and esteem. Sheriffs-
substitute are in fact the 'district judges' of Scotland and therefore to some
extent resent the jurisdiction and status of the Sheriffs Principal^ who (apart
from the exceptional cases of Glasgow and Edinburgh) are normally Q.C.s still
in practice in the Parliament House. While the Sheriffs-substitute are the
9. see p. 11 supra; p- 3.41 Jc s^.
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more experienced judges, the Sheriffs-Principal (unless they have retired
from active practice or are in dwindling practice compared with the leaders
at the Bar) command esteem in Edinburgh principally as successful advocates,
"but also have specially high status in their respective Sheriffdoms. No
Sheriff-substitute has been directly appointed to the Bench of the Court of
Session, though in rare cases a Sheriff substitute has been promoted to the
appointment of full-time Sheriff Principal.
If an advocate decides not to remain in practice until he takes silk,
there are a number of options open to him apart from the Shrieval bench, such
as University teaching (which is expanding and progressing rapidly at present)
or joining the staff of the Lord Advocate's Department or joining the Procurator
Fiscal Service. With the exception of the office of senior Legal Secretary
in the Lord Advocate's Department and University chairs, these various occupa¬
tions do not compete financially nor in prestige with appointments as Sheriffs
substitute.
On the assumption that an advocate remains in practice until he takes
silk, he will thereafter enter substantially the same game, but for higher
stakes. His prestige so far as the public at least are concerned will be
higher than that of an advocate who has not received a patent. He will not,
and may not, be employed to undertake some classes of work,, such as drafting
pleadings or conducting the ordinary undefended divorce case, and will
normally only appear when a case is important enough to require both a senior
and a junior. Accordingly every Q.C. on taking silk must compete with those
whose esteem as leaders of the bar is well established in the hope that, when
judicial promotion has thinned their ranks, he too may be regarded by the
profession as an acknowledged leader. Clearly there is not room at the top
for everyone, and some will drop out of the competition, accepting appointment
as Sheriffs substitute or as legal Chairmen of various Tribunals. In general
the more senior Q.C.s may expect to be appointed to the office of Sheriff
Principal (of whom there are twelve). The Sheriffs Principal of the Lothians
and Peebles (.Edinburgh) and cf Lanarkshire (Glasgow) are full time appointments
and the Q.C.s appointed to these offices (unless in the rare case of the
elevation of Sheriff Substitute) in effect renounce as beyond their reach the
highest prestige as Senator of the College of Justice. The other Sheriffs
Principal - viewed in the context of the advocate's life cycle - fall roughly
into two classes. For those who are leading the field in practice, experience
as Sheriff Principal provides preliminary judicial experience before elevation
to the Bench of the Court of Session. For others who have not held their
place in the closing laps of the race, the office of Sheriff Principal is to
some extent a consolation prize which provides a useful supplement to income
without excessive official duties, and which confers high prestige within the
Sheriff's own Sheriffdom. In the latter category will be found some of those
most jealous of the status, which is the highest which they can expect. Their
prestige in their sheriffdoms is substantially higher than that accorded by the
professional group in Edinburgh. The same may be said of some Q.C.s who
leave practice for University Chairs. Having opted out of competition within
the group, highest esteem is withheld.
The most prestigious role possible for an advocate is that of a judge
(Senator of the College of Justice). This is the reward for lasting the course
despite all strains and hazards, recognition of individual success won by
physical and moral toughness. Such an advocate takes his place on the Bench
with the judicial title of Lord X10 and, though his judicial duties as Lord
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Ordinary may often be less interesting or exacting than those of a Sheriff
substitute, by tradition his prestige in Scotland is high. (Social anthropo¬
logical analysis of the roles of Scottish judges would provide material for
another thesis and is not attempted here). Within the faculty itself the
highest esteem is accorded to the Dean of Faculty. Yery few of the most
successful advocates of Scotland have not been promoted to the Bench. In
some cases there may be a breakdown in health after long and successful practice
before a vacancy occurs; in others factors affecting an individual's private
life may make him \inacceptable according to professional norms for judicial
office; others have been baulked in the past by political considerations.
It is generally accepted that the Dean of Faculty, the group's elected head,
will be offered a seat on the Bench after holding office for two or more years.
(Earlier abandonment of the Faculty's most honourable office is discouraged).
The other Faculty offices which carry expectations of judicial promotion have
already been noted. Tat in the present centuxy at least three Deans of
Faculty, Asher, Condie Sandeman and S.P. Mor/ison were passed over. The
latter two, of course, had held but had resigned the Deanship of Faculty,
but Asher's case deserves special mention. Born in 1835, be was admitted
to Faculty in 1861. He held office as Solicitor General on three occasions,
but resigned in 1S94. In 1895 be was elected Dean of Faculty, and held that
Office until his death in 1905. His brethren commissioned his portrait, and
in 1902 caused it to be placed in the Parliament Hall, the only case of the
portrait of a practising advocate being hung there in his lifetime. The
political embargo which the Conservative Party imposed on Asher's elevation
to the judiciary is strangely compensated by the solidarity of the Faculty of
Advocates, irrespective of political opinion, in honouring their elected leader.
The names and reputations of many of those who attained the Bench in Asher's
time are virtually forgotten, but Dean of Faculty Asher has established a
special place in Faculty legend. Young advocates observing his portrait not
infrequently ask their older brethren for an account of this man.
The influence of politics in the Faculty of Advocates has already been
described. In the present context of the advocate's life cycle it may be
sufficient to add that prudent association with a political party increases
and accelerates prospects of promotion to the Bench, but does not necessarily
command the esteem of the group. This depends on recognition of an individual's
professional skills combined with observance of the accepted norms of conduct.
The leaders of the Bar are essentially recognised by the group itself, quite
independently of any public stereotype. The clearest recognition of this
group esteem is usually election of an advocate as Dean, though in an election
contested by more than two candidates there may be room for doubt whether the
man elected is necessarily held in highest esteem by those in actual practice.
It may be observed that most Deans of Faculty, while esteemed for profess¬
ional skill have also usually belonged to an in-group within the Faculty itself
based on class-education factors. On the other hand ability and personality
have latterly opened the office to others not of the in-group. The rank
equality of all advocates tends to social equality, reducing social distance,
as of course does the element of propinquity in the various roles played by
advocates. The fact that a situation of such high social density and there¬
for of great social control reduce. The significance of social class is
analysed in a later chapter"'""''. Such considerations weaken the influence of
the in-group, though it survives in attenuated form. There are still a few
11. infra p. 2.12. ,
advocates who attend the' Parliament House without substantial practice and
without ambition to gain it. In due course they take silk, and become very-
influential in faculty matters, often as Officers of the Faculty. These are
men of independent means usually of the in group. The fact that they are
primarily concerned with the interests of the Faculty as such rather than with
their own personal advancement or remuneration gains them the substantial
esteem of many advocates, though some, not of the in group may resent and envy
them. These independent figures, who mil not leave the Floor for the Bench
are important as guardians of professional norms and of the solidarity of the
group. Their orientation is essentially conservative and they will jealously
defend the privileges of the Faculty. ' This element which was more prominent
in past centuries may be dying out, and it is difficult to believe that the
professional ethos would be noticeably affected by the disappearance of those
advocates for whom the status rather than the work-role is important.
The advocate's life cycle may then be summarised as follows. Esteem of
the group is all important and highest esteem can only be gained by succeeding
competitively at every stage in the role of the practising advocate. A
seat on the Bench, however, is accepted as the appropriate recognition of a
highly successful advocate; rather less esteem is accorded to promotions
influenced by association with a political party. The highest esteem is given
to the Dean of the Faculty of Advocates and after him to a small number of
leading Q.C.s some of whom may be Sheriffs Principal, a factor which does not
greatly influence their position in Edinburgh. Next in esteem probably
•come busy Q.C.s and a few very busy and fairly senior advocates who have not
yet taken silk, and after them ranking is debatable. In Scotland the tradition
of interchangeability of function (though no longer complete) seems to "blur
the discrimination in prestige accorded officially and "by the public between
Q.C.s and other advocates. Esteem within the group is more important, and
the rest of the Bar outside the groups mentioned are evaluated as individuals
by the legal profession. Those who have opted out of the competition for
success in practice may command esteem within the professional group according
to different standards. The Bar recognizes that some advocates must learn
other legal skills, e.g. judicial-, administrative or academic, and accepts
them as still part of the group, though with some discrimination. Ranking
above the 'busy Q.C., very busy junior' class one might place the Sheriffs of
the Lothians and Peebles and of Lanark, and on par with or slightly inferior
to the 'busy Q.C., very busy junior' class one might rate now practising
Sheriffs Principal, the most efficient Sheriffs substitute in busy sheriffdoms,
the Legal Secretary to the Lord Advocate and occasionally an academic lawyer.
Those Sheriffs substitute who have not to undertake much responsible judicial
work, the junior staff of the Lord Advocate's Department and a number of
academic lariyers receive approximately the same esteem as if they had remained
at the Bar in reasonable but not exceptionally distinguished junior practice.
This ranking is known by the role-set, and in the wider community to
close associates only. The greater the social distance of the observer the
less accurate it will be and for the public at large all that will be known
will be the categories 'advocate', 'Q.C. ', 'Sheriff, 'Judge', the last three
having a greater status value than the first. The writer has found that
many people do not know the meaning of the status 'advocate' and even in Scotland
understand the status better when it is described as 'barrister'. This may
be due to the fact that few books, films or television versions of the Scottish
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system appear while a very large number do about the Snglish Bar. The status
•barrister' is generally awarded high prestige even by people at a considerable
social distance from any holder of it.
■I 2
Willmott and Young" ^ give a clear example of this in 'Family and Class
in a London Suburb'. 'v7e have a very dear friend at Woodford G-reen who's a
practising barrister. It never struck us that people might like to know them
just because he was a barrister, but when the wife's needlework group had a
meeting there, some of the wives were very pleased just because he was a
barrister'. The substitution of the word advocate would not produce the
same response even in Scotland.
In his life cycle it is clearly true that the advocate's status becomes
noticeably higher in the minds of the public when he is designated 'Q.C.'
The public image of this rank differs markedly from that within the profession
itself.





Robert K. Merton remarks that 'contemporary sociological theorists are
largely at one in adopting the premise that social statuses and social roles
comprise major building blocks of social structure.' This study is largely
about the status and role of the advocate seen historically and comparatively
2
in Part One and now sociologically in Part Two. Linton meant by status a
position in a social system involving designated rights and obligations; by
role, the behaviour orientated to these patterned expectations of others.
That everyone occupies many statuses and fulfils the roles associated with
3
them is evident. Merton goes on to say: 'Unlike Linton, I begin with the
premise that each social status involves not a single associated role, but an
array of roles. This basic feature of social structure can be registered by
the distinctive but not formidable term role-set.' Now this concept of Mer¬
ton' s could lead to an infinity of relationships being associated with any
given role; it rather resembles a man throwing a handful of pebbles into a
pool and being surprised by the number of eddies and intersections of circles.
However, for the purpose of this thesis, it is proposed to use Merton's word
role-set in the simple sense in which he defines it; * ... Then, by role-set
I mean that complement of role relationships in which persons are involved by
virtue of occupying a particular social status.' As Merton himself points
out this concept helps to show the social mechanisms which operate in prevent¬
ing or producing role-conflict.
1. Robert K. Merton, The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory: British
Journal of Sociology, (1957) p.110.
2. Ralph Linton, 'The Study of Man*, chap. VIII.
3. Robert K. Merton, op.oit.
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The Advocate and the Clerk
The most important members of the advocate's role-set are the judges, Ms
clients, the solicitor and his clerk. This chapter will deal mainly with the
last two. It will suggest that in his relationship with these two categories
of persons there can be some possible situations and activities in wMch role-
conflict could arise. The advocate's role has been seen to be related to the
structure of the system in wMch he operates, and has been seen in its three¬
fold nature; namely, as officer of the court, as a member of his profession
and. in relation to Ms client. It is meant by the use of the word 'role' to
suggest the performance of a set of rtgkiis and obligations. The behaviour
expected of the player is the content of the role, and the behaviour is diff¬
erentiated because the player has many roles. The advocate has three in the
professional field; he has others in his life wMch are not relevant here.
Nevertheless it must again be noted that his 'part' (to use again the acting
motif) is played in public a great deal of the time. In Southall's major
categories of roles - kinship and ethnic, economic, political, ritual or re¬
ligious, and recreational - it has been seen that the advocate's role-playing
of any of these aspects of his 'part' is not unrelated to the others. The
solicitor and his client are frequently in a position to observe, or could if
they would observe, Mm either directly or through gossip in any of his roles.
The nature of the group, it must be stressed yet again, is one in wMch privacy
is unlikely to be achieved, and therefore one in which considerable social con¬
trol is exercised over all his roles.
. Since it is the inter-relations between
roles and their differentiation that is of particular interest the role relation¬
ship between the advocate on the one hand and the solicitor and clerk on the
other must be examined.
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In the chain of communication between the advocate and the client, the
clerk very frequently comes first. Therefore, the description of the clerk's
work or of his role in relation to the advocate will be taken before that of
the solicitor.
In the Parliament House there are four advocates' clerks to serve the en¬
tire profession. In Green's Legal Diary 1965 the number of practising advo¬
cates stands at 124 and the clerks serve 34s 24, 30 and 36 advocates respective¬
ly. This list is inaccurate. The number of advocates actually practising and
requiring the services of a clerk is as nearly as can be ascertained 108-110.
(it is difficult to be accurate; for example, less than a week before the
writer completed her final draft (April 19^5) four advocates had been called to
the -Bar and at least two had left to take up other employment in the legal world).
One clerk consulted at this time on comparing his own private list of advocates
he serves with the list in Green's Legal Diary found a substantial discrepancy
between the two. He had on his list 28 advocates (two of whom had been newly
•called' and therefore could not have been on Green's list at all). Therefore
he served 28 and not 34 as listed by Green. Clerk&?; duties are fairly onerous.
They attend at the Parliament House in the morning before the arrival of the ad¬
vocates. The Courts sit at 10. a.m. so most members of the Bar reach Parlia¬
ment House between 9.45 a.m. and 10 a.m. The bagman will have earlier deli¬
vered the bags of the busier advocates who employ him, and will have, unpacked
all papers into the advocates' boxes which are in a corridor of the Parliament
Hall outside the 'Divisions'. The clerk writes up the advocate's professional
diary, entering in it all consultations and cases for which the advocate has
been instructed. This personal professional diary goes up and down with the
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advocate's other papers in the bag. The clerk can therefore consult it in
the box during the working day, as he is approached by solicitors wishing to
instruct one of 'his' advocates. His working day at the Parliament House
will be spent largely in consulting with solicitors and with his advocates
about administrative arrangements for present or future cases and in seeing
that his advocates' cases do not overlap. The clerk negotiates the advo¬
cate's fees with the solicitor mainly according to a recognised scale at the
lower level of practice, but more according to the 'market value' of the par¬
ticular advocate in the most successful class.
The clerk's personal relations with the solicitor are of great importance
both to himself and to his advocate. He is remunerated by fees based on a
proportion of the advocate's honorarium. This has not changed since it was
fixed by the Court in the Act of Sederunt, 15th July 1876. The clerks' scale
of fees is as follows: he receives 2/6 on one guinea, 5/- on two to five guin¬
eas, 7/6 on from 5 to 10 guineas and thereafter 5/ of the amount of the advo¬
cate's fee. Because the advocate's fees have been increased since 1876 and
because the clerk's fees are a proportion of the advocate's this might seem an
equitable arrangement. The belief is held, however, that advocates' fees lag
behind the general rise in the cost of living, and the clerks believe that,
having even less of a 'Trade Union' than the advocates, their remuneration has
not kept up with the general rise in wages, salaries or fees. It nevertheless
sometimes seems to the young advocate that his clerk is better off than he is.
The status-income dilemma does arise at the beginning of the advocate's career.
It seems unilluminating to do anything but describe this fact. The advocate's
clerk does seem to the young advocate to be more prosperous than himself; the
clerk is 'better off' in conspicuous consumption terms. He has a newer motor-
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car when the advocate has possibly a serviceable and rather old model, and a
more 'desirable residence' costing more, when the advocate either from necess¬
ity or from choice usually prefers 'the Quarter*.
It is interesting to note at this point a matter which has not been
sufficiently relevant to discuss elsewhere -the 'snob' aspect of 'the Quarter'.
The New Town of Edinburgh which constitutes 'the Quarter' is impeccably Georgian,
some of it including the most admirable of upper and upper-middle class Georgian
houses, so fashionable in our time ana so properly admired for their proportion
and elegance. These houses are by modern standards large and costly to keep.
It is suggested by those who live outside 'the Quarter' that for the last rea¬
sons they are inferior. The upper and upper middle class elements in the Fa¬
culty have continued to live in them. They have preferred the aesthetic quali¬
ties and the undoubted nearness of these houses to anything that 'matters', to
the relative disagreeableness of living in suburbia, which entails among other
inconveniences long tedious drives to their place of work or to the schools of
their children. These New Town houses between the two World Wars and for
several years after the Second, depreciated in value. It is suggested that
this was due to two main causes: - first, the increasing use of the motor-car
and, secondly, the generally held idea that a well placed and well appointed
kitchen is the most important part of a house. That these New Town houses are
now increasing in value at an astonishing rate is due again to two main causes.
The increase in the number of motor-car owners and users has made the journey
from suburbia more difficult and time consuming, and the possibility of creat¬
ing a utilitarian kitchen in a house with aesthetic qualities has become ec¬
onomically possible. All the advocates' clerks live in suburbia. It is also
true that 30-40^ of advocates now do so too; the class motif is not being unduly
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stressed. What is being stated is that in recent years, and until fairly
recently, the superiority of living in certain parts of suburbia was assumed
by many of the middle classes and this view was founded on considerations of
affluence and wealth.
This fact of the clerks' superior economic status in relation to the
young advocate has been widely observed in fieldwork among the advocates.
It has been suggested that the chief aim of the clerk is to make money. How
else can he gain high prestige? His status is that of clerk to an advocate;
his training is not controlled by any professional norms; his recruitment and
qualifications are not the subject of any known regulation; he achieves his
success and standing, unlike the advocate or the solicitor, by the more gener¬
ally accepted 'class' standards of modern Britain - by being economically
successful.
To be economically successful the clerk must ensure that his advocates
are so. Chance plays some part in this. But at the outset of the young ad¬
vocate's career his clerk is of the utmost importance. The clerk's personal
relations with the solicitor are therefore of great value. He is often, and
especially at the beginning of the advocate's professional life, the chief in¬
termediary between the advocate and his patrons, the solicitors. If a soli¬
citor approaches the clerk to ask if Mr X can take a.case, and Mr X is already
engaged, the clerk will endeavour to produce a Mr Y from his own 'family' of
advocates. (The clerks have this terminology; they keep cases if possible
•within the family.') In this way a clerk may contribute to the practice of
any of his junior counsel. His influence is smaller after the advocate's own
professional value and reputation have become established. At the top of the
Junior Bar and of the Senior Bar certain individuals become known to their peer;
to solicitors and to clerks as outstanding practitioners, and any solicitor
will be concerned to instruct them in causes in which they may excel. Here
the clerk has little influence. But, as we have seen, the bulk of the work
at the Scottish Bar is not of this,nature. The interchangeability of counsel
is not a fiction but a relative truth. The clerk is in a position to inter¬
vene when Mr X is unavailable and may, without in any way contravening the
system, put work in the way of Mr Y instead of allowing it to go to Mr A in
the 'family* of another clerk.
In the first ten years at least of his career this is of great importance
to the young advocate. Bach year one or more 'senior juniors' take silk.
All the junior work they have had falls to be reallocated. Their clerks here
have a great importance. Any competent advocate can perform in this sphere
of junior work. The clerk will suggest to the solicitor one or any of 'his'
advocates for work that the new silk would formerly have done. At the top
end of the profession, however, the advocate's own standing is the relevant
factor. The advocates, the solicitors and the clerks know that the distin¬
guished or capable Mr P cannot be replaced by any Mr X. Mr P's successor will
be chosen from the 'family' of any clerk. At this stage in the advocate's
life the clerk's influence will or may be irrelevant, although his assistance
will still be necessaryi In the evaluation of the services of the clerk (out¬
side his purely clerkly functions - of providing shorthand and typing facilities
for which he is paid, of keeping the diary, etc.) he may be said to be most im¬
portant as an intermediary in the early years of the advocate's career - medi¬
ating work to those who are less successful and may be free when the more ad¬
mired of their brethren cannot accept all the briefs offered to them.
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This exposition has, to a great extent, represented the advocate's view
of the matter. The clerk's own view is different, as can be imagined. lie
can be seen, and might see himself, as supplying a free service to the advocate.
The young advocate has the services of a fully qualified clerk which costs him
nothing. On the other hand the clerk has considerable expenses. He buys all
paper, pays all postage both of letters and heavy packages of papers, pays tele¬
phone calls, typist, tape-recorder service, etc. It was recounted to the wri¬
ter that tape-recording equipment and services cost one clerk £600 last year.
Typists have to be highly qualified and intelligent because of the nature of
the work involved, and so have relatively high wages. The clerk's car could
be seen as part of his expenses because it is necessary for his job. His du¬
ties of collecting and delivering papers at the advocates* houses or chambers
in vacations or at other times when the Parliament House is not in session
would be impossible without a motor-car. On the other hand some of these ex¬
penses are chargeable against the client and can undoubtedly be claimed against
income tax. To quote A.J.G-. Mackay,^ 'Advocates have clerks whose duty it is
to write or copy the papers prepared by their masters and to attend them in
court. They are paid not by salary, but by fees exigible from the client and
in practice usually paid by the agent at the close of each session.'
The clerks' duties comprise more than those specified by Mackay and for
many of their services it would be difficult to fix a readily estimable recom¬
pense. These clerks have the qualities of trained, professional, solid citi¬
zens. They appear not only to know, but also to insist on, the same ethical
standards as their advocates, and feel they have some influence in instilling
4. Court of Session Practice i p.120.
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these in the new young advocate. They take pride in the fact that no clerk,
any more than an advocate, v/ould break the known customs and mores of the sys¬
tem. One clerk informed the writer of a small breach of the advocate's code
to the following effect. A young advocate X in the course of a train journey
had decried the skill of brother advocate Y to a solicitor who had been intent
on employing Y. Subsequently, the solicitor, reporting this to the clerk,
•swore* that he would not in future put any work in the way of X who had in his
view behaved with disloyalty and impropriety. The clerk, telling this tale to
the writer, remarked; 'I often tell this to my young lads (soil., advocates) as
an example both of what is done and of how such behaviour gets around. Not,'
he added, 'that there are many that need to be told. But I think the clerk
can be a great help to the young ones.' It seems clear that the clerk does
play an important part in the social as opposed to the technical training and
role acquisition of the young advocate.
The clerk can also be a great help in recommending counsel to the solici¬
tor and in this it must be noted that the clerk is hazarding his own reputation
as well as that of his advocates. The clerk's role demands judgment of charac¬
ter as well as competence in.his duties. He is often one of the shrewdest ob¬
servers and judges of the ability, chances of success and esteem of the advo¬
cate, and will naturally use this knowledge if his opinion is asked. One clerk
insisted that 'if a chap (soil., advocate) is keen he'll get the work. One of
my own lads, just started up, was there when some one had to be found quickly
for .a small case. This Mr A did the job, and three times in succession did a
similar job for the same agents. The agent said he felt he was "using" Mr A
whom he thought to be a competent and decent wee chap and he'd sent him all
his work since.'
It became clear as information from all sources was collected that the
clerks identify closely with the advocates. They see, and are seen to have,
an image which in some senses is similar to their masters". This is particu¬
larly clear of the role fulfilment and the role expectation of the clerk in
relation to the ethical norms and the professional behaviour, attainments and
success of counsel. The sanctions against the clerks breaking these norms
are similar to those the advocate faces. He might be rebuked by an Officer
of the Faculty, or by Counsel; and the primary sanction would, as in the
larger group, be gossip which, as has been seen before, exercises a very real
control in a community as small as this one. One of the Officers of Faculty
said he could suggest no controls of the conduct of the clerks besides the
ones suggested above, and thought the ultimate sanction might be by the clerk's
Counsel deciding to leave him or to warn their devils against going on the list
of the offending clerk. As this senior member of the Bar put the matter of
social control in the role-set: 'It is all done by kindness and white spats.'
The recruitment and training of the clerks seems to follow no set pattern.
One of the present four is a solicitor and took over the 'practice' of a clerk
who was retiring and who had.served in the Parliament House for fifty years.
Two of the clerks started as library boys and learnt from older clerks whose
practices they inherited. The fourth took over his .father's practice, his
father's father having been superintendent of the Parliament House. Tradi¬
tional skills, customs and ethics of the job are passed from generation to ge¬
neration orally and by imitation. The most important qualifications for the
post seem to be a cheerful and friendly disposition and a methodical and order¬
ly mind.
There have recently been attempts made to find a new clerk to supplement
the services of the existing four. The Faculty itself is worried about the
dwindling number of clerks and the fact that if any one of the four now prac¬
tising were to retire there would be no-one even partially trained to replace
him. A committee of Faculty was set up to try to find a solution to the prob¬
lem and decided to advertise for a kind of trainee advocates' clerk. No suit¬
able candidate could be found at the level of remuneration offered and because
of the fact of the uncertainty of its future level. The clerk faces the same
risks as does the advocate, since his fees are a proportion of his master's
rate of remuneration.
The clerks then made efforts to solve the problem, though it would seem
that it is one which should be of greater concern to the advocates themselves.
The present clerks manage with typists and modern mechanical aids to fulfil
their duties, and the introduction of another into their midst would obviously
reduce their earnings and involve them in the extra duties of training a new
man. However they did make efforts to supplement their number and were un¬
successful. One clerk described the matter in the following way: 'It was
difficult to find anyone independent, who would see the work in the right way.
And no member of the Bar would want to go to the new clerk because they would
feel he had no contacts with solicitors. You can't just allocate a certain
number from each of the existing lists to the new man. An advocate has the
right to choose his own clerk and the clerk to keep his own advocates. Then
some of a chap's list will be earning big money while others are earning al¬
most nothing. Could he be expected to part with his top chaps? In the end
we decided to try to get an assistant and to pay him ourselves but we couldn't
get anyone at the salary we could afford to pay. So nothing further has been
done.1 The fact that the clerks show such concern about this matter is yet
another sign of their identifying closely with the group they serve.
Their word usage also shows this identification. *A took over B's
"practice".' One clerk, now deceased, describing his life-cycle in which he
started as a library boy, became a judge's clerk and then an advocate's clerk,
said 'I went on the Bench with Lord A and when he died I returned to the floor
of the Parliament House.*
The clerk's behaviour towards his advocates - ana sometimes to all advo¬
cates - is frequently such as to show some familiarity rather than any great
degree of deference. It is said that the familiarity has been growing and in¬
creased rapidly immediately after the war. It can best be illustrated by the
naming customs. These had formerly been that advocates called all clerks by
their surnames and referred to them similarly. Clerks called counsel 'Sir'
and by title and referred to them by title. Many advocates, especially the
older ones, still hold strictly to these rules, and the writer has heard much
talk of the matter even from the young members of the Bar who would like to
have this custom enforced. In fact, however, a large number of counsel call
their clerks by the first name and not so large number are so called by the
clerks in return. In some cases the exchange of first names is done only in
private but it is said to be becoming more usual in 'the parliament House itself.
Many members of the profession describe actual instances with the greatest dis¬
approval and with such remarks as 'The Dean should do something about it;'
other advocates appear to find no harm in the practice. One clerk remarked
that the advocates themselves by checking it at all times could halt the matter
of which he too disapproves. The fact that the custom is growing might indicate
an aspect of possible role-contamination. An advocate should have the liking
and co-operation of his clerk. It might be that, were he to address his clerk
as an inferior while others were using an address of equality with the clerk
he would be thought of as being arrogant, conceited, 'stuck up' and that he
would therefore lose some of the clerk's favour and help. It is always diffi¬
cult to reverse a process of this kind. That the superordination of the advo¬
cate and the subordination of the clerk should be symbolised in their modes of
address in their professional relationship is thought by many to be necessary
in order to preserve the system. Others, failing to separate the professional
and the general social relationships, seem unaware of the possible dangers and
conflicts involved.
The conflict involved in the advocates' role as superordinate, as masters
in the professional sphere and as equal and friend in the wider social sphere
can be clearly seen. The situation in which the clerk could possibly say to
the advocate in the work situation 'Well Jack, old chap, I don't seem to have
found a case for you today' would clearly show some breakdown in the whole sys¬
tem, not only of deference but of non-contamination and segregation of roles.
In fact it is universally agreed that such a remark could not be made except
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as a joke. There is no avoidance of the subject as there would^were corrup¬
tion suspected. Both sides have expressed the opinion that such jokes are
made frequently and openly and may come from either the advocate or the clerk.
In this it can be seen that the superior does not necessarily indicate the
role that is to be played. In Michael Banton's analysis of the policeman and
his joking relationships with inferiors he gives an example of the situation
in which the superior initiates this kind of behaviour. This example from
the advocate - clerk relationship gives no indication of a superior - inferior
attitude. There is wide agreement that the clerks rarely use the first names
of their advocates except in private. The examples given have almost all re¬
lated to the behaviour of one clerk towards certain named advocates and could
therefore be seen as marks of diapproval of certain individuals rather than a
true belief that the entire system is being corrupted.
When the advocate and clerk are seen as part of a team with strictly de¬
fined roles and procedures, visible to some of the outside v/orld in their work-
role and to the whole of their role-set in the Parliament House,the lack of de¬
ference in the clerk's way of addressing the advocate becomes a point of great
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importance. It might be said to provide in G-offman's words 'distinctive in¬
formation.' As he points out ... 'a team must have its secrets and its sec¬
rets kept.' There are many advocates who believe that the breakdown in defer¬
ence customs between clerk and counsel has become much more serious now that it
is so openly observed, not only by the advocates themselves, but by solicitors,
faculty servants, clients and members of the public who might be in the Parlia¬
ment House.
A senior officer of the Faculty, himself rigidly observing the former cus¬
toms of formality, said the custom had so far changed that nothing could be
done about it. The writer had been told by more than one advocate that this
officer had publicly rebuked a clerk who had been heard addressing a member of
the Bar by his first name. This incident was described in terms of great
approval and with the suggestion that such matters would soon be put back on
the old footing. The Officer of the Faculty denied that the incident had
occurred, said he had frequently heard counsel and clerks using first names,
and felt that there was little to be done to remedy the matter since it had
5. Erwing Goffman, The presentation of the Self in Everyday Life, p.141»
spread widely. He felt it did not, and could not, lead to any role-contamina¬
tion. Other counsel suggest by their open dislike of the changed manners that
it could. Yet if the matter is so put to them they too deny the possibility
that such overt familiarity could have serious consequences for the observance
of the proper fulfillment of the role of either advocate or clerk, maintaining
only that it is a matter of 'bad form'.
From all sources of information among advocates, solicitors, clerks and
Faculty servants and from her own observation the writer has concluded that
there is believed to have been some change in manners, in naming and in defer¬
ence since the 1939 War. She has not had any serious information that v/ould
lead her to believe that these small differences have changed or affected for
the worse the professional relationship between advocate and clerk. The exam¬
ples of clerks playing golf with their advocates, dining or drinking with them
are many, and such stories as are given may be told from the point of view of
favour or disfavour. It seems that they have historical precedent and may
not be so much of an innovation as the Faculty imagines. In James Boswell's
diary of Thursday, 30th June 1775) he gives a list of his guests at dinner.
•Captain & Mrs Schaw and their daughter, Dr. Grant, Colonel Webster, Miss Web¬
ster, Fairlie, Matthew Dickie and Mr George Haldane dined with us*. Of this
list the last named is an advocate and Matthew Dickie is Boswell's clerk.
The pattern of familiarity between the two groups has not necessarily changed.
The clerks have frequently achieved and been accorded high status in the
general community. Twenty-five years ago an elderly Clerk was Chairman of the
Conservative Club in Princes Street and was given some deferential treatment by
6. Boswell for the Defence 1769-1774* Ed. William K. Wimsatt, Jr. and Freder¬
ick A. Pottle.
many members of the Bar, of which his son became a member.
The writer was informed, by several advocates that at the end of the Se¬
cond World War an 'All Spheres Club' was initiated to bring together for
social purposes advocates, solicitors and clerks. This was at the time the
subject of much criticism and comment: no such organisation had hitherto ex¬
isted. The originators and supporters of the club approved and commended it
on general social grounds. The gist of their comment was that all those
groups had fought a war together and in comradeship which should not be allow¬
ed to lapse. They suggested too that those opposing the venture were moti¬
vated by old-fashioned 'snobbish' considerations and should have learnt better.
The opposition to the Club based its case on professional rather than general
considerations. It pointed out that there could be a fear that some advo¬
cates might make use of it for their professional advancement, and asserted
generally that it was 'not right'. Though they could not always say why
they were against the club, most of them denied all suggestion that they were
being snobbish. They were afraid of role conflict though none of them so ex¬
pressed the matter.
This account of the 'All Spheres Club' is entirely inaccurate and is inter¬
polated to show that even intensive field work within a small group may lead to
gross misinformation, and therefore to the construction of theory which is not
borne out by the true facts.
There is in existence and in a flourishing condition an 'All Spheres Club'
which was founded about 27 years ago by a very small group of young men aged
about eighteen to twenty years, all of them engaged as assistants in one capa¬
city or another in the Parliament House. They were described by one of their
original number as 'just young lads wanting to join a club together with no
purpose but to meet and enjoy themselves*. One of the number decided to go to
the Bar, though this had not been his original intention, some became solicitors,
one an advocate's clerk, one a Clerk of Court, and so on. It has never been a
large Club, its numbers are limited, and one unwritten rule is that only a small
proportion of advocates should be members. Its object is to help and provide
a social club for all the young men who have their work in the parliament House.
The original member who went to the Bar became a Queen* s Counsel and eventually
took his place on the Bench. He then resigned from the Club but he 'keeps up
associations with it*. Its members comprise a group of men ranging from soli¬
citors* assistants to senior members of the Bar. 'We have not a member of
the House of Lords yet but that may come too'. This comment shows the pride
in the group expressed by the informant. He and some others have also ex¬
pressed the opinion that the Club has helped many young men at the outset of
their careers in their relationship with others at work„
It has been said by all informants from this club that no member would or
could take advantage of the membership for professional advancement. That
those outside the group should imagine this to be possible is met with scorn.
The group prides itself on its awareness of the problem and of its solution of
it. The solution given is that such unprofessional behaviour could not occur
because the rest of the group would observe it, remark on it, disapprove of it
and so its recurrence would be unlikely0 If any member were to persist in be¬
haviour contrary to the accepted norms of the group the sanction would be os¬
tracism or possibly expulsion.
*We do not like people talking shop'. 'It would certainly be noticed if
anyone were "touting" for work'. 'Solicitors and clerks are not fools you
f_ know; they'd soon notice people "sucking up" to them just for what they could
get out of it'. Such and similar remarks have been made by informants in
this group when they were asked to suggest any point at which the system might
allow corruption. They feel that the activities of the group and the ^roles of
the members are kept separate from their other activities and roles. The in¬
formation gained from outsiders has been largely inaccurate, and has tended to
take the form, as happened in the gossip about naming customs, of anecdotes cri¬
ticising persons rather than criticising the institution itself.
There are in Parliament House, as in all communities, persons who are be¬
lieved to be norm-breakers. These sometimes persist in such behaviour and the
sanctions against them are mainly gossip and ridicule. Further persistence
would lead to ostracism and rarely if ever occurs. Men living together have
to obey certain rules if their common activities and interactions are to meet
with any success. These rules or norms governing the relationship between ad¬
vocates and clerks are known to all and there is stated to be an almost com¬
plete conformity to them0 Homans' remark^ 'the larger the number of members
that conform to a norm, the larger the number that express approval for other
members* is certainly borne out by the evidence of the advocate-clerk inter¬
actions and activities. The difference in status of the advocate and clerk is
considerable, especially in the eyes of the wider community where, although
they are all men of standing, they must describe themselves as 'clerks' a de¬
signation now more lowly than it was in the Middle Ages. However^much of the
descriptive terminology at the Parliament House and in Scots Law is misleading
to the outsider. The Lord Justice Clerk is the second of Her Majesty's judges
in Scotland; the office of Sheriff-Substitute, although the individual no
7» Seorge C. Homans: 'Social Behaviour: : Its Elementary Forms'. Harcourt,
Brace & Wald, at p.129
longer substitutes for anyone, might also seem a lowly status. The in-group
knov/ the exact standing of its members. The clerks enjoy a certain prestige
and often acquire great esteem, not only within their group of four, but among
the advocates and solicitors,.
The social control is complete because of the size of the group and be¬
cause of the visibility of all in their role-relationships. Norm-breaking
can very readily be seen if it should occur, and, with the exception of a few
deviants, who were frequently named by both clerks and advocates, there was
consensus of opinion that fevi of either group even wanted to break the rules.
Some did, but rarely tried more than once. A very small minority would be
expected to break the rules when they though they could do so unobserved. As
this freedom from observation was virtually an impossibility, those very few
persons were seen as deviants and it was frequently said that they either had
conformed or would eventually conform. The relatively informal nature of the
interaction of advocates and clerks at Parliament House and in many informal
activities, their familiarity and friendliness,breed no sort of contempt.
There exist minor criticisms on both sides but a most unusual loyalty exists
between the two sets- of people if any question is raised of any misdemeanours,
with the exceptions already noted of a few deviant individuals. It was im¬
possible to find any rooted belief that there ws,s any fault in the system be¬
yond small day-to-day failures of activities or communications. The uniform
and predictable actions seen in daily behaviour seem, as is stated to be the
case, to continue undisturbed and imperturbable.
The possibility of the existence of role-conflict and role-contamination
arising out of early interviews and information proved, as has been said, to
relate to individuals and not to the institutions themselves. The role of
the advocate can hardly be seen as grayer after an examination of this set of
role-relationships and again the main feature patterning and controlling the
situation is the sraallness of the group and its structural relationship to the
system of which it is a part.
The Advocate and the Solicitor
Both professionally and socially it is with the Edinburgh solicitor rather
than with solicitors in general that the advocate mainly interacts and especi¬
ally with those Edinburgh solicitors who do court work. A large number of
Edinburgh solicitors do no Court ^vork at all. Only solicitors practising in
Edinburgh and Leith have the right to practise in the Parliament House. Those
who practise in any other part of Scotland must appoint an agent in Edinburgh
to act on behalf of their clients in the conduct of a case in the Court of
Session. Thus if the client lives in Edinburgh he goes to his solicitor, who
advises him and, if it is necessary,takes the opinion of counsel, and, again
if it is necessary, instructs counsel to appeal" in court. If the client lives
outside Edinburgh a further link in the chain is necessary. His solicitor may
advise him and take counsel's opinion on his behalf; but if counsel's services
are required in the Court of Session the client has the expense of employing an
Edinburgh solicitor as well as his local one. If the case goes on final appeal
to the House of Lords yet another firm of solicitors will be engaged - a London
firm. (Even an Edinburgh client will have to employ London solicitors for an
appeal to the House of Lords in addition to his Edinburgh solicitors.) So the
client who lives out of Edinburgh may end by paying three firms of solicitors
in the course of one case and, if English counsel are instructed for the House
of Lords, there will be three barriers between him and the counsel who conducts
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the ease. . It should, however, he stressed that professional norms at every
stage operate to restrict rather than promote litigation. Solicitor and ad¬
vocate alike will discourage a client who lias little prospect of success from
beginning or persisting in an action. Frequently they will advise a client
with a good case in law to accept a reasonable compromise settlement. Of
these links in the chain between the advocate and the client it is the Edin¬
burgh solicitor or agent -who is most important in the consideration of the
advocate's role-set. The advocate may know many country solicitors and may
be sent many briefs by those from his own part of the country. In the case
of advocates with connections in Glasgow this is particularly true, since a
great deal of litigation and court work originates in that city. It is fre¬
quently possible to guess an advocate's city or place of origin by noticing
the cases in which he is involved. He will meet these out-of-Edinburgh agents
at consultations and when he attends at cases in the Sheriff Courts in their
areas, and may have kinship ties with them as well as a considerable inter¬
action outside the realm of his work. He may not know them at all. And
his interaction with them at the Parliament House will be negligible.
It is with the solicitors he may meet daily that he is most concerned.
They form the links between him and the country agents and, although he may be
chosen personally by the country agent, in most cases it is the Edinburgh soli¬
citor who chooses counsel. The larger Edinburgh firms normally have a parlia¬
ment House partner (or partners) and a Parliament House clerk. In the smaller
firms the partner himself or one of his qualified staff will attend at the Par¬
liament House when the firm has a case in hand. All these men form one of the
most important elements in the advocate's role-set. Counsel is the specialist,
in status the superior, yet the solicitor is the patron. Conflict might indeed
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arise in such a situation. The structure of the group and of the two parts
of it, it will be suggested, make such conflict unlikely. But first it is
necessary to describe some of the relationships, activities and interactions
of advocates and solicitors.
Because of the nature of the Scottish system of legal education members
of both branches of the profession will have attended classes together at
Scottish universities (usually in terms of the most relevant part of the role-
set Edinburgh University but by no means alwaj's). In such a situation the
men of any generation will make social contacts at the outset of their careers
with law students who may join either side of the profession. Many do not
decide which to join until a late stage in their law degree or indeed until
it is finished. In the Scottish system the choice of career pattern does not
have to be made before professional training begins as it does in England with
barristers and solicitors. Many of these students will also have been at
school together at one of the larger boys' day schools in which the city
abounds. Many will have kinship ties. The social network of the future ad¬
vocates and solicitors is already close. There is little class difference
between them. Most are middle-class, a very few upper-class (there is one son
of a Duke in this year's intake) and a few lower-class. In any of these groups
any individual may choose the advocate's or solicitor's branch of the legal pro¬
fession. To choose the former money must be found but there are scholarships
and grants and a proportion of advocates practising today come from lower-class
families or from middle-class families with very low earnings (for example,
sons of the manse).
The relationships formed at this stage and those already existing continue
between the advocate and the solicitor practising in Edinburgh and in the
Parliament House in daily intercourse of a professional and social kind. Of
course all advocates do not know all solicitors, even those who practise in the
Parliament House, hut all advocates do know some solicitors very well, .many as
acquaintances or instructing agents and most of them at least by name. This
is a small, close-knit group of high social density. The role-diff'erentiation
is by function and is so because the structure of the legal system as it de¬
veloped demanded the differentiation.
It may be interesting to note here one small item of social change which
might suggest a decline in the deference paid by the solicitor to the advocate.
It was formerly the custom in the letters of instruction to counsel to use the
third person. Thus the letter might read; «Messrs. A, B & C present their
compliments to Mr X and beg to inform him that this case is No. 1 of Lord M's
Roll for Proof on Saturday, 7th April 1965» The agents will be obliged by
Counsel attending on behalf of the Pursuer', and so on. Nov; the first person
is more usual as in; 'Dear Sir
Jones v. Brown
On the instructions of our correspondents, Messrs. A, B & C. we enclose
for the favour of your opinion a memorial and other papers as per inventory in
the above matter.
Yours faithfully,'.
The first type of letter is now rarely sent. The informal would appear to be
driving out the formal.
Unlike the advocates the solicitors have no right of audience in the Su¬
preme Courts but they undertake most of the forensic work in the Sheriff Courts,
which have a very wide civil and criminal jurisdiction. Thus many solicitors
have to develop the same skills and perform the same functions as advocates.
This has led recently to pressures that the two branches of the profession
should merge as has been described elsewhere. Solicitors can move easily
across to the profession of advocate (this is not allowed in England) after
they have been purged by the 'idle year' in which they may not work for re¬
muneration a,nd should serve as pupils or 'devils' to advocates. Except for
this apprenticeship their qualifications are usually suitable for membership
of the Faculty,,
The solicitor has other skills not used by the advocate, for example in
conveyancing and land law and other functions in his closer relationship v/ith
clients. Every step of process, in such matters as summonses, defences,
closed records, lists of witnesses and productions, is lodged by the solicitor.
This keeps the advocate's role clean in dealing direct with the Court ana not
with the Clerks of Court. It also means that the advocate's clerical work is
minimal and contributes to the remuneration of the solicitor, who is paid for
each of these steps in any action. The clearest symbol of the advocate's
role, the wig, is not worn by the solicitor and in modern times, at least in
unimportant cases or in the smaller Sheriff Courts, he may not even wear a
gown. As a rule, all but the older and/or grander members of the profession
dress more like businessmen than like advocates, though in some Sheriff Courts,
where a case is being heard before a jury, there is a practice for solicitors
appearing to wear wing collars and white bow ties. Some few solicitors become
sheriffs-substitute and by the Acts of Union a Writer to the Signet could be¬
come a Judge of the Court of Session but in fact none has done so. Because
they have no right to plead or to be heard in the Supreme Courts they cannot
become law officers of the Crown. In 1924- the Labour Government had no mem¬
bers of Faculty in Parliament and wanted to appoint a solicitor as Lord Advo¬
cate. This was seen to be impossible. There was further discussion of this
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matter in the House of Commons in 1962 when the Conservative Government was in
the same position. Again it v/as found to be impossible. The functions of
the two branches do overlap but are different in many particulars, and.the ar¬
guments for and against a merger are many and diverse. A social anthropolo¬
gist would perhaps find more reason for retaining the present division than
would meet with the approval of most solicitors.
In fact the solicitor is further removed today from the advocate image
than he was thirty or forty years ago. He may be nearer to his original role.
He started as a 'man of business' or 'doer' and once again, even in the out¬
ward symbol, his dress, is becoming more like one. When he is engaged in
commercial matters he may be a specialist in the business world where the ad¬
vocate might be described as the general practitioner. This type of solicitor
tends to avoid litigation as much as possible. Perhaps if he were entitled to
conduct and benefit from the litigation the community would be the loser.
The solicitor is the intermediary between the client and the advocate,
9
though he does not fit into Goffman's categories of the 'go-between'. It is
easier to see the clerk in this way than the solicitor. One clerk informed
the writer that a distinguished Judge had described him as an entrepreneur.
The client goes first to his solicitor if he has a legal problem and the soli¬
citor advises him. The advice may be that Counsel's opinion must be taken.
This is done and Counsel may advise court action. The solicitor interviews
his client in the light of Counsel's opinion and interviews the witnesses.
In more important cases there will often be a consultation with the advocate
which will be at his place and time of choosing, usually arranged through his
clerk, to which the solicitor's will bring the client. Otherwise the advocate
9. Erving Goffman, 'The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life,'pp. 1A9-151
may see his client only briefly before the Court appearance. At the end of
the case the solicitor is often left to deal with a disappointed litigant;
only if the case is successful will the advocate sometimes be at hand to re¬
ceive thanks and congratulations•
Some aspects of the consultation are described elsewhere, and need not be
repeated here. One interesting point of etiquette and symbolic behaviour may
be noted. A senior member of faculty told it in the following words. 'I
always shake hands with the agent and the country agent when I show them out.
Counsel never shake hands' (soil, with each other). He added at the end of
the interview as the writer made to take leave with a handshake 'Counsel never
shake hands - nor do counsel's wives with counsel'. The apparent deference
towards the patron is in fact a sign that he is not in the in-group, cannot
share its customs and must be shown more overt courtesy. The factor of social
distinction is here evident in a rather unusual example. The naming customs
in such a situation also show social distance. The solicitors will be called
•Mr' or by any other title they may have, as will the client. Except when
acting their roles in the presence of those outside the group advocates (Senior
and Junior counsel) will use.last names only to each other as is the custom at
all times,except when first names are used in circumstances of less formality.
Junior advocates in all situations would show much more deference to older
solicitors than they would be expected to show to the older or even elderly
members of the Bar. On looking at the behaviour patterns without a knowledge
of their structural significance it would be easy to suppose that deference
was being paid to the patron as patron, in return for work received or in the
hope of work to come. In fact the opposite is true - deference is paid to an
inferior, one not admitted to the rank and therefore to the symbols of the more
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exclusive group. Advocate and solicitor may interact outside the Parliament
House on terms of friendship or intimacy arising out of factors which have no¬
thing to do with their professional roles. Their relationship may well go
hack to school or student days, and both branches of the profession, as has been
noted, attend the same University lav/ classes. Membership of the same social
ox1 golf clubs in or near Edinburgh also decreases social distance. When, how¬
ever, there has been no apparent spontaneous reason for close association, such
as long standing friendship or living in the same social milieu, an advocate
who seems to take the initiative in cultivating the acquaintance of solicitors
may incur the Faculty's disapproval. An advocate who is seen frequently play¬
ing golf, drinking or dining with solicitors who can influence his career may
be the subject of gossip. This is realised by the Bar whose consequent re¬
action not infrequently creates social distance between its members and those
of the solicitor's profession. As a counterpart, solicitors who do not have
close acquaintances at the Bar will observe that advocates 'don't mix' or that
they are * snobbish' or 'stand-offish'. It is in fact the fear of gossip or
disapproval of their brother advocates, anxiety lest they break one of the
strictest professional taboos, which may cause a member of Faculty to behave
in a somewhat formal and distant manner to those who are in a position to in¬
struct him.
In the wider community the solicitor may sometimes rank higher than the
advocate in terms of birth, wealth, and long family professional traditions.
There is a large 'Establishment' group of solicitors in Edinburgh, more than
elsewhere in Scotland, though in most cities or districts they can be found.
These and the upper group at the Bar interact more with each other on the whole
than either group does with other groups in their own branch of the profession.
The Society of Writers to the Signet is the most distinguished and oldest society
of Solicitors in Scotland and members of it are part of the College of Justice.
This is symbolised by the fact that in the Lord Lyon's list on protocol.this
Society takes precedence over the Lav; Society of Scotland. The writer has been
told more than once that 'manyof those in the W.S. society are a lot more "snob"
than the Bar*. The group indicated by this kind of remark are frequently of
old Edinburgh legal elites, often having ancestors who were judges or advocates
and having sons who may join either side of the profession. They can hardly
be described as typical of solicitors as a whole.
The patronage of the solicitor towards the advocate has been noted. The
law agent has in his gift all the cases the advocate craves. On the whole the
eventual success of the advocate at top level comes with ability and hard work.
There are, however, many factors involved at the outset of the advocate's ca¬
reer - luck, chance, kinship, or social connections with a solicitor or his
family, place of origin and the capacity to make good in the first cases he is
given. The solicitor and clerk form a close but informal association in the
matter of briefing counsel. The solicitor is aware that the clerk.knows near¬
ly as much about the abilities and qualities of counsel as he does himself, and
the clerk's advice and suggestions are usually welcomed and invited. Solici¬
tors may even choose their 'own' clerk in the sense that they want to keep their
work in his 'family', and when a chosen counsel is engaged elsewhere will demand
that, rather than go to another clerk's list,the clerk find them out from his
own0
There is no doubt that influence with one or more solicitors plays some
part in the advocate's success. But in what sphere of life does it not?
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Michael Banton writes; 'British policemen continually allege, "It is not
what you know hut who you know"... If people believe that promotion does not
necessarily reflect merit then it is no disgrace to fail's, "There's many
* 11
good men still walking the beat", policemen say. Melville Dalton has noted
the same statements in relation to business and industry, and suggests that
•pull' is even more important in the professions. Advocates in their own
way say much the same thing. Influence, however, is not enough without some
other factors. If even the most influential counsel fails to make a reason¬
able showing on important cases his influence will wane. The solicitor has a
duty to his client and cannot take the risk of losing the client's case. The
observation and condemnation of the clerks and other frequenters of the Parlia¬
ment House would also have great control over the solicitor were he to perse¬
vere in the briefing of incompetent counsel. The fact that a great deal of
the work, especially at the outset of a career at the Bar, can be done by any
advocate who is properly trained and hard working does, however, mean that
some men, no more able than their peers, have very large practices when others
have little work.
The solicitor tends to employ the 'devils' of counsel he has always em¬
ployed. Thus a 'devil* if he is clever will choose as his master a man who
is about to 'take silk' in the. hope that his master's junior practice will at
least in part come to him. This is a common way of achieving early success
and might be given in 'Advice to a Young Advocate' .
Bearing in mind that, as in any system, preferment can be affected by in¬
fluence as by chance or luck, there is no evidence to suppose that there is
any corruption in the solicitor's v/ielding of his patronage. His professional
10. The policeman in the Community, p.165.
11. Melville Dalton. Informal factors in Career Achievement, p.407.
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ethic, his duty to his client and the social control exercised by the role-set
in the Parliament House, make such a possibility unlikely. The last factor
must once again be stressed, that the size and closeness of the group is pro¬
bably the greatest factor in preventing role-conflict arising or role-contami¬
nation occurring.
The description of the activities in the -wider world which bring even more
closely together this small community within a community applies in much the
same way to the solicitor as to the clerk although the status of the solicitor
is higher and, as there are very many more solicitors than clerks, it is more
difficult to see them all as acting to the same pattern. They interact soci¬
ally with advocates and clerks, marry with their families, entertain and are
entertained by them, play golf or other games with them, belong to the same
clubs, for example, some to the All Spheres Club but many more to the New Club,
the Arts Club and the United Services Club. It is interesting to note in this
context that, whereas certain members of the Bar objected hotly to the All
Spheres Club as being a possible contaminating factor by providing a meeting
ground for advocates with solicitors, many of these same advocates see nothing
at all amiss in belonging to the New Club, the most upper-class of the Edinburgh
clubs, whose membership includes large numbers of advocates and solicitors. In
many cases their families have been members for generations, and it is assumed
that anyone joining is not doing so in order to meet and influence solicitors.
It would quickly be seen and remarked on as 'bad form', were professional con¬
siderations uppermost in the behaviour of a member. Upper-class behaviour
prohibits this kind of ' touting for work*, even if professional behaviour should
¥/eaken. It may be that the critics of the All Spheres Club were afraid that it
had not had enough time to establish such traditions and that contamination might
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therefore set in; it may be that motives of class and snobbery did in fact in¬
form some of the criticism. As it is the writer cannot suggest that either
institution does contaminate the advocates' role, nor would nor could be likely
to do S0o
The solicitor's own professional ethic, plus the solidarity and high social
density of the group yet again leads to the conclusion that, with the same ex¬
ceptions of known deviant behaviour the advocate* s role in relation to his pro¬
fessional colleagues, the solicitor, is so structured that their interaction in
their separate roles lacks any real conflict and rarely leads to any kind of
contamination.
Merton points out in the paper quoted at the beginning of this chapter
that the greatest potential for role-conflict is that the members of the role
12
set tend to be 'diversely located in the social structure, they are apt to
have interests and sentiments, values and moral expectations differing from
those of the status-occupant himself.' It seems to emerge from the study that
this is not true of the clerk and solicitor aspects of the advocate's role-set.
They are not 'diversely located in the social structure.' There are kinship
ties relating them across the barriers of differing statuses; advocates' and
,
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solicitors' families frequently intermarry; one advocate at least has married
a clerk's daughter, and one clerk's son is himself an advocate. Their social j
ties and social networks in the ?d.der community frequently overlap and they i
appear not to have 'interests and sentiments, values and moral expectations
differing from each other.' Thus structurally little role-conflict would be
expected and in fact little or none has been found. The high social density
12. Robert K. Merton,' The Role-Set: 'problems in Sociological Theory'
(1957) 8 Brit. Journal of Sociology 112.
of the whole group - and judges may be included because, although their rela¬
tionship has not been fully described, it must be remembered that every one of
them proceeded from the Bar to the Bench and their role-set and social network
is therefore similar to that of the advocate - ensures great social solidarity
and little chance of role-conflict and the high visibility among all the mem¬
bers of the group further ensures its role-cleanliness.
In his relations with the client outside the parliament House the advo¬
cate* s role is so structured as successfully to prohibit any possibility of
conflict or of contamination0 Counsel must be approached through the media¬
tion of a solicitor. The client has, or should have, no direct relationship
with the advocate in person, in writing, or by telephone but must employ a
solicitor as intermediary. The advocate is in full charge of the case while
he is retained and cannot be obliged to follow his client's wishes in respect
of the case if they conflict with his own. He can, for example, refuse to
call his client as a witness in his own interest or in his own defence, he can
refuse a client's wish to attack a witness, and most important he must refuse
to falsify what he knows to be true. His fees are paid by the solicitor and
not directly by the client himself, and he is the sole judge of his conduct
unless it transgresses the rules of his profession or of the court.
There is an interesting anecdote of a now deceased Dean of Faculty who
when he was conducting a consultation in his own house had an opinionated and
recalcitrant client. This man voiced an opinion contrary to that of counsel.
This was ignored and the client was asked to keep quiet. He shortly after¬
wards ventured a further opinion, whereupon learned counsel rang a bell for
attention and ordered his servant to show the client out of the house. This
was a perfectly proper, though unusually overbearing action.
Such behaviour as contravenes the norms of this advocate-client relation¬
ship is usually of the deviant sort and does not often occur. It has been
13noted above that T.H. Marshall sees the actor type of barrister as a deviant
and the least professional of lavjyers. This kind of advocate, as has been
noted elsewhere, is rare in Scotland and not regarded with the highest esteem.
Another form of deviance which has been observed, and is the subject of comm¬
ent, but is also rare, is the over-identification of the advocate with the
client in the conduct of his case. This could lead the advocate to forget
his duty to the court and to his profession and is strongly condemned. It
loses the offending counsel the esteem of his peers in the first place because
it goes against all their training and socialisation. (American lawyers are
astonished by the restraint with which Scottish advocates present their cases).
In the second place it offends because it could be seen to be attempt to corrupt
the legal system itself; and finally it is a fault because if advocates were
to persevere in such behaviour the group as a whole would lose prestige and
would be seen to fail in its duty. This form of deviation can be seen as an
aspect of undertraining. A most amusing account of another form of under-
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training is given by Henry Cecil in his book 'Sober as a Judge*.' 'Mr Meldon
had only recently been called to the Bar but he was a little over thirty. It
very soon became apparent that, before being a barrister, he had been a high
pressure salesman.
•My Lord' , he opened, 'This is a claim which will cause your Lordship
no difficulty at all. Of that I can assure your Lordship. I have
two witnesses who will only have to be seen to be believed. They
are both persons of the strictest integrity and their memories are
Sociology at the Cross Roads, p. 158
14. p.159 et seq.
extremely good0 Your Lordship will be able to rely with confidence
on every word they say' „
The judge eventually recalls him to the case - 'Your duty and your.only
right..., is to make submissions to the Court. You are not allowed to give
me the benefit of your own opinion, however valuable'. Counsel proceeds to
state facts about his clients of a flattering and irrelevant kind rather than
to lead evidence and when he is again recalled to the presentation of the case
expostulates, 'then the pep talk comes later?'
Such minor instances serve to give point to the claim that the norms of
the advocate client relationship are almost always observed. The whole social
structure would be impaired were they not. The possibility of conflict and
contamination is remote. The solicitor and clerk as intermediaries demons¬
trate the advocate's segregation from one form of possible corruption; his
status as an officer of the court and- his status within the system of law he
helps to administer; his status as a member of his profession, all ensure that
he will play a role of a suitable kind towards his client. The system is
structured in a way that makes role-breaking difficult and ensures the visi¬
bility of role-breaking on the rare occasions when it does occur.
The system itself, its structure and its symbols are known and seen by
the role-set. The roles are so clearly defined and have been so for such a
long period of time that the individuals who play them do not need to feel con¬
cerned about their prestige and self-esteem. Distance does not have to be ob¬
served because it is structurally clear and objectified in many symbols. Per¬
sonal relations are more important than, for example, considerations of class.
The social density is high because relations are based on conventional under¬
standing and clearly symbolised. This group, whose well-defined structure
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has developed and existed for so long, is a particularly good, if not an unique
example in an industrial society of a system structured in such a way that role-




An attempt will now be made to list and analyse some of the devices by
which the role of the advocate is sustained and kept from contamination, the
devices which uphold the ideal image of his professional role and help him to
follow the norms laid down in the ethic of his profession. The possibility
of there being weak spots in this system and the points at which the ideal
might be less than fulfilled will also be examined.
The separation of function in the advocate's role-set is the primary de¬
vice which preserves his role from contamination though, paradoxically, the
solicitor and clerk may have .the same or some of the same skills and the same
education, the advocate's function is separate and distinct. An advocate may
not do a solicitor's work just as a solicitor has no right to plead in the
highest courts. This separation of functions and the resulting prestige
accruing to the advocate is reflected in the convention that the advocate con¬
sults in his own home, or at a time of his choosing in the Parliament House
and does not go to the solicitor's office at the solicitor's bidding. The
implication of deferential treatment in this is obvious. It also seems to
bear out another finding of anthropologists from studies of simpler societies.
It has been noticed that in determining roles, in watching their fulfillment
within the social structure, the actual rights and duties of persons can be
observed as following a certain pattern of superordination or subordination.
If a simple, patrilineal society such as the Tallensi is taken, it can be
seen that the material duties of the father (the superior) are greater and
the conventional duties of the son (the inferior) are greater. The deference
paid by the inferior to the superior can be seen to be partly based on material
benefits given by the superior. In the case of the advocate's consultations,
he is conferring the material benefit of providing the place of meeting, thus
in one of many ways showing his superiority and his expectation of deference.
Among the most important devices for role-preservation is certainly pro¬
fessional training, both in technical matters and in more general 'socialisa¬
tion' . The professional training of the advocate has already been described
in general terms and here it is only necessary to relate a few of the factors
to the general theory of the present chapter. In its broadest sense the ad¬
vocate' s training goes far beyond the testing of technical and professional
competence. The first stage of his training is (practically invariably) at
a University where he takes a degree in Arts and Law. Pressure from the
solicitor's branch of the profession in particular has made it possible to
qualify as a solicitor without any knowledge of Latin; but it is still vir¬
tually impossible for an advocate to be admitted without some grasp of the
rudiments of Latin and he must also offer proof of general scholarship as well
as of law at University level. Though some solicitors acquire an equally
broad education, the majority do not, and therefore the advocate at an early
stage is distinguished from most other lawyers.
Though there are no professional law schools outside the Universities,
the influence of the legal professional is apparent in the Law faculties.
Though the Oxbridge and London law teacher in Scotland may dress like his
colleagues in Arts or Social Sciences, those teachers who are advocates tend
to dress formally in dark suit and stiff collar when they meet their classes.
The author has been told by some that this practice is deliberately folloxved
to instil a professional image. Perhaps significantly Scottish Law Faculties
do not offer courses in professional ethics, though from time to time a law
teacher- may comment (often from his experience) upon conduct which he would re¬
gard as dishonourable. One Scottish advocate-teacher was surprised that the
Dean of a distinguished American Lav/ School should have welcomed the new 'in¬
take* with a speech which warned then against mingling clients' money with
their ovm. Considerable use is made, in Edinburgh University particularly,
of young advocates as part-time law tutors. These tend to be employed by
•advocate-professors' to help the young advocates in the lean years, and the
out-of-court 'uniform' of these young men clearly identifies them as a separ¬
ate group. There is a certain resentment against this among some sections of
the University teaching staff, mainly because they are so obviously 'advocates'
first and 'teachers' second, and in large measure it tends to keep to itself
in the Staff Club. The sociological reasons for this are clear. The advo¬
cate is a member of a close professional association of high social standing
in which the main part of his career will be made. He looks upon Ms univer¬
sity tutoring as an unimportant part of his professional life and must there¬
fore seem like a rather over-favoured interloper to those who have chosen to
make their entire professional career in the University.
After training in the law as such the next phase of a young advocate's
training is as a 'devil* when he will learn professional skills mostly of a
practical kind. He will have an intimate association with his 'devil-master'
in all the latter's professional work and this aspect of Ms training is higMy
important in inculcating a standard of behaviour covering both ethics and eti¬
quette. Much will be learnt by observation, much by imitation and a good deal
through discussion of problems in private conversation. Unlike the apprentice
solicitor or apprentice chartered accountant, the young advocate's association
with his master tends to cover the whole working day. Naturally, therefore,
he is much more likely to model himself on his 'master', especially as the
mutual selection of 'master' and 'devil' is essentially voluntary, and in the
first place is largely determined by an admiration of the younger for -the ol¬
der man,
Oswald Hall, discussing 'The Informal Organisation of the Medical Pro¬
fession', concludes that the established members of a profession set up an or¬
ganisation and 'will develop an orderly manner of incorporating new members
into their community, of repelling the un?;anted or the intruder... .To call
such an organisation "informal" implies that it' does not originate by estab¬
lishing a constitution....It is an assumption....that the working constitution
of any established profession is something that has to be discovered. More-
1
over, it is likely to deviate considerably from the formal constitution.'
So far as the Faculty of Advocates is concerned, there is no doubt that an
informal organisation has not only developed but is of the greatest importance
in preserving status and propagating an ideal image. Nevertheless once a man
has been accepted as 'devil', though not yet a full member of the profession,
he has a certain status within it and is subject to some of its ethical rules -
as, for example, confidentially regarding his master's papers and consultations.
It may be remarked that neither client nor instructing solicitor has any say in
the 'devil's' participation in their affairs. No case is known in which a
'devil' has abused his position, nor of the Faculty excluding a person after
he had acted as 'devil'. In theory no doubt a 'devil' (if, as is usually the
case, not yet fully admitted to the Faculty while devilling) could be black¬
balled at the Public Examination. No case has been cited to show that this
has ever happened.
1. Oswald Hall, p.32.
At the stage of 'devilling1 the process of socialisation will he most
2
pronounced. G-oode has observed that 'as a consequence of the rewards given
by the larger society, the community of profession can also demand higher ta¬
lent in its recruits and require that they go through a considerable adult
socialisation process.* Again,^ he says, 'socialisation and social control
are made important by the peculiarly exploitative opportunities the professions
enjoy.' In the case of the Faculty of Advocate the compulsory adult sociali¬
sation process is restricted to the quite short period of devilling, but so¬
cialisation - and therefore informal control - continues long thereafter, day
in, day out and for many years in close association and conversation with his
brethren. The constant interaction with the others in his role-set in the
advocate's daily life in the Parliament House contributes too to his process
of socialisation.
Even after an advocate has been in practice for a good number of years,
he may be confronted with a delicate problem regarding which the professional
norm is not clear to him. He will therefore probably discuss it with inti¬
mate and experienced friends, however large or small its apparent importance.
One informant, who had been .over fifteen years in practice, found himself in
a situation in-which he considered that his professional position was embarra-
sing in relation to the Dean of Faculty. He turned for advice in this very
unusual situation to the Vice-Dean, who was able to recall a comparable inci¬
dent which had occurred some thirty years before. The advice was given, re¬
ceived and acted on in complete confidence. Again, an advocate who had also
been admitted to the English Bar was anxious to conform on admission to Faculty
2. William J. Goode, Op.cit. p.196
3. ibid.
etiquette regarding dress. In the English Courts, including the House of
Lords, he had worn a gown similar to an advocate's, except that it had a purse
and streamer which in Scotland are only worn by an advocate who lias appeared
in a House of Lords Appeal. This barrister-advocate invited and accepted a
ruling that until he had 'won his spurs' (soil, the pux-se) in a Scottish appeal
to the Lords he should not wear it in the Parliament House. The equality of
all and the small rites de passage by which added experience or esteem are
noted are clearly signified yet again.
Role symbols such as costume and naming can be clearly seen as devices
for preserving and demonstrating the status of the person. The advocate's
distinctive garb in court, described above, and utterly unlike the ordinary
dressing in the 1960's, sets him apart in his work role from the rest of the
community. To the layman, this distinctive costume is immediately recognis¬
able so that even he, in all the strangeness and, no doubt, awe of a court of
law can tell his advocate from his solicitor. To the layman, also, much of
the awe inspired by the courts of law is induced by the setting apart of Judges,
Counsel, and Officers of the Court by their odd and unusual dressing customs.
Thus one function of these customs can be seen to be the inducement of a con¬
siderable respect for the law itself. But another function can be seen as
inducing respect for lawyers, or that branch of the profession which has the
sole right to plead in the highest courts. A solicitor pleading in a lower
court should, according to tradition, wear a gown over dark clothes, but in
practise in many smaller courts and in unimportant cases he nowadays frequently
does not wear the gown. That prestige, esteem and deference are all related
to this setting apart of the advocate, especially in the mind of the layman,
can be easily observed and checked by the enquirer in the field. Most clients
appearing in court questioned by the writer had little if any knowledge of the
actual structure of the legal profession. All, though not knowing the differ¬
ence between their 'lawyer' (solicitor) and their 'counsel' (advocate), felt
the latter to be of higher status and of more significance in the conduct of
their case. Questioned further, clients talked of the dress as being very
significant in giving importance to the advocate's role, besides suggesting
that they clearly saw him as the 'expert' brought in at the end to do the real
work of the problem - solving,,
Within the legal profession itself and its role-set these matters are seen
rather differently. The comparative lack of social distance between indivi¬
duals makes the actual award of prestige and esteem rather more accurate/1"
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the advocate's distinctive dress, and the
fact that it is both a sign and a mandate for his special position within the
profession, contributes to giving him a higher status and more deference than
he would otherwise have.
An aspect of social behaviour which always gives an indication of the role
relationship is the naming system in the group. The advocate as has been des-
h
cribed follows rigidly the custom that all professional colleagues are osten¬
sibly equal and this is reflected in the way he names his brethren. The wri¬
ter found in the telephone directory of 1964 only one advocate who designated
himself 'Q.C.' All others followed the custom of calling themselves, 'A.B. -
Advocate'. Professional associations commonly have a minimum of ranking and
the assumption is made that, having qualified professionally, all members are
equal. This equality is reduced by the greater skills and success of some
4« The distinction between these first came to the author's attention in the
Ph.D. thesis, later published as Westrigg: The Sociology of a Cheviot
Parish of Dr. James Littlejohn, who attributes the differentiation to K.
Davis, 'Conceptual Analysis of Stratification', Amer. Sociol. Hev., 7
1942, pp. 309-21o
5« See p.^3 supra.
members who acquire greater esteem than others but the prestige of all is
assumed to be equal in the eyes of the outsider. As has been described the
Scottish Bar since 1897 has followed the English practise of accepting, that
the status Q.C. may be given to senior members. Though this would seem to
introduce inequality it in fact does so more in the eyes of the layman than
in the group itself which is well aware that the taking of silk in Scotland
g
depends more on length and adequacy of service than on outstanding success.
Thus social solidarity in the professional group is maintained and is seen to
be of the greatest importance. The outsider at least must be made to believe
that all members of the profession have the same status and prestige. The
greater the social distance of the outsider from the group, the more this will
seem to be so. It is interesting to note in this context the growing custom
in the Scottish press of describing all counsel as 'Q.C.' This may be be¬
cause the journalist is aware of the ignorance in the public of the meaning of
the word 'advocate' and may be a shortcut for him in distinguishing that par¬
ticular type of 'lawyer' from the others. It may be a reflection of the re¬
cent public taste for detective fiction and television accounts of great Coun-
selo In according to all advocates the designation 'Q.C.', the press might
be seen to be reflecting a public image of the high status accorded to the
person pleading for a client in a court of lav/. The profession's own lack
of advertising is complete. But as long as society in general sees, as it
seems to do, the advocate's role as dramatic, expert, critical, he will command
considerable space in the newspapers without having to buy it. As Adrian
Taylor has said"'7 'neither the aims nor the mechanisms of Justice are simple.
6. See also pp.jgO-l.
7. Paper read in Anthropology Seminar. Edinburgh, December 196l+»
The popularity for writers and film makers of the Courts of Law.....is due not
only to the ritual but to the ritually played-out drama where value wrestles
with value beneath the values of the lav/ itself.'
Those who interact with the advocate at a very close range will see the
situation in a different way. The judge, the solicitor, the clerk, the mem¬
bers of the community at no social distance from him will have a fairly clear
view of the actual esteem in which he is held, what his skills are, how great
the volume of work he is briefed to do, the measure of his success both in the
cases he conducts and in the income he receives from them. This is true of
all professions. It is also true that the professional image is deliberately
one of equality, between colleagues and the bureaucratic, hierarchial, ranking
system is seen to be excluded through such devices as similarity of dress and
equality in naming.
The advocate is in manj/ aspects of his working life physically segregated
from the rest of his role-set0 This, by establishing an avoidance system,
helps to sustain his role. He changes from street clothes to his working
clothes in a Robing Room into which only advocates or their servants may enter.
His places of working, the Law Room and The Corridor are reserved for advocates
alone, as is the Reading Room where more general literature, newspapers,.and
learned journals may be read or consulted. The books in this room are supplied
from the Rational Library of Scotland next door„ The reason for this privilege
is that the National Library was originally the Advocates' Library, having been
established by a former Dean, Sir deorge Mackenzie of Rosehaugh, who was also
King's Advocate in the reign of Charles II. It was given to the nation by
the Faculty in 1926. Anyone who was a member of Faculty at that date still
has the right, enjoyed by all members of Faculty then, of borrowing books from
the library; those called to the Bar after the transfer have no borrowing
rightsj but only the same reading rights as the general public. The Faculty
still has the right to have their Reading Room stocked with new novels, bio¬
graphies and general literature from the National Library. Many advocates*
wives comment on the fact of their husbands being so up-to-date in their gener¬
al reading, with certain wry remarks as to, the amount of 'work* that is done
in the parliament House. But more important, it must be noticed that this is
a privilege reserved for the Faculty alone and from the Reading Room other fre¬
quenters of the parliament House are excluded.
In the matter of commensality the Faculty is significantly segregated from
all the other users of the Parliament House. The Judges eat together and
separately from everyone else, as well as having their own Robing Rooms. The
Advocates have a separate Coffee Room and Lunch Room. Solicitors and Clerks,
if they take coffee or lunch in the Parliament House, eat in the Public Res¬
taurant. So yet another symbol of the separation of the advocate's role from
that of others with whom he works can be seen.
A further example of his physical separation from this nearest colleague,
the solicitor, can be seen in his position in Court where he sits immediately
behind the Bar and in front of the solicitor. This would clearly appear to
symbolise his superior status as a factor in itself and would certainly suggest
to a layman some superiority in his rank.
The advocate is a member of the College of Justice and an Officer of the
Court so he has a triple duty; to the court, to his client and to his profession.
He cannot or does not sue for his fees ana he cannot be sued for professional,
negligence.6 He can be disciplined by the Dean and the Dean's Committee who
8. See pp, l03-£d Very recently there have been doubts raised regax-ding coun¬
sel's immunity from action in respect of professional negligence.
are the custodians of the rules of professional behaviour. This possibility
of formal censure is, for the advocate, less likely and less important than
the informal censure he may meet from his fellow advocates if he transgres-ses
in a,ny way the mores of his calling. The strength of this pressure and the
relevance of these sanctions as one of many ways of preventing role-contamina¬
tion is due in a large part to the smallness of the group and to its structured
relationships. It has been explained that the difficulty of entering the
group could be seen to be financial rather than intellectual, and in fact the
number of advocates practising at the Bar has remained fairly constant in the
present century. Whether by design of the Faculty or because no larger num¬
ber would make an adequate living or because no larger number of individuals
in the community is likely to be able to afford the hazardous and, in its
initiation, expensive burden of an advocate's early life is difficult to de¬
termine. The fact is that the group is small, of its nature homogeneous and
the result of these factors is one that the social anthropologist could pre¬
dict; informal sanctions are strong; norms are clear and known to all; ig¬
noring or breaking these norms is visited by the censure of the group. Sanc¬
tions may be in terms of joking, gossip, avoidance. They have rarely been in
terms of formal expulsion.
The disciplinary powers of the recognised tribunals of most professional
groups are subject to the ultimate control of the judiciary. Thus appeals lie
from the General Medical Counsel to the Privy Council, from the Benchers of the
English Inns of Court to the High Court (sitting as a domestic tribunal) and
solicitors in Scotland are struck off the roll by the Court of Session after
investigation by the disciplinary Committee of the Law Society. It seems
clear that the Court of Session has the right to censure, suspend or deprive
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advocates of their office for unprofessional conduct. These powers have not,
9
however, been used in modern times. There are two reported instances in
10 11
164.9 and 1699 of advocates being deprived for acquiring an interest in the
causes for which they had been employed professionajlly - contrary to the Act
12
of 15^tf . The right to cwnsure, suspend or deprive of the right to appear
before them may also be exercised by inferior courts, subject to the super-
13
vision of the Court of Session. All these cases go back to the Seventeenth
Century and the most recent treatises, such as those of Mackay and McLaren on
Court of Session Practice cite no later examples. In more modern times the
Faculty itself lias censured or struck off the rolls members guilty of grave
1 )
professional misconduct or crime. The last instance cited appears to be
23rd January 1872. It would not seem that an advocate thus deprived has right
of appeal to the Courts. On the other hand the Legal Aid and Solicitors (Scot-
15
land) Act gives a right to an advocate to appeal to the court against hi3 ex¬
clusion by the Facility of .Advocates from the Legal Aid lists for professional
misconduct.
The approval or disapproval of colleagues can be reward or punishment
enough. The esteem gained by blameless professional behaviour can be as great
in many ways as the esteem gained by outstanding skill and is often greater
than that gained by what the wider community sees as.'success*.
There is no written code of professional ethics in the Faculty of Advocates,
9. Mackay, Court of Session Practice 1, 114»
10. Maxwell. A.S. 21 Dec. 1649.
11. Mowat v. Cumming. 2 Fountainhall 6br.
12. Act 15#!j. c.216.
13« Russel v. Commissaries of Edinburgh (1609) M.341 •
14« Mackay ibid.
15. 1949 S. £[2).
but the Dean'and his Council are expected to give guidance in any possible con¬
flict of duty as well as to censure formally any disobedience of the widely
known and accepted rules of professional behaviour. These include, the rule
against advertising in any form, the rule committing every advocate to conduct¬
ing a case he has accepted even although at a later date he may have received
a more lucrative brief. The Dean and his Council perform a very real function
in seeing that the individual advocate and therefore the whole group keep the
unblemished professional image that is their ideal. Nevertheless, it is
suggested that the close attention to this ideal, likewise the lack of evidence
that deviation from it passes unnoticed or often happens, is due to the small-
ness and closeness of the professional community. There is little chance of
' getting away with it' - anyhow more than once - and this above all ensures
that the professional role will be played according to the rules.
The extension of the advocate's small, integrated world, observed and open
to his colleagues, into his home life and wider social network is of great in-
16
teresto As has been described he must have his house, or his chambers in a
certain part of the New Town of Edinburgh. His wife and family constantly
meet other advocates' wives and families, members of the profession, frecjuently
entertain each other in their homes. The writer has found at many Edinburgh
cocktail, dinner or evening parties given by a member of the Bar, that the
great majority of guests have been other advocates and their wives. The men
belong to the same clubs, the New Club, the United Services Club and the Arts
Club being the most popular, and to the same golf clubs such as iluirfield.
There is thus very frequent interaction in the group outside its ?/orking life.
Elisabeth Bott in her London study, Family and Social Network, states that
16. See p.^3
• homogeneous - local areas of a single profession are very rare', and many Ameri¬
can sociologists suggest they do not exist. The Faculty of Advocates in Edin¬
burgh ■il'S certainly a fine example of this rare species. The outsider finds
this small, immobile, integrated society both unusual and unlikely in the modern
Western world. The closeness and intimacy with colleagues which pervades the
advocate's social and home life must be seen as yet another factor leading to
a marked degree of informal social control in the group. An English barrister
may live as he pleases and where he pleases. His colleagues and the solici¬
tors on whom his practice depends may not even know his home address. He has
less need to 'keep up appearances', to be seen to be prosperous, outside the
sphere of his.work. The evidence of penury in the earlier period at the Bar
can easily be hidden from all but chosen intimates. The situation in Edin¬
burgh is very different and the amount of accurate information readily avail¬
able among the group on the standing, wealth, house, education, and behaviour
of any given person is great and clearly makes an important addition to the
knowledge advocates have of each other as colleagues, as well as establishing
bonds of acquaintanceship or friendship in the community.
This extension of group-interaction to the advocate's home or social life
is one of the important features in the establishment of group.- norms outside,
while also contributing to the purely professional normative behaviour» at the
Bar,
This thesis doe3 not attempt to make a close analysis of the advocate's
home or social life, nor to relate his community to the wider community in
which he lives except to note that, even more than in most small groups in
modern society, social and professional equals most frequently eat and drink
together, have parties and play games together. Nevertheless, it must be
noted that constant interaction between groups of colleagues and their wives
clearly contributes greatly to the informal social control exercised within
the professional association itself. As much as in any small community close¬
ly linked in all its activities gossip plays a large part as a mechanism of
control. Many of the wives of advocates are fully ay/are of the professional
as well as of the general, social norms that govern behaviour. The writer has
participated in, and observed in her own and others' drawing-rooms, much sound
and some malicious and witty comment on all aspects of major and minor deviance.
Perhaps it is in this sphere that more open criticism of norm-breaking is voiced.
The writer has observed in a group of advocates that the suggestion by any out¬
sider (even a wife) that any serious deviance takes place, or could take place
more than once, is frowned on at once. That the advocates sometimes go so far
as to criticise one of their colleagues for behaviour which is not according to
the professional ideal is true. This they do almost entirely within the in-
group and such criticism does control the deviant from repetition of his fault.
If he is foolish enough not to be aware of such adverse criticisms he can rare¬
ly be unconscious of the loss of esteem he suffers if he pursues a course v/hich
violates the behavioural code. When outsiders (and in the context of pro¬
fessional conduct being gossiped about socially, wives are the most frequent
outsiders) join in such gossip implying that chicanery within the group is usual
or even frequent the in~group loyalty quickly asserts itself. The criticism
and gossip which is informed and to a greater extent objective tends to come
from those who are in close contact with the Parliament House but are not prac¬
tising advocates, from academic lawyers, leading solicitors and some other pro¬
fessional persons, especially those who interact socially with the advocates
17
group. Some of this criticism is noted and explained elsewhere.
17. See p.2if9 infra.
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In this-chapter the writer may stress again her reason for selecting the
Faculty of Advocates as the special subject for her research. From her read¬
ing of American anthropological and sociological material on the professions
she found an apparent consensus of opinion" that no group such as this did exist
in the Western world - a group immobile, concentrated geographically, ethnically
integrated, demonstrating a high degree of role preservation and few signs of
role conflict or contamination. Time and again she has reflected that, how¬
ever improbable the situation, it does exist. It may be exceptional: it is
probably unique. She has found considerable difficulty in explaining it's na¬
ture convincingly to sociologists who have studied lawyers elsewhere and to the
lawyers themselves in other countries.
The critics of the Faculty of Advocates are frequently to be found in the
nearest professional group to it, and may naturally be motivated to some degree
by jealousy of this highly privileged association. It may be said - and has
frequently been said - that 'the Faculty looks after its own'. There is much
truth in the statement, though this does not necessarily imply discredit.
Judges who have themselves been advocates may help their younger successors by
using them to take evidence o.n commission; professors of law may use their
patronage over part-time teaching jobs in the University; law reporting pro¬
vides other opportunities. The Faculty's patronage .over certain University
teaching appointments has often, though certainly not always, been Tri.sely exer¬
cised. The bad appointments are very well known in legal as in University
circles. The much greater patronage of the Lord Advocate may extend to giving
appointments in the quieter sheriffdoms or appointments on national bodies to
advocates who are falling behind in the struggle at the Bar. Again, it is
often said that 'the Faculty has too many privileges', or that it is 'too
snobbish'. -These accusations are to a certain extent just. Other accusations
especially perhaps from academic lawyers who have not proved themselves to be
successful practitioners, reproach the majority of the Bar as being 'intellec¬
tually torpid' and engaged in work of a pedestrian but well remunerated kind.
There is truth in- thus also. On the other hand, however, these main criticisms
do not challenge the survival and maintenance of a high professional ethic.
The Faculty may be 'old fashioned* but, in discharging its functions, it shows
few signs, if any, of becoming a purely money-making business. Though there
are some variations in remuneration according to the esteem in which certain
leaders are held, on the whole advocates are rewarded according to a tariff of
fixed fees for particular pieces of work. These fees, by comparison with the
rewards of the rest of the community, have not altered substantially in the post
war period. Interchangeability of function is largely preserved by this fee
system, and role-preservation as many have noted is assisted by fixed feeing.
A contrast may, perhaps, be noted with current trends in the United States.
Though there is a tariff for counsel's work in Scotland - and this is the usual
rate paid - the impecunious client has not suffered, formerly because of gratu¬
itous service undertaken by the Bar and now because of legal aid. Y/hen the
writer visited Philadelphia in January 1963? she met and talked with many law¬
yers, both academic and practicing. One in particular was a very prosperous
and respected member of one of the oldest law firms in a city renounced for its
lawyers. This informant R. was strongly opposed to 'the new behaviour' which
he had observed in the legal profession in his own country. He gave many
examples, as did many United States lawyers, of how the whole ethic had changed
and how consequently that 'law has become a business', In particular R. was
opposed to the local Bar Association's rules fixing fees. He believed that
many of these were fixed too high in relation to the work done - presumably to
prevent 1 cut price service' . The really competent lawyer, in R's view, should
be able to deal adequately with routine legal problems in a short time. ' Since
an American lawyer's fees are largely determined by the amount of time spent
actually and notionally on a case, the time factor is very relevant. R. point¬
ed out that he was liable to be accused of unprofessional conduct because in
some cases he prefers to charge at less than the prescribed minimum rate.
Being convinced in his own conscience (despite the Bar Association's views on
professional ethics) he was almost welcoming a challenge to his allegedly un¬
professional conduct. He feared, as did many of his compatriots, that pro¬
fessional ethics were becoming more and more concerned with the execution of
the lawyer's job and less (if at all) with the client's interests. This in¬
formant was a rather conservative conventional man. There was no doubt that
he had a very high ideal image of the lawyer's role in society and a low opinion
of too many American lawyers. He tended to identify his own standards as 'old
fasioned'. In a sense perhaps this is precisely what the standards of the
Faculty of Advocates are. They have been so clearly safeguarded by excellent
role-preserving devices in a setting and community where great control is poss¬
ible.
There are mahy occasions on which the ' old fashioned' or traditional role
of the advocate is reaffirmed in relation to the profession and the community
as a whole. At the opening of the legal year, for example, there is a Kirking
of the College of Justice, who by tradition are allocated special seats in the
High Kirk of St. G-iles. (There is a corresponding Red Mass for Roman Catholics).
Those who attend these services observe strict rules of procedure, the Senators
of the College of Justice, preceded by the macers taking precedence, followed
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by the Faculty of Advocates, preceded by their Officers, in order of seniority
of their patents as Q.C.'s or of admission to the Faculty. Bag wigs are on jrhis
occasion worn by judges and senior counsel. Then comes the W.S. Society (as
an integral part of the College of Justice); thereafter other societies of
solicitors in Scotland. When the High Court of Justiciary goes on circuit
special hospitality is provided by the Town Councils, notably in Aberdeen -
and the very junior advocates who often gain experience on such occasions are
treated as important, if not very important, personalities. These symbolic re-
assertions of the role are encountered on all great state occasions as on coro¬
nations of sovereigns and so on. They perpetuate a public image and create
the opportunity for the whole Faculty to reassert its solidarity and show its
privileged status in the community. The motto of the Faculty's cognizance is
18
taken from Ulpian's famous Ehree principles of Justice, 'Jus suum ouique' (giwe
to each his due). The other two principles are 'Honeste vivere' (live
honourably) and 'Alterum non laedere' (do not harm your neighbour). In this
particular setting the Faculty seems largely to approximate to these standards -
and this fact is seen in their playing their part, not only as professional
lawyers, but as men of high standing in a small community. They have been
relatively only slightly exposed to the influences of great wealth or power
which might have tended to corrupt, while their sense of privilege and tradition
has safeguarded them from jealousy of those who (inside or outside the legal
profession) have enjoyed these other determinants of human conduct. The
Faculty is not an intellectual elitS; it does not minimise the difficulty of
legal techniques, nor, on the whole, pioneer law reform. Preservation of
their mystery tends to preserve the lawyer's role. The proposals for law
reform propounded by Lord Gardiner reputedly include making the law intelligible
18 Dig. 1, 1, 10, 1.
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to the layman. The writer is informed (by lawyers) that this is quite
impossible and herself believes that it would he an exceptionally difficult
task. Nevertheless, the expected wide-ranging scrutiny of law and legal
techniques may not he irrelevant in the context of role-preservatioh.
19
The psychologist Robinson has showed the matter as follows: "The lawyers
are a priesthood with a prestige to maintain, they must have a set of
doctrines that do not threaten to melt away with the advances of psychological
and social science.... they must, in order to feel socially secure, believe and
convince the outside world that they have peculiar techniques requiring long
study to master. In a way they have overplayed this cad-d. Even laymen are
corning to see that if the Law were as difficult to understand as the profession
implies, nobody would ever be able to become a lawyer."
19 E.S.Robinson, Law and Lawyers, p.28.
Chapter 10
CONCLUSION
For the purposes of a social anthropologist the Faculty of Advocates
can protally be regarded as a unique professional group. Its social solidarity
has'only been confirmed - not lessened - by possible threats to its economic
security and established privileges. To a large extent even the cocktail
and dinner parties given by members of Faculty may be seen as reaffirmations
of the group, asserting in effect 'Here we are, a group of people holding the
same values, obeying the same rules, fixed in the same system. Let us
demonstrate our solidarity to one another.' Specialist roles in most groups
have become more specific while basic roles of sex, age and race, which custom
exaggerates to serve the ends of social organisation, become vaguer and less
Important as societies advance. This research has been concerned with a social
system which has been developing for about four and a half centuries. A
classification and differentiation of roles was desiderated to refract the
various ways in which basic and specialised roles have responded to economic
and social change. It was conjectured hypothetically at the outset of this
enquiry that in the comparatively unchanging society in which the Faculty acts
its roles, some typology of devices might be found of more general relevance
What In fact emerged when the evidence had been collected and analysed
is that one 'device', if it may be so described, Is of overwhelming importance,
namely, the smallness of the group itself. The professional community, its
role-set, the wider (yet limited) community in which members of the profession
pursue family and leisure activities are all munerically small. 'Thus the members
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of the community and of the 'community within a community' can he and are
constantly observed by each other. Social density is high. Pressures of
the outside vrorld. tend to promote role-conflict, but the advocate's community
in large measure avoids this result by rejecting the world, its standards and
general social and economic trends. 'there is no desire to be 'with it' or
ahead of events, as seems to be the reaction, for example, of the high powered
.American corporation or trust lawyer. Such an attitude would be unacceptable
by the norms of Parliament House.
Constant and mutual 'policing' of the group and its members by the
members and bjr their close associates, seems to be the overriding factor in
the control of role-playing and in the apparent absence of role-contamination
in the faculty of Advocates. An American social anthropologist, parodying
television advertising, remarked to the writer at an early stage in her
research 'As far as I can see, the role of the advocate in Scotland is washed
whiter than white.'
After long investigation, extending at different levels of intensity over
twenty years, the writer has observed some grey patches and the bleaching
process which they undergo. . This process appears to be achieved in a way that
Durkheim specifically indicates, and Malinowski by insignt suggests; namely,
through nigh social density and homogeneity of the group leading to
social solidarity and social control beyond what is commonly achieved in the
modern western world. The faculty is not interested In expansion, but in
preservation and perpetuation of its 'organic mystery'. Collectively it does
not question that conservation ana pursuit of its own best interests and norms
also tend to further the best interests of society m general. The institution
functions admirably. Beyond what mignt nave seemed possible before the data
were closely studied, the faculty nasmaintained, its own ideal image, including
control of normative Dehaviour and. role-performance, absence of role-conflict
ana of role-contamination. T'nis iaeal self-image is largely related, to a
world, which through tradition the faculty came to apprehend» and. x'or wnicn it
was admirably suited. In tne 'New Anatomy of Britain' this image is less
relevant. nevertheless, as with tne elite and exclusive regiments of tne
armed rorces and tne foreign Service, so with the faculty of Advocates,
traditional norms of exceptional integrity and service maintain tneir value
in a social setting which in general does not reflect them. DJopxesse oblige,
and the faculty which, though middle class, has inherited aristocratic traditions,
does not by reason of its professional monopoly neglect the obligations wnicn
the faculty construes to be incidental to privilege. The structure of the
faculty still remains essentially eignteenth century, as does tne professional
dress or advocates, and its legal techniques are largely tne product ox and
appropriate to the century which roiiowed.
failure to react with realism ana comprehension to tne social, economic,
scientific and international trends of the modern world seems to characterise
the outlook; ana attitude of tne faculty of today. Its self-image and its
popular image among those equally unaware of the significance of these trends
do not correspond to the image presented to those, within the profession and
outside it, who are capable of a wider view and of a.more penetrating assess¬
ment. It has been observed already that those who hold high positions in
mercantile and industrial life, and vxho are responsible for its national and
international direction, do not regard the faculty of Advocates authoritative
or expert in th^jp matters which concern industry, commerce, finance or the
national economy generally. The days when A&afi Smith could be quoted to the
Scottish Courts to influence judicial decision on economic questions have no
modern counterpart. Though adequate grounding in economics, philosophy and
political theory is required for practice in legal professions elsewhere in
the world, even an amateur grasp cannot he assumed in the case of the modern
Scottish advocate. No longer, as in Cod-churn's time,could the advocates
he regarded as the cultural elite of the Scottish capital. The accidie is
apparent hoth in an attitude to the practice of law, and in a wider context,
where it has resulted in a defensive attitude to inherited privileges and
carrying out of roles.
So far as the practice of the lav/ is concerned, there seems to he a
marked unwillingness to experiment with new ideas or techniques which have heen
discussed or put into operation elsewhere. Thus the main faculty reaction
to the prospect of Britain entering the Common Market - which would have far
ranging legal implicationswas of indifference. No positive harm was
anticipated: there was 110 immediate threat. There was no interest in the
challenge of new economic and political legal facts. Except for a few essential
technical legal treatises, the shelves of the average practising advocate are
meagrely supplied with legal literature. The average advocate possesses f©w
of the 'tools of his trade'. The Bar as the so called 'learned profession'
might be expected to be willing purchasers at least of law books. 'This is no
longer true, and accounts for the fact that Scottish'legal literature is largely
obsolete because of an inadequate market. In South Africa where the legal
system Is isolated and the profession limited in number, book selling flourishes,
Few advocates in Scotland subscribe to or contribute to the learned journals.
Most rely on the facilities of the Advocates' Library which closes at 4 o'clock in
the afternoon or (if they live in the New Town) on the Juridical Library in
Charlotte Square. Now the Faculty is dependent on the Ministry of Works for
a library building and on the statutory right of the Rational Library to receive
gratuitously new books published in Britain for their legal literature. A
recent endeavour to secure the use of the Advocates' Library until 7 p.m. on
weekdays has been refused. Discouraged by certain judges, who are reluctant
to consider citations from modern authors, the Bar itself seems hostile to and
afraid of nexv ideas and to the presentation of basic principles in new or
expanded contexts. Most advocates have been nurtured on one introductory
text book :G-loag and Henderson's Introduction to the Law of Scotland. When
this went out of print an attempt was made to replace it with a less condensed
and dogmatic treatise . This new work, which discussed the law of Scotland
critically and in relation to other legal systems, is virtually unused by the
practising Bar, and very few have troubled to read it before rejecting it.
In general the 'patching of old wine skins' - the issuing of revised editions
of familiar treatises - is preferred to the production of new books.
Legislation has been introduced to set up 'Law Commissioners' in
Scotland and England to modernise the law in harmony with current social and
economic needs. There has been considerable hostility to the idea among
Members of Faculty, and the initiative was entirely from the English side.
When questions of law reform have been considered in'Scotland, the evidence
submitted by the Faculty of Advocates to the La?/ Reform Committee for Scotland
or to special Committees or Commissions has almost invariably been conservative,
and either apathetic or antipathetic to ideas of change.
Little encouragement is given in the Inner House to a deep and scholarly
argument such as the late Lord President Coop .r appreciated. To a large extent,
of course, the cases which have to be argued today lack the intellectual
stimulus of earlier times. The general attitude is that the solution will
"be automatic when the relevant cases are cited as precedents. Seldom do
counsel rely on authorities other than Scottish or English, and increasingly
depend on the latter, since they are more numerous and more modern. Hence
many characteristic and valuable principles of Scots law as a civilian system
have come to be obscured and lost. The late Lord President Cooper, a man of
wide interests as historian and engineer, observed that without attention to
Comparative Law, the Law of Scotland must die. His warning has, on the
whole, fallen on deaf ears. There is very little interest taken by most
members of Faculty in any legal system but their own, and the facts that few
foreign treatises are taken by the Advocates' Library and that few judges or
advocates would have the linguistic skill to master them, increases the isolation
of Scots law and its profession. Paradoxically a lack of interest in the
ethos of Scots law as such is matched, as- has been stressed already frequently,
by the solidarity of the Faculty in maintaining its own prestige and privileges.
Awareness of these matters accompanies a rather parochial satisfaction with
the system as it is, and lack of interest in the world outside.
It would be in the best interests of litigants, notably in the matter
of expense, were jury trial to be dispensed with in civil cases, most of which
could also be dealt with in the Sher^iff Court subject to the right of appeal
to the Court of Session, and we re divorce jurisdiction to be given to the
Sheriff Court. Such alterations in jurisdiction would have grave financial
repercussions on the Faculty and are resisted on account of the indirect
challenge involved to the Faculty's survival as It Is at present. The interests
of the public are only mentioned in casuistic arguments to preserve the
status quo.
Further, the Faculty is consciously or unconsciously afraid of other
professions which have emerged and may seem to challenge its own authority or
prestige. Little use is made in Scotland as in France of experts participa¬
ting in the process of decision, though expert witnesses are frequently examined
and cross examined "by counsel, who lack specialist knowledge, b.efore judges
or juries who are similarly handicapped. In the nineteenth century, there
were relatively few professions, and that of advocate in Scotland was pre¬
eminent. The modern advocate seeks to cling to this inherited prestige, and
is not anxious to yield part of it to the newer professions such as that of
the accountant. For a longer time account has had to he taken of the opinions
of medical experts. The more modern tranches of medical science, such as
psychiatry, are accorded little respect by lawyers especially in criminal
proceedings. Though psychiatry is generally accepted as a perfectly reputable
science, its practitioners will frequently be referred to disparagingly by
the legal profession as 'trickcyclists' or 'head-shrinkers', and an impasse
may result when the psychiatrist cannot explain his 'mystery' in terms of legal
categories.
In conclusion, it must be suggested, not without considerable regret, that
the methods and assumptions of social anthropologists in studying modern
professions seem to have little relevance (if any) to an analysis of the Faculty
of Advocates. More useful clues are provided by the older school of social
anthropologists, who studied small groups in primitive societies. The smallness
and high social density of the Faculty in a wider but yet restricted social
setting and in a small country account for most of its enaracteristics. Its
prestige and influence are largely due to Historic factors and its recruitment
from a limited social class. Many of its leaders are socially 'anglicised',
and even in exercise of professional techniques prefer English text books and
decisions to working out Scottish legal principles. There is a certain
cultural conflict involved in the situation that the 'in group' of the Faculty
of Advocates is largely identified with the London orientated 'establishment'
which regards Scottish institutions and cultural values as parochial. Almost
by accident the Faculty, as pert of the College of Justice, has been protected
by the Union Agreement of 1707, which safeguarded the Scottish legal system
independent from that of England which in most other matters has tended to
engulf Scottish life. Yet the insularity, which, has been characteristic of
the English legal profession in the past, at a time when that of Scotland
was cosmopolitan and orientated towards Europe, is now a characteristic of
the Faculty of Advocates. Now parochial and privileged it is content with,
but also defensive, about its image. It is parochial, not only with regard
to legal ideas and techniques, but also with regard to natural science, social
science - including economics, sociology and politics - and to general culture.
To some extent in enjoyment of monopolistic privileges the Faculty
corresponds to the state?in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, of
the Scottish Universities which had too often failed to adapt themselves to
a changing world, though, as TtDavie has demonstrated, they were more successful
than Oxford and Cambridge at the same period. (Radical reforms vtere made
after a number of .Royal Commissions had reported, though many University
teachers especially those from England consider the present Scottish University
structure still to be anachronistic.J Another general comparison could be
made with the social density and exclusiveness in the eighteenth and early
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nineteenth centuries of the Scottish Burghs, the rights and privileges of
which had teen protected by Article XXI of the Union Agreement. Of these
1
Professor G.S. Pryde has written, 'The town councils of the royal burghs were
self perpetuating todies, answeratle to no one tut themselves and forming a
close oligarchy, while turgess-ship itself was kept within narrow limits ty
the raising of charges exacted from guild brethren, craftsmen and burgesses.'
In short, in the eighteenth century Scotland there were a number of exclusive,
privileged groups, and of these the Faculty of Advocates is virtually the
sole survivor. Its positive contribution to the cultural life of the
community in the past and the activity of its "Whig members in furthering reform
in the early nineteenth century (but not of the Faculty itself), no doubt
safeguarded it in an earlier era of radical reform.
It may be that the Faculty is approaching the end of an epoch, unless
it can adapt itself more to the modern world, reject the devices which ensure
monopoly, and create a new image of itself. Such of its traditional
professional ethics deserves preservation in a new setting if this is possible.
So long as the solidarity of the group is maintained, including the solidarity
of those appointed Law Officers of the Crown, direct attack on the institution
by legislation or Government pressure would encounter formidable obstacles.
Any such attack, moreover, would affront the sentiments of many Scotsmen, of
the middle classes at all events, who have a favourable image of the Faculty,
fostered by the Faculty, as the repository of a unique and indispensible national
tradition. High social density has determined role-control and social solidarity.
It has also operated to preserve the group. Should this solidarity relax,
dissolution of the group would seem imminent. External trends and forces are
not propitious to its survival. The ultimate challenge to the Faculty is not
1. A New History of Scotland, ii, p.189.
the direct impact of social forces to which it refuses to adapt, "but a challenge
to its solidarity by diluting the elements of homogeneity and tradition. This
could happen in three ways. first, there might be fusion of the legal--profession
in Scotland. "Secondly, there might be the infusion of an 'alien' element.
2
As long ago as 18pl Lord Cockburn spoke scathingly and resentfully of Brougham's
project to give English counsel the right of audience in the Scottish courts:
he did not pause to explain the potential jeopardy for a 'protected' profession.
Thirdly, entry to the Common Market or some such European integration would
3involve acceptance of professional mobility among the participating states,
and therefore an even wider possibility of saturation by those who have not been
conditioned by the norms of the Faculty. It is only an apparent paradox that
these challenges are stated in ascending order of probability. The Faculty
is so structured as to contend in the strength of its own solidarity and
complacency against the nearer and more obvious threats. Therefore to convey
a viaticum would be premature. Unique in so many other ways, the Facility of -
Advocates is also unique in its viability as a very small homogeneous group
in a social context for which it was net devised and to which it is reluctant
to adapt.
The interesting features of this conservative unchanging profession are
perhaps less easy to assess sociologically than they are historically. It
seems clear that the function, the role and the normative behaviour is of high
integrit77; and the nature of the group in which the advocate lives and works is
such that a great deal of informal social control is exercised. There is no
real evidence of role-contamination and no real pattern of role-conflict. There
2. Journal jj.i p. 3' Brougham, who had 'passed advocate'( was one of the few
Englishmen to have practised at the Scottish Bar.
3. See p. 10 supra
are deviants -within the group; the fact that their names frequently occurred
in examples of role-breaking or of role-contamination was the first sign the
writer had that deviance rather than a structured pattern of role-breaking
existed. The role of advocate may be outdated. Advocates themselves may be
less a 'learned profession' than they would like to believe. The specific
nature of their role and its preservation through training and through the
customary and close observation and control of their small society is a prevailin
fact. It would indeed be easier to compare them -with the Barotse than with
the Americans.
This institution has acquired no new functions. The scale of its
operations has diminished rather than increased in recent years, its values
have remained the same and there has been no dilution of them. The 'business'
of the advocate has undergone no radical change, there is no competition, the
monopoly persists. If society as a whole is the 1 oer no one appears to be
noticing unduly. The criticisms of 'the lawyer' remain basically as they
have always been. Dean Swift suggested in their heyday that the Bar was 's
society of men bred up in the art of proving that black is white and white is
black, according as they are paid'Bentham declared that 'the duty of an
advocate is to take fees, and in return for these fees to display to the utmost
5
advantage whatsoever falsehoods the solicitor has put into his brief . Even
Boswell felt compelled to ask Dr. Johnson 'whether, as a moralist he did not
think that the practice of the law, in some degree, hurt the nice feeling of
honesty'The public image is most of the time as it has always been. The
ideal image is equally unchanged. The art of the advocate is modelled on the
systems of Cicero or Quintillian for whom 'the true orator must be, above all,
a good man';"^ his task to protect the foremost of our civil liberties - 'The
A. Quoted'from Leo. Page 'First Steps in Advocacy' (1943) p. 15
5. Jeremy Bentham, 'Packing' (1821) p. 48
6. Life of Johnson (revised Birkbeck Hill Ed. 1934) Vol. II p. 47
7„ Quintillian Institutes II xvi. 11
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open administration of justice according to known laws truly interpreted and
8 9fair constructions of evidence'. To quote Sir Randall again. 'I take
pride that, in Scotland, some of our firmest champions of truth, honour, and
liberty have been trained in the law' - men like the draftsman of the famous
Declaration of Arbroath in 1320, who put his own soul into these words which
he borrowed from Sallust. ^ 'For we fight not for glory nor riches nor honours,
but only for that liberty which no true man relinquishes but with his life'.
The ideal is unchanged. The real image of the Scottish advocate is perhaps
less noble than this expression of the fourteenth century which in fact
preceded by more than two eenturies the establishment of the Faculty. If their
role in the legal system were to be examined in the 1960s it might be found to
be less necessary than is supposed. And yet, were they to disappear society




Hallam, Constitutional History, Yol. 1 p. 231
James Randall Philip, op. cit surra at p0 2.
Sallust. Bellum Catalinae, xxxiii.
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APPENDIX A1
(Extracted from T.B. Smith, British Justice: The Scottish Contribution)..
CIVIL COURTS
Court of Session
By the early nineteenth century the need to improve the organisation and
procedure of the Scottish courts was generally accepted; but the proposals for
reform suggested by a succession of Select Committees and Royal Commissions,
disclose little agreement as to the most expedient solutions. Empiricism and at
times prejudice determined the course of certain earlier legislative changes, while
others have proved wise and far-sighted.
Reorganisation of the Court of Session
First, we may note that the Court of Session, for the conduct of normal
business, lost its unitary character. After various experiments the organisation
(which still operates) was adopted of dividing the court into an Inner House of two
permanent chambers of Divisions, and an Outer House in which the eight junior judges
sit singly as Permanent Lords Ordinary - judges of first instance. The First Division
of the Inner House is presided over by the Lord President, and in the Chair of the
Second Division is the Lord Justice-Clerk. Unlike the system of judicial promotion
in England, a Lord Ordinary is promoted to the Inner House according to seniority
of appointment, while vacancies in the offices of Lord President and Lord Justice-
Clerk are usually filled by former law officers. Each Division (comprising four
judges, but with a quorum of three) exercises both an original and an appellate
1. See p;lQ2 supra.
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jurisdiction, though its work is mainly appellate. The appellate jurisdiction of
the Divisions comprises appeals from the Lords Ordinary and from the Sheriff Courts.
The original, unitary character of the Court of Session has, however, survived
for certain important purposes. Questions of special difficulty or importance may
be argued before five judges or seven judges or before the whole court. Moreover,
a Lord Ordinary may report a case of difficulty, without deciding it himself, in
order to have an authoritative ruling. Though strictly, a decision by one Division
may not be a binding precedent except for single judges; in fact choice between
conflicting precedents, or the over-ruling of an unsound precedent, is usually
achieved by convening a court of seven judges - or if necessary, all sixteen - who
could overrule any precedent other than that of the House of Lords. This is a very
convenient device, and results from the theory that in a collegiate court the majority
of judges cannot be bound by a minority, regarding law or fact. The converse
solution has been reached by the Court of Appeal in England.
Consolidation of the Central Courts
The next development to be noted is the merging during the nineteenth century
of other central civil courts - over which there had previously been appellate
jurisdiction - into the Court of Session itself. There was, of course, no question
as in England of need to fuse law and equity - since these had never been separated
in Scottish practice. (Lord Eldon, in the era described in Bleak House, concluded -
sombre thought - that until a division between law and equity had been achieved in
Scotland, the House of Lords could not deal properly with Scottish appeals.
Fortunately, on this point at least he was restrained)» The Court of Session
by a succession of reorganising statutes absorbed the higher Commissary Court, the
civil jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, the Court of Exchequer and the Jury
Court - this last, itself a creature of the nineteenth century. In 1836 the Commissary
Court was suppressed; and so thereafter consistorial matters such as marriage and
divorce and also most questions of status generally have been within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Session - though the Sheriffs have concurrent jurisdiction
regarding judicial separation aid custody of children. The Scottish Court of
Admiralty - administering a law in which Scotsmen had given the lead to Britain -
succumbed to the jealousy of three rivals. In 1825 by a particularly offensive
example of the tendency of certain influential interests to regard the English courts
as imperial and the Scottish as local and limited, jurisdiction in prize was taken
from the Scottish court, and vested solely in the High Court of Admiralty of England.
In 1827 the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the Scottish Admiralty Court was
distributed between the Court of Session, the High Court of Justiciary and the
Sheriffs. The Scottish Court of Exchequer set up after the Union to deal with
revenue questions was absorbed into the Court of Session in I856, but Exchequer
jurisdiction is still subject to certain specialties due to the English origin of
many matters which concern it.
The Legal Profession
A point which would surprise the American and English observer in Scotland is
the lack of specialisation on the Bench and at the Bar. , Though some counsel are
particularly sought after in certain types of case, none can specialise in one field
exclusively. This has merits and disadvantages. (One advantage is that a judge on
appointment has wide general experience, while among the disadvantages may be counted
the fact that in very technical branches of law such as patent law, Scotland cannot
produce a Stafford Cripps. The leading experts in fields such as company law,
taxation and financial trusts may be found among specialists in firms of solicitors).
For the very great majority of entrants to the legal profession, advocates and
and solicitors, the professional qualification is a university degree in law - which
facilitates transfer from one branch to the other, if, for example, a solicitor
wishes eventually to specialise in advocacy. Moreover, there is no atmosphere of
stratification between the two branches. Members of the Faculty of Advocates alone
(the Scottish Bar) have right of audience in the superior courts, tut solicitors may
plead in the Sheriff Courts which have very considerable jurisdiction. Advocates
who practise in the Parliament House have an address in the New Town of Edinburgh
and may not combine in partnership. Solicitors, on the other hand, normally practise
in partnership. Recruitment for the practice of law in Scotland is democratic;
but, particularly since the Union, those who maintain the legal heritage of Scotland -
especially in the Parliament House - have become a professional aristocracy by
function.
The Sheriff Court
I must stress in particular the importance of the Sheriff Court in Scotland
today - and contrast the role of the Sheriff with the very different arrangements
made in England for the administration of justice outside the Supreme Courts. After
the abolition of the hereditaiy sheriffdoms in March, 1748, the Sheriffs Depute were
paid from public funds. These Deputes were advocates practising in Edinburgh, but
were required to reside in their sheriffdoms for four months in the year - a duty
which they frequently shirked when in conflicts! with the claims of practice in the
courts. They were authorised to appoint substitutes to act in their absence (whose
salaries after 1787 were paid by the Crown). These substitutes might be men with
no adequate legal experience, and therefore any matter of consequence was reported
to the Sheriff Depute for decisioh. Thus Walter Scott as Sheriff Depute of Selkirk
2
handled much more judicial work himself than most writers have realised. In 1838
2. J. Aikman Smith, "The Great Shirra", The Scotsman; Jan. 12, 1959«
Sheriffs Depute (other than those appointed to Edinburgh and G-lasgow, which are full-
time appointments) were released from the duty of residence in their sheriffdoms,
while a series of statutes increased greatly the status of, and qualifications
required of, Sheriffs Substitute. They were required to be advocates or solicitors
of at least five years' standing; they were appointed and remunerated by the Crown,
and thus became the territorial judges of Scotland. No titular Sheriffs can now
be appointed. (The Sheriffs Depute, now generally known as Sheriffs Principal,are
thus today not in fact depute to anyone, while the designation Sheriffs Substitute
is equally misleading, since they are not in fact substitutes for anyone). Both
categories are addressed on the Bench as "My Lord" and off the Bench as "Sheriff".
Though in civil causes an appeal lies from the interlocutor of a Sheriff
Substitute to the Sheriff Principal, it is equally competent for a litigant to
appeal direct to the Court of Session. The original jurisdiction of Sheriffs
Principal and Substitute is the same. By amalgamations of the less populous counties
the number of sheriffdoms has been reduced to twelve. To each a Sheriff Principal,
a senior member of the faculty of Advocates, is appointed, while one or more Sub¬
stitutes reside in each sheriffdom, and administer justice in the principal towns.
There are about fifty such judges. As a court of original jurisdiction in civil
causes the Sheriff Court has, in general, concurrent jurisdiction (without monetary
limitation) with the Outer House of the Court of Session.. A Sheriff can grant
interdict or decree specific implement; he can deal with judicial separation, custody
and aliment. Other actions involving status, however, such as declarator of marriage,
divorce and bastardy are reserved to the Court of Session, as are actions for
setting up or setting aside documents and certain company matters.
CRIMINAL COURTS
High Court of Justiciary
While I think that criminal justice in Scotland is very fairly and efficiently
administered today, the system is not necessarily suitable for export. Much
depends on certain conventions which have developed within the Crown Office and by
the etiquette of a small profession. Let us, however, just look very briefly at
the organisation of courts of criminal jurisdiction in Scotland today. The High
Court of Justiciary is Scotland's supreme criminal court, exercising both original and
appellate jurisdiction. Since 1887 all Senators of the College of Justice - that
is sixteen judges - are by virtue of their appointments also Lords Commissioners of
Justiciary. They may sit in Edinburgh or go on circuit to the various towns in
Scotland to try the gravest crimes. (There are four circuits, North, West, South,
and Home). As a rule one judge only sits at the trial of an accused, but in complicated
cases two or even three judges may sit. Moreover, if some question of exceptional
difficulty emerges at a trial, the presiding judge may certify the case for the
opinion of the whole court. Fundamentally the court is a collegiate body. Any
matter involving the nobile officium or "criminal equity" of the High Court must be
dealt with by a Bench of judges, and not by one alone. If the traditional power
remains to declare a new crime sui generis, or to consider the legal validity of a
doubtful defence, such power can only be exercised in this way. Thus in Sugden^
the whole court sat to determine whether the rule of Roman law, that crimes could
not be prosecuted after twenty years from the date of wrongdoing, was part of the law
of Scotland. In Kirkwood^ sentencing policy in dealing with cases of diminished
responsibility was considered by all the judges.
Though the High Court has always exercised control over criminal proceedings
3. 1934 J.C. 103.
4. 1939 J.C. 36.
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in the lower courts, it was not until the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act
came into force that there was jurisdiction to hear appeals from conviction
and/or sentence after trial on indictment. In fact, Oscar Slater, who in
1909 had been found guilty of murder, had his conviction quashed in 1928 af-
5ter completing a life sentence. It is largely as a result of this appellate
jurisdiction that the criminal law of Scotland is developed in modern times,
since the opinions of single judges do not hind their brethren. Decision be¬
tween conflicting precedents pronounced by quorums may be achieved by conven¬
ing a Full Bench - usually of five or seven judges. It is a moot point whe¬
ther the whole Court could repudiate an earlier precedent by the Whole Court -
6but^is probably entitled so to do.
Sheriff Court (criminal) and Inferior Courts
The Sheriff has long exercised a very wide criminal jurisdiction indeed,
though he may not try certain crimes such as murder, attempt to murder, rape
or incest. His powers of punishment are, however, limited. If he is exer¬
cising solemn jurisdiction - when the accused is tried by a jury of 15 - after
conviction the Sheriff himself can generally impose no heavier punishment than
two years' imprisonment. On the other hand, he may remit the accused to the
High Court for sentence; and this procedure is frequently adopted these days
to secure speedy trial. If the Sheriff is exercising summary jurisdiction he
sits alone, and, unless statute has prescribed a heavier penalty, cannot nor¬
mally impose a sentence of more than three months' imprisonment. His decision
may be appealed by way of stated case.
5« Slater, 1928 J.C. 94
6. T.B. Smith, Doctrines of Judicial Precedent in Scots law, p.30
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The Sheriff's criminal jurisdiction is universal, subject to certain
crimes being reserved to the High Court. Other inferior courts, however,
only have such jurisdictions as is conferred on them by statute or necessary
implication. Moreover, the Sheriff has concurrent jurisdiction with every
other court within his sheriffdom.
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APPENDIX B
Tiie painting of the Scottish Bench and Bar in I89O by Skeoch Curn-
ming belongs to the Faculty of Advocates and hangs in Parliament House. A
reproduction is included in the present thesis to illustrate some of the points
made in the text. The Lord President has the Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald
(Lord Kingsburgh) on his right and the other judges sit alternately left and
right in order of seniority of appointment. A 'Whole Court* of the High Court
of Justiciary would have the same judges in criminal scarlet robes. At the
time when Lord President Inglis presided there was no roll of Queen's Counsel;
though this honour (as appears from the picture) was granted to the Lord Ad¬
vocate, Solicitor General and Dean of Faculty. In this illustration thirteen
judges make up the 'Whole Court': today the number is sixteen. It will be
observed that the Lord Advocate (addressing the Court) sits within the Bar
and across the table from him sits the Solicitor General with the Principal
Clerk of Session immediately below the Lord President. Other Advocates sit
(unlike the English practice) on Counsel^ bench, with the Dean of Faculty in
the middle of the Bar. Though the style of white tie has altered with the
change in men's formal neckwear generally, the formalised dress worn by Ad¬
vocates in 1890 is as today, and the different dress of 'silks' and those who
have not been granted this rank and dignity can be seen in the picture.
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APPENDIX C
M EXCURSUS QgT SOCIETY. LAW MP MORALITY
The upholding and enforcement of morality or of a morality in Western
Europe has been undertaken in past centuries by the law and by the Church
with a certain overlapping of function. Indeed it has been noted that in
most societies law and religion have often been closely linked; religious
sanctions frequently being used to enforce social control. Sir Henry Maine,
though he did not present a religious theory of law in general (as is. sometimes
supposed) did, under the rubric 'Wrongs and Sins'} point out the clear inter¬
action of law and religion in primitive societies. 'Torts then are copiously
enlarged upon in primitive jurisprudence. It must be added that Sins are
known to it also ... non-Christian bodies of archaic law entail penal consequences
on certain classes of acts and on certain classes of omissions, as being
violations of divine jurispurdence and commands ... The conception of offence
against Sod produced the first class of ordinances (those punishing sins);
the conception of offence against one's neighbour produced the second (those
punishing torts)'. In countries such as Switzerland, Holland and Scotland
which adopted a Calvinist theocracy at the Reformation, the citizen was in
effect subjected to two systems of jurisdiction - one lay, the other ecclesiast¬
ical. With the decline of ecclesiastical authority in Britain there have
been indications recently that the lav/ may be stretched to enforce a morality
which formerly primarily concerned the Church. The relationship between law,
the Church and morality is a matter of controversy among lawyers, theologians
and social anthropologists.
1. Ancient Law, p. 393
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In Western Europe the association between Church and Law has been very-
close - much more so than in Eastern Europe. Prom the Fathers of the Church
to modern times the Roman Catholic Church has used terminology- and concepts
taken from jurisprudence. These include trial, judgment, condemnation,
punishment and retribution. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the
Church did much to preserve the Soman law. Indeed, in the Barbarian kingdoms
where justice was administered, not nationally but on the basis of personal
status, the Church as an institution continued to live under the Roman law,
and gradually built up a legal system of its own, the Canon law, which was largely
a moralised version of Roman law. Not only was the law of the Church concerned
with the internal forum - matters of sin and conscience - but in mediaeval
Europe she claimed jurisdiction generally over certain civil matters and also
imposed sanctions on certain conduct such as incest, bigamy, sodomy, adultery,
fornication, blasphemy, heresy and usury, which are now dealt with or tolerated
by the civil power. In Scotland where a permanent centralised judiciary evolved
late, church lawyers played an important part up to the Reformation. As T.B.
2
Smith has put it in his Studies Critical and Comparative 'Unlike the position
in England very considerable jurisdiction was conceded in Scotland to the
ecclesiastical courts before the Reformation and their successors, the Commissaries
up to the nineteenth century.' Moreover, a criminal indictment might formerly
be laid in Scotland on the grounds that conduct offended against the Canon law.
In Smith's book and in other writing he has traced the influence of leading
churchmen on Scottish legal institutions. Not unnaturally Catholic concepts of
morality permeated the administration of justice in local and central courts,
though ecclesiastical lawyers were bitterly satirised by men such as Robert
Henryson . in his fifteenth century Fable of the Wolf and the Lamb."'' on charges
2, pp. 36-7
3. Cosmo Innes Scotch Legal Antiquities - Appendix
of avarice, oppression and venality.
In pre-Refo rmation times the law in Scotland was on the whole content
to leave the disciplining of morals to the Church arid to the confessional in
cases where the lapse from the accepted code caused 110 great harm to others.
This did not satisfy the Reformers. By legislation they struck at gambling,
drinking, fornication, sloth and adultery in particular. Savage penalties,
directed against those who could not or would not find work, authorised What
L
was in effect forced serfdom on a large section of the Scottish people.
'Notour' i.e. manifest adultery 'became a capital crime. Though divorce for
adultery was allowed by the Reformers, this remedy was envisaged as a punish¬
ment for crime, and, lest love might be fulfilled in consequence, it was
specifically enacted in 1592 (and only expressly repealed in 1964) that all
marriages between divorced persons and their declared paramours should be
unlawful and that their children should be excluded from all rights in succession.
The Reformers' morality however was less sensitive in the economic field.
5
Where the Church of Borne had forbidden usury, Scots law after the Reformation
permitted not only interest but also penal stipulations to compel performance
of obligations. It is unnecessary to develop the implications regarding religion
and the rise of capitalism drawn by writers such as Weber and Tawney, and it may
be permissible to quote the late Lord President Cooper:^ 'There is no legal
system of the period which had to devote so much attention for so long a time
to the frustration of chicanery as Scots law had to do in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and I wish John Knox had told us why.' Though the
theme of Weber's study The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism^ is
1+. T.B. Smith 'Master and Servant' in Introduction to Scottish Legal History
- (Stair Soc. Vol. 20)
5. Por discussion see Stephens History of English Criminal Law iii esp. pp. 19il+> 19"
8 'for a considerable time usury was regarded all over Europe as an inferior
pursuit. This view was attacked at the Reformation'. Usury was an ecclesiastical
offence. See also Smith Short Commentary on the Laws of Scotland pp. 857-8.
6. Selected Papers pp. 288-9
7. Max Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (trans. Talcott
parsons p. 37)
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well-known, the following quotation may "be less so: 'The rule of Calvinism ..
as it was enforced in the sixteenth century in Beneva and in Scotland, at the
turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in large parts of the Netherlands,
in the seventeenth century in New England, and for a time in England itself,
would be for us the most absolutely unbearable form of ecclesiastical control
of the individual which could possibly exist. That was exactly what large
numbers of the old commercial aristocracy of those times in Geneva as well as
in Holland and England, felt about it. And what the reformers complained of in
those areas of high economic-development was not too much supervision of life
on the part of the Church, but too little. Now how does it happen that at that
time those countries which were most advanced economically, and within them
the rising bourgeois middle classes, not only failed to resist this unexampled
tyranny of Puritanism, but even developed a haoism in its defence? For
bourgeois classes have seldom before and never since displayed heroism. It was
'The last of our heroism' as Carlyle, not without reason, has said.'
Though much private morality came directly within the province of the
criminal courts, under Calvinist theocracy the Kirk session and other legally
recognised church courts also exercised sanctions which in a rural society may
well have been more oppressive and humiliating tha . the pains of the law. This
more diffuse social control exercised by means of such sanctions as ostracism,
ridicule and gossip have powerful effect in all social systems. It is evident
from the mission of Jeanie Deans to save her sister Effie, described in Scott's
The Heart of Midlothian, that it is the saving of 'an honest house from dishonour',
the knowledge of the social shame more than the fear that Effie may be hanged, that
sours Jeanie on Effie's behalf. This public shame of the 'cuttystool' or of
'standing in the Kirk' was a strong sanction in Calvinist Scotland. (The sanction
27'+.
survived in the North of Scotland within the experience of middle-aged people).
The consequence of an attempt to '"brazen out' the punishment can be found in
Q
Calt's .Annals of the Parish where Nichol Snipe 'a graceless reprobate' being
'obligated to stand in the Kirk ... came with two coats, one buttoned behind
him and another buttoned before him, and two wigs of my lord's (his master's)...
the one over his face, and the other the right way and he stood with his
face to the church wall. When I saw him from the poaLpit, I said to him, "Nichol,
you must turn your face towards me?." At which he turned round, to be sure, but
there he presented the same show as his back... I... cried out with a voice of
anger, "Nichol, NicholI If ye had been a' back ye wouldna hae been here this
day" - which had such an effect on the whole congregation that the poor fellow
'
suffered afterwards more derision than if I had rebuked him in the manner
prescribed by the Session.' The described sequel to the minister's devastating
rebuke has particular significance.
The evil alliance between church and state in the persecution of witch¬
craft was largely concerned with sexual matters as well as with fear. Though
this persecution was in effect initiated by the Holy Inquisition, its full horror
was only realised in the Calvinist countries of Scotland, Switzerland, and
Holland, and under the English puritans on both sides of the Atlantic, where of
course the law was also used as an engine to enforce morality in private life.
The writer heard of at least one woman who was sentenced to prison in the State
of Massachusetts for adultery in 1962. Though the witch hunts of the twentieth
century have a political drive, recent events have shown that sexual morality
may well be invoked to set on the pursuit.
8. Blackwood Ed. I, p. 42-3
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The doctrine of desuetude of Statute Law, changes in social attitudes
and the reduced authority of the Church - reduced not only in severity but
also and particularly in the numbers who accept it - have eroded much of the
old puritan legislation in Scotland. On the other hand, most of the Scottish
Bench and many of the leaders of the Bar from which it is recruited are devout
and faithful churchmen and accept the traditional morality.- It may be
questioned how far the law is prepared to go in enforcing that morality when
the authority of the Churches has declined. In considering this question it
may be useful to take also into account the approach of English lawyers to
comparable problems, in particular because the current trend in England seems
to be that the judges favour and the jurists reject the right to use the law
to enforce a particular morality in matters where harm is not occasioned to
others.
first, it may be stated as obvious that any given society has its morality
and an interest to ensure that members of that society shall conform to it.
Various sanctions are available, ranging from legal processes to public disapproval
or ridicule. Next, though in a modern Western State much law is regulatory in
character, the core of the criminal law is concerned with harmful acts which
are morally repugnant to the society. Thus morality has taken a great part in
shaping the criminal law. This-is not to ssy, however, that their spheres
necessarily do or should coincide. They do overlap.
To what extent are the judges in Scotland free to increase the overlap?
In the past the High Court of Justiciary has claimed an inherent power to declare
new crimes if the act alleged was in their opinion grossly immoral and mischievous;
and the leading treatise, Hume's Commentaries on the Law of Scotland in Matters
276.
9
Criminal published in the early nineteenth Century clearly supports that
vie?/. However, by 1835 ^Lord Cockburn, dissenting, expressed the view in a
case concerning a gaming house, that, though the courts could punish new methods
of committing recognised crimes, extension of the categories of crimes were the
province of Parliament. This is the view which in the opinion of T.B. Smith
at least has tended to prevail, though in his Short Commentary on the Law
of Scotland he deals with the issue in somewhat Delphic fashion.It is not
for the present writer to assess what the law is,.but she may record what the
12
lawyers suggest It is. Lord Walker has stressed the importance of the
13
declaratory power in developing the" law, and Mr. W.A. Elliott Q.C. notes that
it has never been expressly renounced. Professor Smith, who is not notoriously
conservative or orthodox in his opinions, concludes"^1" 'While there is no
obvious objection to defining certain crimes today according to broad principles,
some categorising is necessary and it may be observed that Hume's wide language
states why certain acts were treated as crimes and does not provide a definition
of criminal conduct. Clearly not all lying, extra-marital sexual activity or
hostility to the Christian ethics which affects third parties could or should
15
be accounted criminal today.' Moreover, he adopts the view of Turpin that
without the principle of legality we should have what Donnedieu de Vakres calls
a 'justice de circonstance abandonnee a 1'influence des passions indlviduelles'.
He names a case in 1934"^ where the views of Iiume were quoted In convicting for
9. i, p. 12
-'-O» G-reenhuff (1838) 2 Swin. 236
11. pp. 124, 131
12. 'The Growth of the Criminal Law' (1958) Jur. Rev. 230
13. Nulla Poena Sine Lege (1956) Jur. Rev. 22
14. op. cit. p. 28
15. (1961) Camb. L. J. 146.
16. McLauchlan v. Boyd 1934 J.C. 19
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lewd and libidinous conduct of a kind which had never been prosecuted
before. Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison, however, refused in 1937 to extend
the criminal law to punish the supplying of abortifacient drugs to a woman who,
contrary to the belief of the accused, was not pregnant. He observed"^
'It may be reprehensible conduct, it may be injurious to private and public
morality, it may be conduct which ought to be criminal conduct, but that will
not make it a crime by the law of Scotland.' Smith has also drawn attention
to the very wide construction given recently to the offence of breach of the
peace in certain cases involving indecency, but concludes that the limit
has been reached. Rightly or wrongly, he suggests that the Scottish criminal
courts will not assume the power to punish infringements of the traditional
social morality of Scotland beyond the limits already established. Certainly
in Scotland the Lord Advocate refused to prosecute or to concur in a private
prosecution of the publisher of Lady Chatterley's Lover and it was a
Scottish judge alone who dissented in the now celebrated Ladies' Directory
Case, when it was appealed from the English Court of Criminal Appeal to the
19
House of Lords. In Shaw v. the P.P.P.. Lord Reid stressed 'Notoriously
there are wide difference of opinion today as to how far the law ought to punish
immoral acts which are not done in the face of the public. Parliament is the
proper place and I am firmly of the opinion the only proper place to settle
that. "When there is sufficient support from public opinion Parliament does
not hesitate to intervene. Where Parliament fears to tread it is not for the
courts to rush in.' .
English judges seem to have taken a very different view and in Shaw's
Case in particiilar to have assumed the role of custodians of morality generally
17. 1937 J.C. 41 at pp. 45-6
18. McBain v. Crichton 1961 J.C. 25. The Lord Advocate had directed that no
action should be taken in respect of this book except by prosecutors under
his control. No such direction was given in the case of 'Fanny Hill', and
a successful prosecution was brought xn a burgh court - 'Scotsman' Oct. 2prd 1964
!9. Shaw v. D.P.P* (1962) A.C. 220 at p. 275
278.
by exercising the sanctions of the criminal law. Above all, they seem
concerned with the traditional pattern of sexual morality in personal relation¬
ships and in published matter. Within recent years it has been held in England,
that though the purposes of the Street Offences Act was presumably to remove
the nuisance of prostitution from the streets of London, women who from their
rooms attracted the attention of men in the street were committing an offence.
Again it has been held that if a woman supplies for a consideration sexual
gratification short of intercourse, this constitutes prostitution; and the
catetories could be extended further. However, the main issues centre round
two cases - the prosecution which failed of the publishers of Lady Chatterley's
20 21
Lover under the Obscene Publications Act 1961, and Shaw v. D.P.P . In
'his Reith Lecture in 1961 Censors, Lord Radcliffe concluded that the dangers
confronting freedome of expression in literature and art generally la^r in the
future in the anonymous censors who controlled the mass media rather than in
officaldom. He raised the question as to whether the law which punishes
obscene publications is to go the same way in the twentieth century as the law
governing seditious and blasphemous libel -went in the preceding century.
On the other hand, Professor H.L.A. Hart of Oxford, in his recent book
Law, Liberty and Morality, has taken a less optimistic view of legal censorship.
Indeed, he suggests that by invoking the peculiarly English doctrine of conspiracy
the emancipating provisions of the Obscene Publications Act could have been
evaded and conviction of the publishers of Lawrence's works secured. Hart
is no narrow legalist. He recognises that law exists for society and not society
for law. He recognises the relevance in the context of law and morality both
22
of anthropology and psychology. Por instance he notes 'If in our own day




the overwhelming moral majority has become divided or hesitant over many
issues of sexual morality, the main catalysts have been matters to which the
free discussion of sexual morals in the light of discoveries of anthropology
and psychology have dram attention.' To the question; 'Is the fact that
certain conduct is by common standards immoral sufficient to justify making
that conduct punishable by law?' 'Is It morally permissible to enforce morality
as such?' 'Ought immorality as such to be a crime?' He answers in effect 'no' -
rebutting the contrary opinions of Sir Janes Fitx-James Stephens and Lord Devlin
and attscking the decision of the House of Lords in Shaw v. P.P.P. Stephens
in the nineteenth century concluded that In a society which is marked by a con¬
siderable degree of moral solidarity, legal means should be used to enforce
morality as such. The law should be^ 'A persecution of the grosser forms
of vice', whether or not these Involved harm for others. Lord Devlin in
his new celebrated Maccabacan Lecture The Enforcement of Morals delivered
before the British Academy in 1959 apparently considered that the breach of
a moral principle, albeit in private, was an offence against and endangered
society as a whole. Consequently society should use the lav? to safeguard its
own existence^1" 'But the true principle is that the law exists for the protection
of society. It does not discharge its function by protecting the individual
from injury, annoyance, corruption and exploitation. The law.must protect
also the community of ideas, political and moral, without which people cannot
live together. Society cannot Ignore the morality of the Individual any more
than It can his loyalty'. These words applied to private acts of adults are
very sweeping. The recent high water nark of judicial ..intervention into the
moral field, Is however, to be found in the speeches delivered in the House of'
23.
24.
Liberty Equality Fraternity p. 162
Proceedings of the British Academy (1959) p. M-9
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Lords in the Ladies' Directory Case.
The essential facts in that case were that the accused had composed and
had published a Directory containing the names and addresses of prestitutes
the nude photographs of some of them, and a code indicating certain services
which they made available. The prosecution was founded on three counts, of
which the third alone is of importance in the present discussion, namely,
'Conspiring to corrupt public morals by means of the Ladies Directory'; all
the judges, with the exception of Lord Jteid, supported the conviction on this
26
ground. Lord Simonds observed 'then Lord Mansfield, speaking long after
the Star Chamber had been abolished, said that the Court of King's Bench vtas
the cuatos rnoruni of the people, he was asserting as I now assert that there is
in that court a residual power where no statute has yet intervened to supersede
the common law, to superintend those offences which are prejudicial to the
public welfare.' If this view is to be pressed to its logical extreme, the
courts In England will have assumed the full powers of a puritan theocracy,
punishing infringements of a moral code which, however venerated by senior
judges, in fact no longer represents the standards of their grandchildren.
Morality in Western society as in any society is not static but emergent, nor
is it likely that fear of legal sanctions will check the evolution of new
patterns. At present it seems probaHaLe that In sexual and other matters there
may be a number of mutually tolerant moralities, and that, In the views of
many, the deprivation of liberty of action and the condemnation of sincerely
held deviations from traditional patterns may Itself infringe basic principles
of morality."
25. Shaw v. D.P.P. sun. cit. See also A.L. G-oodhart 'The Shaw Case;'The Law
and Public Morals' (1961) 77 LQ.R560. In this article the author also
discusses R. V. Quinn (1961) 3 Y/LR^'in which the proprieter of a private club
was held guilty of keeping a 'disorderly house' by giving 'indecent' performances
26. at p. 26fc>
It is impossible, for example, to scrutinise in detail the inter-relation
of legal, religious, and social considerations in determining the divorce laws
27of Britain at the present time. Professor O.R. McGregor in his paper "x'he
Morton Commission: A Commentary' has criticised sharply and in detail the
Report of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce. The judge who presided
and the majority of the Commission, as McGregor stresses, disregarded alike
the inconsistencies of their attitude to the 'matrimonial o fence' and the
possible assistance which they couH. have derived from sociological research.
28
Sociological evidence was little stressed or indeed given. In England "The
obsession of mediaeval Christianity with the sinfulness of sex persisted through
later centuries and determined the character of the civil law of divorce'. This
obsessi n is reflected still in the Morton Report. The influence of the Church
of England, which claims the allegiance of a minority of the population, seems
to be particularly strong In those legal circles which administer the English
laws of divorce. Professor McGregor described the evidence to the Commission
29
of Mr. J.E.S. Simon, Q.C. a leading divorce practitioner, as commanding 'the
respect that would be accorded to the views of a teetotal publican on the evils
of drink'. Nevertheless, Sir Jocelyn is now President of the Probate Divorce
and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. Though McGregor did not
discuss, except incidentally, the attitude of Scottish judges to divorce, he
recognised the more commonsense attitude of Lord Keith and might have added
that another Scottish advocate, the present Lord Walker, in his Note of Dissent
advocated a complete rejection of the doctrine of matrimonial offence. Never¬
theless divorce law reform for Scotland seemingly can only move at the rate
27. (195&) 7 Brit. J. of Soc. 171
2b. Ibid. 184
29. ibid, note 56.
permitted "by the Anglican establishment in London which is powerful "both in
administering and conserving English Divorce Lav;.
In conclusion it is perhaps the wiser course to say that the law in
England has so far been stretched much fuhther than that of Scotland to regulate
private morality. Nevertheless in Scotland there is a tendency to give wide
interpretation to offences where sexual moralitjr is involved. Moreover, though
the phenomenon is not novel, judges in Scotland may be somewhat prone to pass
moral judgments in situations where a decision in law is all that their duty
requires. There ha% for example, been some criticism of Lord Hheatley's
lengthy judgment in the Argyll divorce.^0 Some of this criticism is not
justified, since His Lordship had to enter into reasons for believing or dis~
31
believing witnesses and for concluding that persons had in fact availed
themselves of opportunities for adultery. To that extent some plain speaking
was unavoidable. Nevertheless one who is not a lawyer might conclude that
Lord Hheatley's comments on certain persons involved were to some extent 'giving
them their characters' and that to appear before the Court of Session today is
to risk some of the kind of censure which the sinner suffered when haled before
the Kirk Sessions in former days. Lawyers in Britain emulate at times not only
the role of the priest of justice but also that of the Old Testament prophet
In the course of an after luncheon speech to the National Union of Journalists
Lord Lheatley gave his views on the position of a judge in society. He is
32
reported as follows 'If people do embarrassing things which bring them into
court, then they cannot complain if they are embarrassed, because the court is
there to ascertain the truth and the truth may be embarrassing... A judge does
not court publicity but by the very nature of his job he is likely to attract it.
He will exercise discretion whenever it is possible but sometimes it is impossible
30. 'Scotsman' May 15th? 1963
31. Some cross examination ostensibly directed as to credibility was given wider
scope than a laywoman would consider necessary to test truth.
32. 'Sunday Hail' April 5th, 196ip ' *
toaavoid the embarrassment to which I have referred.1 Lord T/heatley observed
that by the Judicial Proceedings (Regulations of Reports) Act 1926, the prose
are prevented from reproducing the evidence given in certain civil cases,but
they may reproduce and print the judgments. He continued 'in my view the
reproduction of salacious evidence is neither necessary nor desirable in the
public interest. I would extend the provisions of the Act even further... I
regard it as quite anamalous that the Act should veto the reproduction of the
evidence and allow the judgment to be reproduced by the newspapers, because, as
I ha,ve explained, the judgment has to contain a rehearsal of the evidence, an
appraisal of the witnesses, and has to deal with the character of witnesses ...
I would cancel out the contradiction by vetoing the judgment also in the approp¬
riate case.'
Lord Devlin's theme in his Haccabacan Lecture was concerned with the
question of when law should reinforce morality. Professor A.H. Campbell, of
the Law Faculty of Edinburgh University, is to deliver a lecture in the same
series in 1965. It Is anticipated that he will discuss in the course of his
paper 'Obligation and Obedience to Law' moral reasons for refusing to observe
the law. The classical example was appropriately of a woman. Antigone's
dilemma was one that often occurs in a society of any comphxity. She believed
in the norms, the customary laws of her people regarding burial of the dead, and
was prepared to die to support her moral duty to bury her brother'. Creon knew
another law, one of political necessity, and was prepared that Antigone should
die rather than that the authority he represented should be overthrown. Perhaps
every societjr known to us in history has held these paradoxical ideas of what
is 'lawful'. It seems clear that at any given time two or more widely believed
and supported views of right,, behaviour may exist. Our own society is no
different in this respect and our lawyers.like those in ffestem society in
general, are not philosophers. They are rather the Oreons of our time,
trained in a system that integrates the ideas of law and morality within a
strictly institutionalised framework. G-ibbon, reflecting on Roman society
which has so profoundly influenced all Western ideas of law.might have a last
word: 'The various modes of worship, which prevailed in the Roman World,' were
all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally
false'; and by the magistrate as equally useful.' It seems probable that the
magistracy and the lawyers will always have to conserve what they see to be
the popular mores and to deny either philosophy or avant garde behaviour.
33. Decline and Fall of the Roman Bmpire Ch. 2.
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